On October 20, 2025, at least five suspected militants of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang-Yung Aung faction (NSCN-K-YA) were killed in a drone strike, allegedly by the Indian Army, targeting NSCN-K-YA hideouts in the Sagai region of Myanmar. The strike focused on the Waktham and Hoyat townships, as well as mobile camps near Pangsau Pass. Unconfirmed reports currently indicate that the precision-guided attack killed P. Aung Mai, a senior ‘commander’ and self-styled ‘major general’ of the outfit, though official confirmation by either government or rebel sources is awaited. Multiple bombs were reportedly dropped, completely destroying the command post and nearby militant shelters.
The development comes just days after a pre-dawn attack on October 16, 2025, when suspected militants belonging to NSCN-K-YA and the United Liberation Front of Asom-Independent (ULFA-I) jointly launched a pre-dawn attack on an Assam Rifles camp at Hatman village under the Manmao area of Changlang District in Arunachal Pradesh. The assault, marked by heavy gunfire and grenade explosions, left at least four Assam Rifles personnel injured, including Rifleman Harisharan and Rifleman Rahul Bora. Security Forces (SFs) retaliated immediately, leading to an intense exchange of fire, after which the militants fled into the nearby dense forest. Search operations were subsequently launched to track down the attackers.
A day later, on October 17, 2025, NSCN-K-YA claimed responsibility for the Hatman attack, asserting that its ‘Naga Army’s tactical unit’ had executed the operation. The outfit’s statement accused the Indian SFs of “provoking, inciting, and attempting to destroy” the NSCN/GPRN in recent months to weaken the Naga national movement. Reaffirming its defiance, it declared,
No matter what, NSCN/GPRN remains steadfast in our sacred mission to defend our land and people, and we reiterate our commitment to continue the tactical strikes until the complete withdrawal of the occupying Indian military from our land.
This claim underscores the continuing coordination between insurgent outfits in the Northeast and highlights the fragile security environment along the Arunachal-Myanmar frontier.
On July 6, 2025, a suspected NSCN-K-YA militant was killed in an encounter with Assam Rifles near the India-Myanmar border between Khogla and Lyangche villages in Longding District, Arunachal Pradesh. The gunfight erupted when a patrol team of the Khonsa Battalion came under fire from militants hiding in the dense forest. After retaliating, troops discovered a temporary hideout and recovered a cache of arms, ammunition, and military supplies from the site.
On June 5, 2025, two NSCN-K-YA militants identified as ‘sergeant major’ Nyaklung and ‘lance corporal’ Neyung Aung were killed in an encounter with Indian Army near Langkhu village in Longding District of Arunachal Pradesh.
On April 27, 2025, three NSCN-K-YA militants were killed and another two were injured in an encounter with Indian Army and Assam Rifles personnel in the Pongchau area of Longding District, Arunachal Pradesh. The operation was launched to rescue two construction workers abducted by the group on April 25. SFs recovered four automatic weapons, including three AK-47 rifles, ammunition, and other war-like stores. One abducted worker, Janlung Wangpan, was rescued, while the other, Giyas Uddin of PSK Enterprise, was killed during the crossfire. The clash also led to the arrest of two NSCN-K-YA militants
On January 6, 2025, suspected NSCN-K-YA militants abducted two male workers from an illegal timber camp in Longvi village in the Changlang District of Arunachal Pradesh near the Indo-Myanmar border. The abduction of the two workers was believed to be related to ongoing extortion demands.
According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), there were five NSCN-K-YA-linked incidents of violence in 2025, which included three incidents of killing, one of injury and one of abduction (data till October 19, 2025), resulting in the killing of six terrorists and injuries to four SF personnel. In 2024, there were three such incidents, including one incident of killing (one terrorist killed) and two of abduction. In 2023, there were six such incidents, which included one incident of killing (one civilian), one incident of injury (one militant injured), and four abductions, in which seven persons were abducted. Since August 17, 2018, when the outfit ‘officially’ came into existence, there have been 32 such incidents, including 18 of killing, 10 of abduction (26 persons abducted) and four of injury (six SFs, one civilian and one terrorist). The incidents of killing resulted in the death of 21 persons: two civilians, four SF personnel and 15 militants.
Some of the prominent incidents of killing and abduction, in addition to the ones above, included:
October 25, 2024: A clash occurred between the Assam Rifles and NSCN-K-YA in Longding District in Arunachal Pradesh in which an NSCN-K-YA cadre was killed. The NSCN-K-YA initiated the attack by firing at Assam Rifles personnel, while they were moving from Wakka towards the Indo-Myanmar border.
February 18, 2024: 10 workers employed at the Finboro Coal Mine in the Changlang District of Arunachal Pradesh, were abducted by suspected militants of NSCN-K-YA and ULFA-I, after a failure to meet extortion demands. Sources stated that a group of seven armed militants held the workers at gunpoint and transported them in a dumper truck towards Old Longtoi, a remote location within Arunachal Pradesh. SFs later rescued seven of the 10 miners. Three workers were rescued after several months.
December 28, 2023: NSCN-K-YA claimed responsibility for executing former legislator Yumsen Matey along the Indo-Myanmar border in Arunachal Pradesh’s Tirap District on December 16, 2023. In its press release, the outfit accused Matey of masterminding anti-NSCN propaganda and conspiring against the NSCN/Government of the People’s Republic of Nagaland (GPRN), asserting that he was “awarded capital punishment” for his alleged involvement in anti-NSCN activities.
July 28, 2021: Two NSCN-K-YA militants were gunned down during a search operation in the Kottam Forest area of Tirap District. The two militants fired at SFs when asked to surrender, and were shot dead in retaliatory firing.
The NSCN was established in 1980 under the leadership of Isak Chishi Swu, Thuingaleng Muivah, and S.S. Khaplang with the principal objective of creating a “Greater Nagaland” or “Nagalim” – an envisioned sovereign entity encompassing all Naga-inhabited territories that extend across the boundaries of India and Myanmar. The formation of NSCN marked a critical juncture in the Naga nationalist movement, symbolizing a renewed assertion of Naga identity and self-determination. However, ideological and operational differences among the leadership culminated in a major schism in 1988, resulting in the emergence of two factions: the NSCN-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) and the NSCN-Khaplang (NSCN-K) factions.
The NSCN-K, under S.S. Khaplang’s leadership, established its stronghold primarily in the Naga-inhabited regions of Myanmar, distinguishing itself from the India-based NSCN-IM. Unlike the NSCN-IM, which later entered into a ceasefire and peace negotiations with the Indian government beginning in 1997, the NSCN-K retained a militaristic approach grounded in the belief that true Naga sovereignty transcends the territorial boundaries of India and Myanmar. Nevertheless, the group temporarily adopted a conciliatory stance in the late 1990s. Following the Union Government’s ceasefire announcement on November 14, 1998, the NSCN-K reciprocated by declaring a ceasefire on December 18, 1998. This led to the formulation of a 15-point charter of ceasefire ground rules in April 2001, which paved the way for formal talks held in Kohima in September 2001, emphasizing continued dialogue and cooperation.
However, the peace process was abruptly disrupted when S.S. Khaplang unilaterally abrogated the ceasefire on March 27, 2015, citing disillusionment with the negotiations. This move, unanticipated by Indian authorities, reignited hostilities across the Indo-Myanmar frontier and resulted in a series of targeted attacks on Indian security forces. The termination of the ceasefire not only marked a strategic recalibration of the NSCN-K but also deepened internal fissures within the group.
Following Khaplang’s death in 2017, the organization faced a leadership vacuum and internal discord regarding its ideological trajectory. Amid this fragmentation, Yung Aung, Khaplang’s nephew, emerged as the leader of a new and more radical faction – NSCN-K-YA (Yung Aung faction) – in 2018. The Yung Aung faction rejected any form of peace negotiation with the Indian government, denouncing existing agreements as compromises on Naga sovereignty. His rise symbolized a generational shift within the NSCN movement, reflecting a younger leadership committed to a more uncompromising and militant ideology.
Meanwhile, another breakaway faction led by Niki Sumi, known as National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang-Niki Sumi (NSCN-K-NS), entered into a ceasefire agreement with the Government of India (GoI) on September 8, 2021, signalling a pragmatic shift towards reconciliation. This move underscored the widening ideological divide within the NSCN-K lineage – between those seeking engagement and those persisting in armed resistance.
The NSCN-K-YA upholds a hardline nationalist ideology anchored in the principle of absolute sovereignty and a rejection of the Indian and Myanmar constitutional frameworks, both of which it perceives as “colonial constructs.” This faction argues that Naga aspirations for self-determination cannot be realized within the administrative boundaries of either state. In contrast to the NSCN-IM, which has embraced a model of autonomy under India’s federal system, the Yung Aung faction advocates total secession and the establishment of an independent Naga homeland.
The faction’s organizational structure combines hierarchical control with operational decentralization. While Yung Aung maintains authority over strategic decisions, local commanders operate with significant autonomy in the field. This structure enables the group to adapt to military pressure and sustain insurgent activities through guerrilla tactics, including ambushes, hit-and-run operations, and cross-border raids. Its operational bases in the Sagaing Region of Myanmar, specifically in areas such as Haukyat, Khanmoi, Lohan, Kamai, and Pangsau, offer a geographic advantage. These areas lie contiguous to the Indian districts of Tirap, Changlang, Longding (in Arunachal Pradesh) and Mon (in Nagaland) – the traditional axis of NSCN-K-YA activity. The porous and rugged terrain facilitates movement and cross-border sanctuaries, allowing insurgents to evade Indian counter-insurgency operations.
The group’s strategic outlook also includes alliances with other insurgent outfits across the Northeast, notably the ULFA-I and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur. These partnerships enable the faction to sustain its logistical networks, share intelligence, and access safe havens across the India-Myanmar borderlands. Such cooperation reflects a broader insurgent ecosystem that thrives on mutual support and shared hostility toward the Indian state.
Despite its militant posture, the NSCN-K-YA has experienced internal rifts. In June 2023, internal dissatisfaction with Yung Aung’s leadership culminated in a split, led by ‘major general’ (retd.) Ang Mai, who had been previously expelled from the faction in 2019. During an emergency meeting on June 27, 2023, Ang Mai was elected as the leader of a new splinter group. His faction accused Yung Aung of pursuing isolationist and autocratic policies, whereas Yung Aung countered by alleging that Ang Mai colluded with the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw). The Ang Mai faction primarily operates along the India-Myanmar frontier, particularly in the border districts of Tirap, Changlang, and Longding in India, and the Sagaing Region of Myanmar. This further fragmentation has deepened divisions within the Naga insurgent landscape.
Ideologically, the Yung Aung faction’s worldview remains deeply rooted in Naga ethno-nationalism, historical grievance, and resistance to perceived political marginalization. Its rhetoric portrays both India and Myanmar as occupying powers, and its rejection of peace talks is intended to preserve ideological purity and distinguish itself from groups like the NSCN-IM, which it accuses of compromising the Naga cause. The faction’s militant narrative continues to attract younger recruits disillusioned by protracted negotiations and unfulfilled political promises.
The persistence of the NSCN-K-YA represents a major impediment to the Naga peace process, underscoring the limitations of India’s conflict resolution initiatives in the Northeast. Despite the 2015 Framework Agreement between the Indian government and the NSCN-IM, radical factions like NSCN-K-YA continue to reject negotiated settlements, insisting instead on complete sovereignty. The faction’s cross-border operations, sustained by the porous India-Myanmar boundary and limited administrative control on the Myanmar side, enable it to conduct ambushes and extortion operations, and to maintain alliances with other militant groups such as ULFA-I and Manipur’s PLA. These inter-group linkages transform the insurgency into a networked challenge that complicates India’s counter-insurgency and border management efforts in frontier zones.
The NSCN-K-YA’s ideological rigidity and continued militancy exemplify the enduring challenges of insurgent fragmentation and radicalization within the broader Naga movement. Its rejection of peace accords and reliance on armed resistance have deepened internal disillusionment and weakened prospects for reconciliation. The recent spate of attacks underscores both the persistence of militant activity and India’s increasing resolve to neutralize such threats through precision counter-operations. Addressing this persistent threat requires a coordinated regional strategy that combines robust security measures, strengthened India-Myanmar cooperation, and renewed political dialogue aimed at resolving structural grievances. Without such an approach, the insurgency’s cross-border dynamics will continue to obstruct possibilities of lasting peace and stability in the region.
