On July 17, 2025, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) arrested two operatives of the United Liberation Front of Asom–Independent (ULFA-I), identified as Bhargob Gogoi and Sumu Gogoi, from the Dibrugarh District of Assam, in connection with the recovery of an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) at Dispur Last Gate in Guwahati in the Kamrup (Metro) District of Assam. The recovery was linked to a wider conspiracy by ULFA-I to execute multiple blasts in Assam on Independence Day in 2024. NIA disclosed that the two accused were directly involved in the plot orchestrated by ULFA-I to launch attacks aimed at undermining India’s sovereignty, security, and integrity.
On July 15, 2025, Assam Police and Assam Rifles in a joint operation arrested eight ULFA-I cadres identified as Asim Adhikari, Balen Deka, Dhrubajyoti Baishya, Dharmen Deka, Sirajuddin Ali, Imran Ali, Surajit Dey and Shanku Das from different Districts in Assam.
On July 15, 2025, Assam Police and Assam Rifles in a joint operation arrested an ULFA-I operative, identified as Aham Kanyak, from the Naginimora area of Mon district in Nagaland.
On July 14, 2025, the Assam Police arrested a suspected over ground worker (OGW) linked to ULFA-I, Shanku Das (30), from Barahi Helkatop at Sonari in the Charaideo District of Assam. Police sources stated that Das was suspected of facilitating communications between ULFA-I and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN).
On June 28, 2025, Assam Police arrested an OGW, Shibanan Saikia, from the Charaideo District of Assam, on charges of working as a linkman for ULFA-I.
On June 24, 2025, NIA took formal custody of ULFA-I ‘brigadier’ Rupam Asom aka Kant Borah, after his arrest by the Tinsukia Police in Assam on May 24. Borah was interrogated at NIA’s Sonapur office near Guwahati, in connection with several high-profile cases involving murder, abduction and militant activity. NIA reopened dormant investigations linked to ULFA-I, previously stalled due to his fugitive status. NIA officials believe his questioning could provide crucial insights into ULFA-I’s internal network and cross-border links.
According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), 20 ULFA-I cadres have been arrested in 2025, in nine separate incidents (data till July 20, 2025). In 2024, 69 cadres were arrested in 32 separate incidents, while in 2023, 32 cadres were arrested in 23 incidents. A total of 622 ULFA-I cadres has been arrested in 367 incidents since 2010.
Significantly, on July 13, 2025, ULFA-I ‘chief’ Paresh Baruah issued a dramatic statement alleging that the outfit’s eastern headquarters in the Sagai region of Myanmar was subjected to a devastating drone strike, allegedly orchestrated by the Indian Army. The aerial assault reportedly involved over 150 high-tech drones, claimed to be of Israeli and French origin, resulting in the death of 19 ULFA-I cadres and injuries to another 19. Three of the leaders killed were identified as ‘lieutenant general’ Nayan Medhi aka Nayan Asom, ‘brigadier’ Ganesh Asom and ‘colonel’ Pradip Asom. Baruah further asserted that operatives from allied Manipuri insurgent groups – especially the Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF) – were also among the casualties. However, the Indian Army officially denied carrying out any such aerial attacks on the camps.
On the same day, coinciding with this claim, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland–Khaplang–Yung Aung (NSCN-K-YA) issued a similar statement, alleging that Indian armed forces carried out precision drone strikes on ULFA-I and NSCN/GPRN hideouts located in Hoyat and Pangsau in eastern Nagaland, near the Myanmar border. These claims were categorically denied by the Indian Army. Defence spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Mahendra Rawat stated there were no inputs regarding drone attacks.
Earlier, on June 14, 2025, the NIA charge sheeted three ULFA-I cadres, including the ‘commander-in-chief’ Paresh Baruah for a conspiracy to carry out multiple IED blasts in Assam on Independence Day, 2024. The other two cadres were identified as Abhijit Gogoi aka Abhijeet Gogoi and Jahnu Boruah aka Arnob Asom aka Huntu. NIA stated, “Baruah, along with Abhijit Gogoi alias Abhijeet Gogoi and Jahnu Boruah alias Arnob Asom alias Huntu, has been charged under various sections of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), and the Explosive Substances Act, in a court in Guwahati. The three were found to be linked to IEDs planted by the outfit at Dispur Last Gate in Guwahati, as part of a broader ULFA-I conspiracy to trigger multiple blasts across Assam to disrupt Independence Day celebrations in 2024.
Not surprisingly, on November 25, 2024, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) extended the ban on ULFA-I for five years, with effect from November 27, 2024, citing its continued efforts to secede from India and its involvement in extortion and violence through links with other insurgent groups. A UMHA notification noted that ULFA-I, along with its factions, wings and front organisations, had engaged in activities prejudicial to the sovereignty and integrity of India, with a declared objective to secede Assam from India, continued intimidation and extortion of funds for their organisation, and maintained links with other insurgent groups for extortion and violence.
A recent confidential report submitted to the Unlawful Activities Prevention Tribunal on May 27, 2025, confirmed that ULFA-I had around 250 armed cadres operating from four major camps in Myanmar. The Centre, alongside the Assam government, substantiated the claim that the outfit sustained operational alliances with multiple northeastern insurgent groups, including NSCN, Coordination Committee (CorCom), National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), and People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Justice Michael Zothankhuma, who presided over the Tribunal, upheld the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) notification of November 27, 2024, which extended the ban on ULFA-I for another five years, citing grave threats to national sovereignty, public order, and territorial integrity. The Tribunal also drew a stark contrast between the Baruah faction and the now-mainstream Rajkhowa-led ULFA, which entered peace negotiations in 2011 and eventually signed a comprehensive peace accord in 2023. The Baruah faction, however, continues its secessionist campaign, marked by violent activities and extortion. From 2019–2024, 89 cases, including bombings and extortion, were registered against ULFA, leading to 235 arrests. The Tribunal found sufficient evidence of subversive activities and ruled in favour of the Government, citing serious threats to national security and integrity.
On June 21, 2025, Police sources confirmed that ULFA-I currently operated three active camps in Myanmar, with a growing focus on an extortion racket along the Assam–Arunachal Pradesh border. The arrest of the outfit’s alleged ‘Operations Commander’ Rupam Asom near the border yielded significant intelligence. Rupam admitted that ULFA-I extracted an estimated 60 million through extortion in 2025 alone, primarily from inter-state regions where militants avoid deeper infiltration into Assam. He also confessed that growing internal factionalism, harsh camp conditions, and low morale created disillusionment among cadres, many of whom were contemplating surrender. The outfit’s largest stronghold, the “General Mobile Headquarters”, was headed by Michael Deka Phukan, while the Arakan Camp (Camp 779) – the most volatile and operationally active – was led by Arunodoi Asom, who was linked to several cases of abduction and extortion.
On January 26, 2025, ULFA-I claimed responsibility for twin bomb blasts in Guwahati’s Kamrup (Metro) District, coinciding with India’s Republic Day celebrations. The first explosion occurred at the Lalmati Brahmaputra vegetable market and the second was reported at DV Parking in Beharbari. There were no casualties. An ULFA-I statement emphasized that the attacks were symbolic, meant to express dissent against the Indian state’s celebration of Republic Day, which it claimed undermined Assam’s historical identity and autonomy.
Despite its dwindling support base in Assam, the Paresh Baruah-led ULFA-I remains active through its Myanmar-based infrastructure, occasionally staging attacks and disseminating propaganda. Continued rifts, government negotiations with the pro-talks faction, and internal setbacks have weakened the outfit’s position on the ground. Baruah faces several cases under the stringent UAPA in connection with terrorist funding and arms smuggling, among other charges. Adding to its dossier of charges in May 2024, NIA charge-sheeted Baruah and five others for a grenade attack on an Army camp in Tinsukia District, and later, in June 2024, for a similar grenade attack on a military station at Lichubari in Jorhat District. An NIA statement at the time noted,
The entire conspiracy, encompassing both the attacks, had been masterminded from across the international border in Myanmar by ULFA (I) self-styled Captain, identified as Abhyeet Gogoi alias Kanak Gogoi alias Rumel Asom alias Aicheng Asom alias Aishang Asom, along with ULFA (I) chief Paresh Baruah alias Paresh Asom. Another key conspirator behind these attacks was identified as the outfit’s self-styled Brigadier, Arunudoy Dohutia alias Arunodoi Asom.
India had earlier carried out cross-border strikes into Myanmar in 2019, under Operation Sunrise, aimed at dismantling insurgent strongholds of ULFA-I, NSCN, and other northeastern militant outfits.
A July 14, 2025, report revealed that, with its Myanmar-based camps under heavy attack, ULFA-I is reportedly seeking new hideouts, possibly in Bangladesh. Intelligence sources indicated that Myanmar, ULFA-I’s primary base since 2012, is now unstable due to internal conflicts. Bhutan had earlier dismantled its camps in 2003. Paresh Baruah, the ULFA-I chief, is reportedly moving between China and Myanmar, and warming ties with Bangladesh, where a 2004 arms case death sentence against him was recently reduced to life imprisonment.
ULFA-I continues to pose a complex challenge to India’s internal security in the Northeastern region. Despite intensified counterinsurgency efforts and the arrest of key operatives, the outfit’s persistent operational presence along the Indo-Myanmar border – coupled with evolving cross-border alliances and extortion-based financing – underscores the group’s resilience. The recent drone strikes, reportedly targeting ULFA-I’s Myanmar camps, appear to have significantly disrupted its infrastructure and may have catalysed its reported outreach to Bangladesh for renewed sanctuary. The gradual erosion of support among its rank and file, growing internal disillusionment and factional divides, highlight structural vulnerabilities within the group. However, ULFA-I’s ability to continue low-intensity attacks and its symbolic targeting of national events such as the Republic Day and Independence Day, affirm its ideological commitment to secession. As Paresh Baruah remains at large and maintains fluctuating ties with regional actors such as NSCN-K-YA and PLA, the group’s transnational character remains a pressing concern. Moving forward, a coordinated strategy combining intelligence-led operations, regional diplomacy, and targeted deradicalization will be essential to dismantle ULFA-I’s residual capabilities and to prevent possible resurgence.
