On February 15, 2026, the bulk carrier Grumant (IMO: 9385879) was captured in satellite imagery docked at the occupied Ukrainian port of Feodosia on the Crimean peninsula. The vessel appeared to have already been in port for several days, quietly loading grain before setting out on a two-month voyage that would eventually take it to Benghazi, Libya, where it arrived on April 18. The journey, documented through a combination of satellite imagery and maritime tracking data, has become a focal point in ongoing scrutiny of grain shipments leaving Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory.
The analysis, conducted by Bellingcat, builds on earlier reporting into what Ukrainian authorities describe as “stolen” grain exported from occupied regions. While similar shipments have been documented before, this case marks only the second identified instance in which a Russian-flagged vessel is observed transporting grain from occupied Ukraine directly to Libya. A previous voyage by the Damas Wave reportedly delivered grain to the port of Misrata, also in Libya, in early 2025.
What distinguishes the Grumant case, according to the investigation, is the use of a new analytical approach applied to maritime tracking data. Researchers combined satellite imagery with Automatic Identification System (AIS) data provided by Lloyd’s List Intelligence, focusing not only on location signals but also on vessel heading information to confirm the ship’s presence at Feodosia during a period when satellite positioning data was unreliable due to interference in the Black Sea.
The vessel’s route unfolded against a backdrop of known signal disruption in the region. Between early and mid-February, the Grumant transmitted AIS data showing erratic positions, including points that appeared on land—an indicator of GNSS interference affecting standard positioning systems. Yet amid this unreliable data, one element remained consistent: the ship’s heading.
Across 29 AIS transmissions during this period, the Grumant repeatedly reported a heading of 267 or 268 degrees. That detail became central to the investigation. The port of Feodosia itself is aligned at approximately 267.5 degrees, and researchers concluded that the close match between the vessel’s reported heading and the port’s orientation strongly suggested the ship was moored at the berth during this time.
The use of heading data, which is derived from onboard compasses rather than satellite positioning, provided a critical alternative signal in an environment where GPS spoofing and interference can distort location tracking. Maritime experts consulted in the investigation noted that while positional data can be manipulated or disrupted, compass-based heading information is generally more resilient under such conditions, though not entirely immune to all forms of interference.
The findings were cross-checked with additional satellite imagery showing the Grumant docked at berth No. 1 in Feodosia, a location used for bulk cargo. Visual features such as the vessel’s grey deck, seven cargo hatches, and distinctive yellow mast matched known images of the ship. Residual grain visible near the vessel further reinforced the conclusion that loading activity had taken place at the port.
After departing Feodosia, the Grumant transited the Bosphorus Strait in mid-February and proceeded through a series of stops and anchorages in the eastern Mediterranean. It spent weeks off the coast of Izmir and later near Aliağa in Turkey, where it remained offshore without entering port. The reasons for its prolonged anchorage in these locations are not publicly known, and port authorities did not respond to requests for comment cited in the investigation.
The vessel later entered Libyan waters, where it remained near Benghazi before docking at the port on April 18. Satellite imagery captured on April 20 confirmed the ship in port during unloading operations. It departed several days later, beginning its return voyage toward the Black Sea.
The Grumant’s movements fit into a broader pattern identified by investigators tracking maritime trade routes linked to occupied Ukrainian territories. Five previously identified vessels involved in similar shipments have already been sanctioned by the European Union, while another has been sanctioned by the United States Department of the Treasury. The expansion of routes beyond Crimea’s main ports, including Feodosia, has been documented as part of what Ukrainian authorities describe as an evolving “shadow grain fleet.”
The vessel’s AIS behavior also reflects wider patterns associated with maritime concealment. Ships engaged in sensitive or illicit cargo movements often disable or limit AIS transmissions when entering restricted or high-risk areas, a practice known as “dark port calls.” In the case of the Grumant, there were brief gaps in transmission during its time near Feodosia, although it continued to emit intermittent signals rather than going fully dark for extended periods.
Further corroboration of the vessel’s identity came through visual comparison techniques. Analysts matched structural features including cargo hatch configuration, mast design, and vessel dimensions across multiple images captured at different points in its journey, from the Black Sea to North Africa. The consistency of these features across satellite and surface imagery strengthened the identification of the ship across its route.
The Grumant’s voyage also intersects with broader geopolitical dynamics in Libya, where competing administrations control different regions. The port of Benghazi, where the vessel ultimately delivered its cargo, falls under the authority of the eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA). While Libya’s internal divisions have created complex trade and governance structures, the investigation notes that open-source evidence alone cannot determine whether local authorities were aware of the grain’s origin.
Ukrainian government ministries responding to the findings stated that any commercial activity in occupied Crimea is considered illegal under Ukrainian law and framed the shipment as part of Russia’s continued effort to export agricultural products from occupied territories. They also described the expansion of such maritime routes toward North Africa as an attempt to bypass international sanctions and maintain revenue streams from contested regions.
The investigation additionally highlights the broader legal and commercial backdrop of the vessel itself. Corporate records and court documents cited in the report indicate that the Grumant has been operated under shifting ownership and management structures, including entities previously linked to Russian shipping interests.
As maritime tracking techniques evolve, the Grumant case illustrates how alternative data points—such as vessel heading—can help reconstruct movements even in environments where conventional GPS tracking is compromised. Combined with satellite imagery and commercial AIS datasets, the method provides a layered view of maritime activity that continues to be tested against increasingly sophisticated forms of signal disruption.
The vessel’s journey from Feodosia to Benghazi now stands as part of a growing body of documented cases mapping the movement of grain from occupied Ukrainian territory into international markets, traced not through a single data source, but through overlapping signals scattered across sea lanes, ports, and digital tracking systems.
