About 700,000 Afghans Have Lost Their Jobs Since Taliban Takeover, Says UN Report

1 min read

An estimated 700,000 people have lost their jobs in Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover in August 2021, “with the agriculture, civil service, and construction sectors the most severely affected,” according to the latest report by the UN special rapporteur to Afghanistan.

The report, which covers developments in the country between July and December 2022, stated that around two-thirds of households in Afghanistan have acknowledged “difficulties in meeting basic food and non-food needs.”

“[M]assive job losses, business closures, and the reluctance of foreign investors to engage in the [country’s] economy” have had catastrophic impacts on the lives of millions of Afghans, the report said.

Afghanistan’s worsening economic decline—which stood at around 30 to 35 percent in 2021-2022—has further worsened the humanitarian crisis. “This crisis has been exacerbated by the unintended consequences of political cautiousness and overcompliance with [U.S.-imposed] sanctions, despite the humanitarian exemptions afforded by the Security Council,” the 19-page report that was submitted to the UN said.

The report further stated that an “estimated 18.9 million people are experiencing acute food insecurity, a number which is expected to rise to 20 million, and over 90 percent of Afghans are suffering from some form of food insecurity, with single-parent female-headed households and children being disproportionately affected.”

The report also raised concerns about targeted killings of members of the former Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, allegedly by the Taliban. Similar apprehensions have been raised in another report that claims that the Taliban has gained access to biometric data, which they are utilizing in tracking down Afghans who formerly worked with the U.S. government.

Credit Line: from the Peoples Dispatch / Globetrotter News Service

Afghan Treachery and Kabul’s Collapse – US Viewpoint

14 mins read

The war may be over but the autopsies continue. The latest report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, established in 2012 to monitor U.S. spending and war progress, is yet another withering examination of the last months of the U.S. and NATO-backed regime of Ashraf Ghani.

There is plenty of blame to go around to explain the quick and utter collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, or ANDSF, a summary of the report says. But the details are still stunning.

“The decision by two U.S. presidents to withdraw U.S. military forces from Afghanistan fundamentally altered every subsequent decision by U.S. government agencies, the Ghani administration, and the Taliban,” it states. “Actions taken by each ultimately accelerated the collapse of the ANDSF in August 2021. But the stage had been set for that collapse long before—by the failure of the U.S. and Afghan governments to create an independent and self-sustainable ANDSF, despite 20 years and $90 billion of international support.”

This latest report, Collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: An Assessment of the Factors That Led to Its Demise, provides often riveting details on the last months of the regime, complete with “on-the-ground perspectives from witnesses to the ANDSF collapse.” An “In Their Own Words” section “provides quotes from over 40 interviewees, including former Afghan and U.S. officials who gave SIGAR perspectives about the ANDSF’s final two years. This section includes first-person accounts of the disintegration of the Afghan government and security forces as the Taliban closed in on Kabul, and the aftermath of the fall of the Ghani government.”

Because SpyTalk could not improve on SIGAR’s own exerpts, we’re publishing them without abridgment here. Your comments are welcome.

SIGAR Findings and Commentary (Final Report):

—The last-minute wholesale restructuring of Afghanistan’s security institutions between March and June 2021, in particular, undermined ANDSF cohesion, morale, and ultimately, its ability to counter the Taliban offensive. In 2021, amid rapidly deteriorating security, President Ghani reshuffled most of his security officials, often replacing them with fellow ethnic Pashtuns, especially Ghilzai Pashtuns from eastern Afghanistan. These leadership changes were part of a broader pattern of politicization and ethnicization (in favor of Pashtuns) of the security sector in the final years of the Ghani administration.

(Page 23-24)

—Analyst Timor Sharan told SIGAR, “Districts collapsed not because of the army, but because of that restructuring that happened and the fact that none of [the replacement police chiefs] had connections” at the district level. He claimed that it was the police that did most of the fighting in the final 18 months, not the army. By undermining the morale and political legitimacy of the police, this restructuring directly contributed to the collapse in August 2021.

(Page 25-26)

—Ethnic competition between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns (Tajiks, in particular)—enflamed by the Ghani-Abdullah rivalry—was likely the single biggest source of dysfunction within the ANDSF. But some former Afghan officials described other types of friction. One former MOD official described competition between the younger and older generation of officers, between the jihadis and the professional officers, and between ethnicities. All these issues distracted from the fight, he said.

(Page 26)

—General James Mattis, who served as head of Central Command from 2010 to 2013 and as Secretary of Defense from 2017 to 2018, told SIGAR, “The lack of political clarity on ends, ways, and means meant we were always wondering if we were still going to be here next year. Were we going to be funded next year? We weren’t sure whether to attack, retreat or go sideways.”

(Page 41)

—“In Their Own Words” (Appendix III) provides quotes from former ANDSF, Afghan and U.S. officials. It is broken down into six sections.

               – The U.S.-Taliban Agreement and Withdrawal (Begins on Page 95)

               – Withdrawing U.S. Contractors (Begins on Page 98)

               – The ANDSF Disintegrates (Begins on Page 99)

               – Exodus (Begins on Page 106)

               – Evacuation from Kabul Airport (Begins on Page 107)

—Aftermath (Begins on Page 109)

—“Overnight…98 percent of U.S. air strikes had ceased…the Doha agreement’s psychological implication was so great that the average Afghan soldier felt this idea of abandonment…U.S. soldiers were confused [about] what to engage and what to not. On an hourly basis, the U.S. military had to coordinate with the Doha office of Ambassador Khalilzad and others from the State Department to get clarification on what they could do.”

                                             – Gen. Sami Sadat, former Afghan Army corps commander 

—“They [U.S. partners] said it was not right, but they have to follow orders. They would see the Taliban attacking our checkpoints. They would have videos of the Taliban doing it. But they would say we are not able to engage, because we have limitations. There was also so much concern about civilians, which gave the Taliban an advantage.”              

                                             – Former Afghan Army Gen. Habatullah Alizai

—“Before June…all the Black Hawks had maintenance contractors who could repair them in 24 hours. After June, Black Hawks had to be fixed in Dubai, which took weeks to months…My [special operations forces] were running out of supplies.”

                                             – Gen. Alizai

—“Ghani was more interested in the tactical daily engagements on small minor issues rather than the big strategic issues that the country was facing…for God’s sake, we had provinces falling and he would still bloody hold National Procurement Council meetings for four hours. He would hold urban planning meetings while we had districts falling…” 

                                             – Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Hekmat Karzai

—“Nobody wanted to die for Ghani…die for people who were here to rob the country.”                                

                                             – Former Interior Minister Gen. Masoud Andarabi

—The interviewee determined…they had 12 MD 530s ready to fly and 17 MD 530 pilots. He told his commander they were able to provide 360-degree protection of Kabul and asked for his orders… The commander said that the Taliban were not able to enter Kabul, and forbade anyone from leaving the area. The commander then left to speak to the media, stating that no one can enter Kabul, when in fact, the Taliban were already near the Palace.                 

                                             – Former Afghan Air Force pilot, paraphrased interview                                                                             

—“The Taliban are going after former ANDSF on a daily basis. They search their homes and if they cannot find the individual they will go after their family members…Since the collapse I have relocated four times…If they find out anything I will be executed.”            

                                             – Former Afghan military intelligence officer

—“…you’ve got guys who certainly do deserve to come to the U.S. who aren’t able to, and they’ve got a target on their back. The Taliban knows where they are and how to find them. It’s like we gave this guy a rope and noose around his neck and then kicked the chair out from under him.”    

                                             – U.S. Marine Corps infantry officer                                                                    

Below are the interim report findings SIGAR previously sent in May 2022.

SIGAR Findings:

(Page numbers refer to those on the bottom right of the report pages.)

—SIGAR found that the single most important factor in the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces’ (ANDSF) collapse in August 2021 was the decision by two U.S. presidents to withdraw U.S. military and contractors from Afghanistan, while Afghan forces remained unable to sustain themselves.

(Page 6)

—One former U.S. commander in Afghanistan told SIGAR, “We built that army to run on contractor support. Without it, it can’t function. Game over…when the contractors pulled out, it was like we pulled all the sticks out of the Jenga pile and expected it to stay up.”

(Page 15)

—Former Afghan generals told SIGAR that the majority of the U.S.-made UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were grounded shortly after U.S. contractors withdrew in the spring of 2021 [including those who performed maintenance on those helicopters]. “In a matter of months, 60 percent of the Black Hawks were grounded, with no Afghan or U.S. government plan to bring them back to life,” one Afghan general told SIGAR.  As a result, Afghan soldiers in isolated bases were running out of ammunition or dying for lack of medical evacuation capabilities. 

(Page 16)

—According to an senior Afghan official, it was not until President Biden’s April 14, 2021, announcement of the final troop and contractor withdrawal date that…President Ghani’s inner circle said they realized that the ANDSF had no supply and logistics capability. Although the Afghan government had operated in this way for nearly 20 years, their realization came only 4 months before its collapse.

(Page 31)

—The U.S.-Taliban agreement and subsequent withdrawal announcement degraded ANDSF morale. According to ANDSF officials, the U.S.-Taliban agreement was a catalyst for the collapse. A former Afghan commander told SIGAR that the agreement’s psychological impact was so great that the average Afghan soldier switched to survival mode and became susceptible to accepting other offers and deals. Another senior ANDSF official told us that after the Doha agreement was signed, Afghan soldiers knew they were not the winner.

(Page 6)

—After the signing of the U.S.-Taliban agreement, the U.S. military changed its level of military support to the ANDSF overnight, leaving the ANDSF without a critically important force multiplier: U.S. airstrikes. In 2019, the United States conducted 7,423 airstrikes, the most since at least 2009. In 2020, the U.S. conducted only 1,631 airstrikes, with almost half occurring in the two months prior to the U.S.-Taliban agreement.

(Page 12)

—Many factors affected the ANDSF’s determination to keep fighting: low salaries; poor logistics that led to food, water, and ammunition shortages; and corrupt commanders who colluded with contractors to skim off food and fuel contracts.  But the root cause of the morale crisis may have been the lack of ANDSF buy-in with the Afghan central government.

(Page 10)

—One former Afghan government official told SIGAR that following the U.S.-Taliban agreement, President Ghani began to suspect that the United States wanted to remove him from power.  That official and a former Afghan general believed Ghani feared a military coup.  According to the general, Ghani became a “paranoid president…afraid of his own countrymen” and of U.S.-trained Afghan officers.

(Page 26)

—According to a former Afghan general, in the week before Kabul fell, President Ghani replaced the new generation of young U.S.-trained Afghan officers with an old guard of Communist generals in almost all of the army corps. Ghani, that general said, was “changing commanders constantly [to] bring back some of the old-school Communist generals who [he] saw as loyal to him, instead of these American-trained young officers who he [mostly] feared.”

(Page 26)

—According to a former Afghan Interior Minister, Afghan security officials briefed President Ghani about the impending U.S. withdrawal – five days before the April 14 announcement – but Afghanistan’s then-vice president told President Ghani that this was a U.S. plot, and the briefing was ignored.

(Page 21)

—The U.S.-Taliban agreement introduced tremendous uncertainty into the U.S.-Afghan relationship. Many of its provisions were not public, but are believed to be contained in secret written and verbal agreements between U.S. and Taliban envoys. Some U.S. analysts believe that one classified annex detailed the Taliban’s counterterrorism commitments, while a second classified annex detailed U.S. and Taliban restrictions on fighting.  SIGAR was not able to obtain copies of these annexes, despite official requests made to the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of State.

(Page 12)

—Afghan officials, largely removed from the negotiations, struggled most of all to understand what the United States had agreed to with the Taliban. According to Afghan government officials, the U.S. military never clearly communicated the specifics of its policy changes to the Ghani administration or ANDSF leadership.  The Taliban’s operations and tactics, however, suggested that they may have had a better understanding of new U.S. levels of support the United States was willing to provide to the ANDSF following the signing of the U.S.-Taliban agreement.

(Page 13)

—According to a former Afghan general, in a broad sense, the U.S. military took on the role of a referee and watched the Afghan government and Taliban fight, something the general referred to as “a sick game.” According to that general, Afghan troops had not only lost U.S. support for offensive operations, they no longer knew if or when U.S. forces would come to their defense. U.S. inaction fueled mistrust among the ANDSF toward the United States and their own government.

(Page 13)

—Under the U.S.-Taliban agreement’s rules, U.S. aircraft could not target the Taliban groups that were waiting more than 500 meters away—the groups “beyond the contact” that would engage in the second, third, or fourth wave to defeat the last ANDSF units. A senior Afghan official said this was a loophole that the Taliban used in their targeting to their advantage. 

(Page 13)

—While ANDSF forces were limited to a defensive posture, the Taliban took advantage of its freedom of movement to launch an undeclared offensive targeting vulnerable ANDSF supply lines. According to an Afghan general, an Afghan military assessment found that in 2020 the Taliban caused $600 million in damages to roads, electricity lines, schools, canals, and bridges in Helmand Province alone. “It was the same story all across the country,” the general told SIGAR.

(Page 37)

—The secrecy around U.S.-Taliban negotiations and the Doha agreement meant there was a lack of official information for the ANDSF. Taliban propaganda weaponized that vacuum against local commanders and elders by claiming the Taliban had a secret deal with the United States for certain districts or provinces to be surrendered to them.  One former senior Afghan official told SIGAR that the Taliban used this tactic quite effectively, telling forces, “They’re going to give us this territory, why would you want to fight? We will forgive you…we will even give you 5,000 Afghanis for your travel expenses.” Having not been paid for months, the police would abandon their posts. Then, “the army panicked; they thought the police made a deal, and they’re going to be butchered. So, the army made a run for it too. That started a cascading effect.”

(Page 40)

—SIGAR found that no one country or agency had ownership of the ANDSF development mission. Instead, ownership existed within a NATO-led coalition and with temporary organizations. All of these entities were staffed with a constantly changing rotation of military and civilian advisors. The constant personnel turnover impeded continuity and institutional memory. The result was an uncoordinated approach that plagued the entire mission.

(See “What SIGAR Found”: Page ii (2nd Page))

—The Afghan government failed to develop a workable national security strategy that could assume responsibility for nationwide security following the withdrawal of U.S. forces. One of the main problems was the lack of nationally oriented leaders that were competent in managing and coordinating national security affairs.

(Page 30)

—According to a senior State Department official, U.S. government officials, including members of Congress with whom President Ghani communicated through unofficial channels, reinforced President Ghani’s misperceptions about the U.S. withdrawal. The apparent disconnect between unofficial channels of support and public pronouncements gave President Ghani the impression that the U.S. government was not altogether on the same page on full withdrawal, and that the withdrawal announcement was intended to shape his behavior, as opposed to being official U.S. policy.

(Page 9)

—The length of the U.S. commitment was disconnected from a realistic understanding of the time required to build a self-sustaining security sector—a process that took decades to achieve in South Korea. Constantly changing and politically driven milestones for U.S. engagement undermined the ability to set realistic goals for building a capable and self-sustaining military and police force. Further, many of the up-and-coming ANDSF generals had only a decade of experience; most general officers in the U.S. military have twice as much. Adapting a decades-long process to an unrealistically short timeline was reminiscent of the U.S. experiences in Vietnam.

(Page ii; see Appendix IV for more details)


—The U.S. approach to reconstructing the ANDSF lacked the political will to dedicate the time and resources necessary to reconstruct an entire security sector in a war-torn and impoverished country. As a result, the U.S. created an ANDSF that could not operate independently, milestones for ANDSF capability development were unrealistic, and the eventual collapse of the ANDSF’s was predictable. After 20 years of training and development, the ANDSF never became a cohesive, substantive force capable of operating on its own. The U.S. and Afghan governments share in the blame. Neither side appeared to have the political commitment to doing what it would take to address the challenges, including devoting the time and resources necessary to develop a professional ANDSF, a multi-generational process. In essence, U.S. and Afghan efforts to cultivate an effective and sustainable security assistance sector were likely to fail from the beginning. The February 2020 decision to commit to a rapid U.S. military withdrawal sealed the ANDSF’s fate.

Is Lip Sympathy Enough for Harassed Women in Afghanistan and Iran?

3 mins read

Both men and women are children  of God  and obviously,  God has created men and women to compliment each other. The fact is that men need women and women need men and why  should men  think that they are superior to women in any way.

In all religions including  Islam,  nowhere it has been  said that  women should be subjected to any particular restriction by men.

While  practices of  denying liberty to women  by men were there all over the world in earlier days, most religions  and most countries have changed such approach over the years and reformed themselves.  Unfortunately, this is yet to happen  adequately in a few Islamic countries.

Holy Quran in several observations and guidelines have stressed the importance of women’s role and  insisted how women should be respected and their liberty should be ensured.

Due to inadequate understanding of the essential sayings  of Holy Quran and consequent misinterpretation, some Islamic countries , particularly Iran and Afghanistan have imposed extreme  restrictions on women even today.  Leadership of such countries are certainly acting against the tenets of Holy Quran.

Today, dress restriction for women is prevalent in several Islamic countries and muslim women are not allowed to pray in mosque where men offer prayers. The practice of muslim  man marrying several women   is prevalent  in several Islamic countries. Even in  secular countries like  India  , this practice is followed to some extent . In such countries, if muslim women were to defy   defy such   stressful conditions and insist on  their liberty to live as per their choice like the  other women in developed  countries , they could be harassed by muslim men in some cases . Such liberty craving muslim women would  be accused of violating the practices of Islam  , which is not true.

The recent protest by muslim women in Iran refusing to wear Hijab was put down   with force by the Iranian government. It appears that  such protesting muslim women have now been forced to go silent  by the authorities.

In the case of Afghanistan, the Taliban government is insisting that women should not go for higher education and   even insist that women should not go to the male doctor for medical treatment whatever may be the severity of the illness. Are not all these practices obnoxious?  While in Afghanistan too there are some protests by muslim women against such restrictions, it appears that the protests of the muslim women have been silenced now by  the strong arm of the government.

The question is whether they would be any relief for such muslim women at all in these countries at any time in future.

Unfortunately,  so far,  only lip sympathy have been shown by rest of the world for these suffering muslim women. As usual , world body United Nations Organisation has passed some non binding condemnation about the harassment of  muslim women  in some countries and some women  associations  across the world have passed resolutions condemning the harassment of muslim women. These steps have not resulted in any tangible and real benefits to the suffering muslim women in   some Islamic countries.  In other words, the world opinion is virtually impotent  and the views expressed are nothing more than mere scrap of paper on which they are printed.

This is a very unfortunate situation today, where the leadership of the government in countries , where women are put to such harassment,  do not care for world opinion.  In this process , the fair name of the Islam religion in getting internationally  tarnished. 

To defend the liberty of the muslim women,  war is not an option against such countries under the control of merciless people with extreme views on the principles of Islam. 

At least, sort of strong international economic sanctions can  be imposed on such countries to make the government behave.  This has not been done in any meaningful way.

The muslim men  across the world who understand that Islam advocates respect for womenhood and not harassment of women and who value the reputation of Islam as a progressive religion , should voice their protest strongly against the harassment of muslim women in Afghanistan and Iran. . The silence of such progressive muslim men is evident and their protest is conspicuous by absence. It is high time that the world wide movement to restore the dignity of muslim women should be launched by progressive muslim men, that will have full support of the civilized world and would enjoy the grateful gratitude of harassed muslim women.

Afghan gov’t to turn former U.S. military bases into economic zones

1 min read

The Afghan caretaker administration has decided to change former U.S. military bases into economic zones to bolster economic activities, the state-run Bakhtar news agency reported on Sunday.

The decision has been taken at a meeting of the Economic Commission with Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar on the chair, Bakhtar said in its report, adding that the pilot project would begin from Kabul and Balkh, and expand to other parts of the country.

The military bases, after turning into economic zones, would be gradually handed over to the Ministry of Commerce and Industries, Bakhtar reported.

The United States and its allies pulled out troops from Afghanistan in August 2021, leaving the military bases behind.

Revival of Terrorism – View from Pakistan

4 mins read

Some people might be misguided by the thought that the menace of terrorism in Pakistan was successfully crushed to the roots a few years back and after the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan things have become quite normal but actually the situation is not that way.  Terrorists and terrorism both are still alive; it seems they had hibernated themselves for a very short period of time. Once again, they are out of their short sleep and ready to ‘do more’. The recent bomb attack on a mosque in Peshawar on 30th January seemsthe beginning of a fresh wave of terrorist activities in Pakistan. The terrorists have chosen a time when Pakistan is passing through the toughest period of its history with a lot of political and economic instability. Different experts on security affairs were already apprehendingoccurrence of such incidents. It is also being feared thatmore episodes of the same type could take place in near future. Certainly the law-enforcement agencies will have to be more active and more vigilant against the peace-destroyers.

Even the last year had not been very peaceful regarding terrorist activities in Pakistan. According to a think-tank based in Islamabad The Pak Institute for Peace Studies, Pakistan had to face 254 militant attacks in the year 2022. More than 400 Pakistanis lost their lives in these attacks. The Arab News said referring to the report prepared by the Pak Institute for Peace Studies that ‘The toll is significantly higher than last year 2021, when 335 people were killed by militants in 207 incidents, and in 2020, when 146 attacks killed 220.’ The most affected area had been Baluchistan where foreign-patronized terrorists targeted security forces and particularly the Chinese nationals working on China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project which is a multibillion-dollar project having a lot of possibility of strengthening Pakistan’s economy. Attacks on the Chinese nationals certainly effected the work on CPEC project as hovering security threats make things very difficult for the foreigners working on different development projects. It seems that the sole target of all terrorist activities was nothing but to create hurdles in the way to completion of the CPEC.

Now the beginning of 2023 does not seem very pleasant and hopeful with reference to the terrorist’s activities in Pakistan specifically in Baluchistan and KPK province. On 18th of January, according to the Voice of America, a militant attack from across the Iranian side of the border had killed four Pakistani soldiers.The attack took place in the remote Panjgur district in southwestern Baluchistan province. Sources say that the terrorists used Iranian soil to target a convoy of security forces patrolling along the border. The government of Pakistan, just after the incident, asked the Iranian side to hunt down the terrorists on their side. Whatever happened there at the Pak-Iran border was certainly very much unexpected and disappointing even for the Iranian government and the Iranian embassy in Islamabad strongly condemned the terrorist attack on Pakistani troops but this act of condemnation is not the solution to the problem. Without looking into the matter in detail, such incidents might reoccur in near and far-future.Panjgur district of Pakistan’s southwestern Baluchistan province is an area which borders Iran and Afghanistan. The area surrounding Panjgur had always been terrorists’ hot favourite. In 2019, both PakistanandIran had expressed their desire toform a joint quick reaction force to counter and combat militant activitiesalong the border. Unfortunately that desire has yet not been materialized. Though no terrorist group has yet claimed the responsibility of blood-shed in Panjgur. On December 19th 2022, in another incident of the same type four members of Iran’s security forces were killed in a firefight near the Pakistan border. The killed ones were members of The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. These four were killedafter a fight with an unnamed terrorist group, said the Aljazeerareferring to a statement released by the Iranian state media.The incident reportedly took place in Saravan, in the southeastern province of Sistan and Baluchistan, near the Pakistani border. The attackers allegedly fled to Pakistan when IRGC ground forces repelled the assault.

The situation in Afghanistan is also deteriorating with reference to the terrorist activities. Last year on 23rd September several people were killed and dozens more wounded when a car bomb went off at a mosque in Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul. The worshippers streaming out of the mosque afterthe ‘afternoon’ prayers were targeted. According to the Aljazeera,‘gunshots rang out several minutes after the explosion in Wazir Akbar Khan area which is the location of many foreign embassies and NATO. More than 15 people were killed and 41 wounded in that incident. Earlier on 18thAugust 2022, a huge explosion ripped through the crowded mosque during evening prayers, injuring 33 people and killing another 21. Prior to that in April 2022, two boys’ schools were targeted in the western Kabul. The targeted schools were Abdul Rahim Shahid high school and the nearby Mumtaz Education Centre, both located in the Dasht-e-Barchi area. More than ten students were killed and around 30 seriously wounded.

In short, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, all are facing the worst situation regarding terrorist activities. In present scenario, any type of blame-game would simply add to the gravity of situation. Be it Afghanistan or Iran or Pakistan; terrorism is in the benefit of no one. We all will have to join our efforts with all possible devotion and dedication to curb this menace. The government of Afghanistan will have to play the most active role in resolving the situation as a consistent peaceful atmosphere is the most-required and most-needed ‘element’ for the stability and firmness of that war-torn country.The point to rememberis that the flames of terrorism never remain limited to some particular area or some specific region; they are like a pandemic which goes on and moves on from one place to other. We must never forget the Twin-Towers tragedy which was the most horrible episode in the long series of terrorist activities. All self-proclaimed ‘Super Powers’ including the US, China and others must step forward and try to ‘Do More’ against the revival of terrorist’s era particularly in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran.