While the nuclear nonproliferation discourses are the epicenter of the United Nations’ core agenda, but the concerns about the Uranium black market and the systematic vulnerabilities in India’s nuclear program are exacerbating. In May 2021, India’s Anti-Terrorist squad in Maharashtra arrested two suspects and recovered seven kilograms of Uranium. Meanwhile, in June, police in Jharkhand seized over six kilograms of uranium, again linked to an illicit trafficking network. In March 2022, the firing of a nuclear-capable supersonic cruise BrahMos missile across the international Pakistan-India border exposed the institutional oversight and procedure discipline at the strategic level.
This was not just a one-off incident, but such cases are persistent, which tells a bad story of India’s Nuclear Safety protocols. In 2010, the decommissioned sealed radioactive source of the Delhi University Cobalt-60 was found in the yard scrape, which exposed surrounding residents to dangerous radiation levels. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) declared it a severe failure, as it cost one life and several other people fell ill. The cases were medically linked to radiation exposure.
In January 2019, the Police recovered a Cesium-137 from a scrap dealer used by India’s state-run oil and Gas Corporation. The incident again points to weak inventory control and delayed detention. In 2022, it is even more disturbing that eight people, including two Indians, were apprehended in Nepal for smuggling Uranium, which indicates the transnational nexus. In 2020, Nuclear Theft Intuitive (NTI) ranked India 20th among 22 countries, placing it just above North Korea and Iran. The report further heightened the concerns about the custody of the nuclear program, particularly due to the lack of adequate safeguards and an effective tracking mechanism.
Similarly, various incidents have been recorded beyond Uranium. In August 2024, a high-value radioactive isotope, Californium, was recovered from three individuals arrested in Bihar’s Gopalganj district. The jaw-dropping incident was the theft of a container in 2006 filled with Uranium from a fortified research facility in Rajappa. In August 2021, the authority confiscated 250 kilograms of radioactive substance worth $573 million in Kolkata, which resulted in the arrest of two persons from the Indian strategic Organization. According to the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) chronology, 18 incidents involving theft or loss of over 200 kilograms of nuclear material, including Uranium, have been documented between 2021.
Beneath the burden of these incidents and such unavoidable mistakes, the question always arises as to how these materials leave the controlled facilities, and why such incidents are repeating despite learning the lessons. The answer is hidden, and there are structural problems in the Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL). The loopholes have stemmed from the material accounting and control system, and as per International practices guidelines, the inventory control system must be vigilant to ensure that not even a tiny particle is left unaccounted. The persistent recurrence of incidents further hints at the role of insiders- working in the nuclear facility or mining sites. Combining all these, such lapses depict serious risk and undermine India’s credibility on the global stage.
Meanwhile, firing a BrahMos missile was a strategic blunder as per the Indian authorities; the missile was inadvertently fired during a routine maintenance. The incident sent shockwaves through the strategic community worldwide, indicating a lack of professionalism in the Indian armed forces. In a Nuclear-armed environment, such incidents are hazardous as it is challenging for the other country to determine whether the weapon is conventional or non-conventional and could escalate a full-fledged war.
India is a signatory to a no-first-use policy, but it can be a strategic bluff, as doctrinal operations cannot be practiced in isolation. Over the past years, India has been heavily advancing its missile capabilities, enabling them for deep penetration and for precision strike, thus creating a hypothetical scenario of whether the no first use policy is conditional or immutable. When the Nuclear lapses combined with doctrinal ambiguity, then even a single error would have disproportionate consequences.
India has regulatory bodies and safety mechanisms on paper, as nuclear safety is not proven by speeches or strategic branding, but its safeguards are possible with essential practices in adherence with IAEA guidelines. The uranium that has been lost to date is enough for making a 1.75-kiloton atomic bomb, which could kill 48 % of the New Delhi population. Therefore, it is an awakening call to the proponents of nuclear nonproliferation, and indeed a strategic necessity to declare accountability as a benchmark for ensuring nuclear safety, and reforming institutional vulnerabilities is essential for India to protect both the domestic population and regional stability.
