China has taken another step towards reusable rockets, with two successful booster recovery tests bringing its state-owned and commercial launch sectors closer to a capability long dominated by SpaceX. The developments could have significance beyond launch costs: China is seeking the capacity to deploy large satellite constellations of its own while studying ways to limit the strategic advantages created by SpaceX’s Starlink network.
In July, the first stage of the Long March 10B, developed by the state-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), slowed itself into a netted metal recovery structure on a sea barge. The achievement made CASC the third entity, after SpaceX and Blue Origin, to successfully recover a rocket booster. The result followed a December failure by LandSpace’s Zhuque-3, whose reusable first stage crashed into the Gobi Desert on its first recovery attempt. On 18 August, however, Zhuque-3 completed a soft landing on its extended legs, using a recovery method similar in size and appearance to SpaceX’s Falcon 9.
The two tests do not establish reliable commercial reusability. Each rocket will require multiple successful launches before its recovery system can demonstrate operational reliability, followed by further development before reusable technology produces the launch frequency and cost reductions achieved by SpaceX. Blaine Curcio, founder of Orbital Gateway Consulting and a specialist in China’s space industry, described the Long March 10B test as “a meaningful step forward, but the short term impact [on launch capacity] is not huge”. Even so, the successful Chinese tests, together with other commercial reusable rockets expected to be tested later in the year, indicate that the US lead in reusable launch technology is narrowing.
The significance extends to China’s plans for satellite internet. Starlink, operated by SpaceX, has more than 10,000 satellites and accounts for about 70 per cent of satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO), according to the figures cited by ChinaTalk. China launched 371 satellites in 2025, compared with 3,169 launched by SpaceX. Building a comparable constellation would require substantially greater launch capacity, making reusable rockets an important part of China’s long-term plans.
ChinaTalk’s account describes two broad elements of Beijing’s response to Starlink: developing its own satellite internet systems while also examining ways to constrain, disrupt or, in an extreme scenario, destroy the existing constellation. The military significance of Starlink became particularly apparent during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, where the system supported communications, military coordination and drone operations. Chinese military researchers have subsequently examined the implications of the network for future conflict.
The People’s Liberation Army has publicly expressed concern about Starlink’s military potential. In May 2022, PLA Daily wrote that the constellation could provide “high-bandwidth, high-speed military communications worldwide” and establish a command-and-control network linking US combat platforms. Researchers affiliated with the PLA and China’s state space apparatus similarly concluded in 2023 that the thousands of satellites posed “a major challenge to our existing situational awareness and traditional defense capabilities”.
Some Chinese assessments have gone further, arguing that Starlink could potentially be used against other satellites. ChinaTalk notes that these assessments have sometimes exaggerated the constellation’s capabilities, including claims that Starlink satellites could conduct reconnaissance or surveillance of ground targets. Starlink nevertheless has military applications through Starshield, a version developed for the US military and announced in December 2022.
One Chinese and Russian approach has involved the international regulation of orbital slots and radio spectrum. A November 2023 proposal discussed by officials from CASC and Russian military officials envisaged using existing satellite regulations to restrict Starlink’s expansion. China and Russia considered making international arguments about collision risks and satellite density, although there is no indication in the material that the two countries have jointly implemented such measures or submitted joint filings to the International Telecommunication Union.
China has separately filed plans for two proposed megaconstellations totalling almost 200,000 satellites. The filings could reserve spectrum and orbital positions even if the satellites are never launched. In December, China also lodged an informal complaint at a United Nations Security Council meeting, accusing Starlink of consuming orbital and frequency resources and increasing the risk of collisions and space debris. SpaceX has continued expanding its plans, filing an application in July for a constellation of 100,000 satellites.
More direct methods of disruption have also been examined. Chinese researchers are studying electronic jamming, but Starlink’s large number of satellites provides redundancy, making the destruction or interruption of individual links difficult. A theoretical study by Zhejiang University and Beijing Institute of Technology found that aerial jammers positioned in a grid at 20km altitude could cover an average of 38.5 square kilometres per jammer. Applying that calculation to Taiwan would require almost 1,000 coordinated aerial jammers.
GPS disruption offers another potential vulnerability because Starlink terminals traditionally depend on accurate time and location information from GPS. ChinaTalk notes that GPS jamming could therefore interfere with Starlink as well as other systems dependent on satellite positioning. Newer V5 terminals, however, use Starlink’s own position, navigation and timing source, designed to be more resistant to jamming.
The most extreme proposal involves physically destroying satellites. China has demonstrated an anti-satellite capability, destroying a weather satellite with a ground-launched SC-19 missile in 2007. But destroying thousands of Starlink satellites could create extensive orbital debris, threatening China’s own more than 1,200 satellites in LEO and making key orbital routes harder to use. ChinaTalk notes that the strategic difficulty would increase as Starlink expands, while cyber and electronic warfare offer less destructive alternatives but have no guaranteed, permanent solution.
