More than a decade after signing the Framework Agreement with the Government of India (GoI) on August 3, 2015, the National Socialist Council of Nagalim-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) remains the most influential Naga insurgent formation in the Northeast. While the Agreement was expected to bring the decades-long insurgency to a negotiated conclusion, the prolonged deadlock over core issues, including the demand for a separate Naga flag and constitution, has increasingly coincided with a resurgence of violence involving the outfit. Rather than restricting itself to political negotiations under the ceasefire framework, NSCN-IM has, over the past two years, increasingly been linked to armed confrontations with rival militant groups, attacks on Kuki villages, inter-factional clashes, and confrontations with Security Forces (SFs), raising serious concerns over the credibility of the peace process.
The latest indication of this trend came on July 6, 2026, when two Assam Rifles personnel, Warrant Officer Balwant Singh and Havildar Chandra Mohan Singh, were killed in an ambush near Nungshangkhong in the Ukhrul District of Manipur. Though NSCN-IM denied involvement and claimed that reports referring to an “Eastern Flank” faction were incorrect, the incident nevertheless underscored the continuing volatility surrounding the outfit and the deteriorating security environment in Naga-inhabited areas.
Earlier, on July 5, 2026, suspected cadres of NSCN-IM and the Zeliangrong United Front-Kamson (ZUF-K) allegedly attacked Thingkhongjang, a Kuki village in Kangpokpi District, Manipur, injuring two civilians and setting several houses ablaze.
Just three days earlier, on July 2, 2026, suspected NSCN-IM cadres allegedly attacked and burnt the Leikot Kuki village in Noney District, Manipur, where local village volunteers claimed they were overwhelmed by automatic weapons and mortar fire. These incidents reflected an unmistakable expansion of the ongoing Kuki-Naga confrontation into newer areas of western Manipur.
The violence in July followed a series of equally serious incidents during the preceding months. On June 13, 2026, a Kuki village volunteer was killed near Lasan village in Kangpokpi District, with Kuki organisations alleging the involvement of NSCN-IM and ZUF-K cadres.
Earlier, on June 5, 2026, three civilians were killed and seven houses burnt in a suspected NSCN-IM and ZUF-K attack on Loibol Khullen village in Kangpokpi District.
On April 13, 2026, four cadres of the Kuki National Army-Burma (KNA-B) were reportedly killed in an armed confrontation with NSCN-IM along the Indo-Myanmar border in Kamjong District, Manipur, reflecting the growing militarisation of the border region.
On March 11, 2026, two Kuki civilians were allegedly abducted and killed by suspected NSCN-IM cadres in Ukhrul District, while a third sustained injuries.
NSCN-IM has simultaneously remained embroiled in violent factionalism. On March 28, 2026, at least four cadres of the outfit’s so-called Myanmar-based “Eastern Flank” were killed in an inter-factional ambush in Kamjong District, exposing deep internal fissures. The incident subsequently triggered public outrage, culminating in the burning of the NSCN-IM Wung Tangkhul Region office by an angry mob.
Internal organisational tensions became even more visible in June and July 2026 when the outfit expelled eight senior leaders, including two ‘lieutenant generals’, accusing them of insubordination and operating parallel command structures. Although the Chakhesang Region and the Joint Council subsequently reaffirmed their allegiance to the collective leadership headed by ‘president’ Q. Tuccu and ‘general secretary’ Thuingaleng Muivah, these developments exposed the growing organisational strains within the outfit.
According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), there have been six incidents of killing involving NSCN-IM in the current year (data till July 17, 2026), resulting in 16 fatalities, including six civilians, two Security Force (SF) personnel and eight militants. Of the militants killed, four belonged to the Kuki National Army-Burma (KNA-B) while four were NSCN-IM cadres killed in an inter-factional clash. There were two incidents of killing involving NSCN-IM in 2025, resulting in four fatalities, all of whom were militants (three NSCN-IM and one ZUF). Similarly, there were four incidents of killing involving NSCN-IM in 2024, resulting in four fatalities, including four terrorists. Of the terrorists killed, three belonged to NSCN-IM, one belonged to ZUF.
Significantly, much of the recent violence has been concentrated in Manipur rather than Nagaland. The continuing ethnic conflict between the Kuki-Zo and Meitei communities, which erupted in May 2023, has created a new strategic environment in which Naga interests increasingly intersect with competing territorial claims. NSCN-IM has consistently accused Kuki militant groups operating under the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement of encroaching upon traditional Naga territories. Following the killing of six Naga civilians in Kangpokpi District in May 2026, the outfit demanded that the Government immediately ban Kuki militant organisations and designate them as terrorist groups. It simultaneously accused SFs of failing to protect Naga civilians, while allegedly acting against Naga protesters and village volunteers. Similar accusations have been repeated throughout 2026, with the organisation alleging that Indian SFs were providing logistical and operational support to Kuki militants while dismantling Naga defensive positions.
This narrative has become central to NSCN-IM’s political messaging. Throughout 2026, the organisation repeatedly accused the Government of violating the 1997 ceasefire ground rules, particularly during search operations in Ukhrul District and during clashes around Tangkhul villages. It alleged that SFs conducted warrantless searches, abducted civilians, occupied residential areas and acted in collusion with Kuki armed groups. Whether substantiated or not, these allegations have been consistently used by the organisation to argue that New Delhi has failed to honour both the ceasefire agreement and the spirit of the Framework Agreement, thereby attempting to justify its increasingly confrontational posture.
Alongside its growing involvement in violence, NSCN-IM has continued to intensify its political campaign against the Government of India, accusing New Delhi of reneging on the commitments made under the Framework Agreement. Throughout 2025 and 2026, virtually every major public statement issued by the organisation reiterated that the Framework Agreement recognised the “unique history” and “shared sovereignty” of the Naga people and, therefore, could not be diluted through subsequent negotiations or equated with the Agreed Position signed with the Working Committee of the Naga National Political Groups (WC-NNPGs). Addressing the outfit’s 47th Republic Day celebrations on March 21, 2026, the collective leadership once again maintained that any final settlement must be based solely on the Framework Agreement, while rejecting the 1960 Sixteen-Point Agreement and the 1975 Shillong Accord as political arrangements lacking legitimacy. Similar assertions were repeated during the Joint Council meeting at Hebron in Nagaland on June 18, 2026, where the organisation reaffirmed that it would not compromise on what it described as the “Naga National Cause” and pledged to defend the sanctity of the Framework Agreement.
The repeated emphasis on the Agreement has, however, stood in sharp contrast to the outfit’s conduct on the ground. The very purpose of the 1997 ceasefire and the subsequent Framework Agreement was to create an environment conducive to political negotiations by suspending armed hostilities. Yet, recent developments suggest that NSCN-IM has increasingly resorted to violence while simultaneously invoking the peace process for political legitimacy. The attacks on Kuki villages in Kangpokpi and Noney Districts, the alleged abduction and killing of civilians in Ukhrul, armed confrontations with KNA-B along the Indo-Myanmar border, continued clashes with ZUF-K, and the ambush in which two Assam Rifles personnel lost their lives, all indicate that the organisation continues to retain and employ its military capability despite being engaged in one of India’s longest-running peace negotiations. Equally significant is the persistence of inter-factional violence within the Naga insurgent movement itself, exposing the fragility of organisational cohesion despite repeated public declarations of unity.
The internal crisis witnessed during 2026 further illustrated these contradictions. The expulsion of eight senior functionaries, including two ‘lieutenant generals’, over allegations of disloyalty and parallel command structures revealed growing fissures within the organisation. While subsequent declarations by the Chakhesang Region and the Joint Council sought to project organisational unity and reaffirm allegiance to the collective leadership under Q. Tuccu and Thuingaleng Muivah, the developments suggested that the prolonged uncertainty surrounding the peace process has also generated internal strains within the outfit. Such divisions are not unprecedented in the history of the Naga insurgency, where ideological disagreements and leadership disputes have repeatedly produced factional splits. Although NSCN-IM has remained the strongest among the various Naga armed organisations, maintaining organisational discipline amid prolonged negotiations without a political settlement appears increasingly difficult.
Another issue that has emerged as a major point of confrontation between the NSCN-IM and the Union Government is the latter’s decision to terminate the Free Movement Regime (FMR) and erect fencing along the India-Myanmar border. The Government has justified the move primarily on security grounds, citing concerns over insurgent movement, cross-border smuggling, narcotics trafficking, arms proliferation and illegal migration – concerns that acquired greater urgency following the outbreak of ethnic violence in Manipur and the political instability in Myanmar after the 2021 military coup. The NSCN-IM, however, has rejected this rationale outright. The outfit argues that the India-Myanmar boundary is an artificial colonial creation that arbitrarily divided the Naga homeland and that fencing the border would permanently separate communities sharing common ethnic, cultural and familial ties. In statements issued in January and September 2024, the organisation declared that it would oppose border fencing, insisting that Nagas constitute “one family” irrespective of the international boundary and describing the proposed fence as another attempt to fragment the Naga nation. According to the outfit, the abrogation of the FMR is not merely a border management measure but a political decision intended to undermine the Naga national movement by institutionalising colonial-era territorial divisions.
This position fits into the broader political narrative consistently advanced by NSCN-IM. Throughout 2026, the organisation repeatedly alleged that New Delhi was deliberately using Kuki militant groups operating under the Suspension of Operations agreement as proxy forces to weaken Naga political aspirations. It accused Security Forces of assisting Kuki armed groups, dismantling Naga defensive positions and violating the ceasefire ground rules. The organisation also portrayed ongoing ethnic violence in Manipur as part of a larger geopolitical strategy aimed at fragmenting “Nagalim” and facilitating demands for a separate Kuki homeland in areas that it claims as traditional Naga territory.
Meanwhile, the peace negotiations themselves remain in limbo. Although interlocutor A.K. Mishra held another round of discussions with NSCN-IM and the Working Committee of the NNPGs in June 2025, and both sides expressed optimism regarding an inclusive settlement, the fundamental issues that have stalled the negotiations for years remain unresolved. Successive statements issued by NSCN-IM throughout 2025 and 2026 have reiterated that the Framework Agreement cannot be diluted or reinterpreted and have accused New Delhi of deliberately delaying implementation. Such rhetoric has become increasingly sharper, with senior leaders warning that continued non-implementation threatens the credibility of the entire peace process.
The cumulative picture that emerges is deeply concerning. More than 28 years after the signing of the ceasefire agreement and over a decade after the Framework Agreement, the NSCN-IM continues to function as both a negotiating partner and an armed insurgent organisation. While political dialogue remains formally alive, developments over the past two years indicate that the outfit has shown little hesitation in resorting to violence whenever it perceives threats to what it considers Naga political or territorial interests. The increasing frequency of armed confrontations, civilian killings, attacks on rival groups and cross-border engagements suggests that the ceasefire has not translated into genuine demilitarisation. Instead, it has largely frozen the conflict while allowing the organisation to preserve its military infrastructure and operational capability.
The continuing deadlock over the political settlement has undoubtedly contributed to frustration within NSCN-IM. Nevertheless, the repeated resort to violence, particularly against civilians and rival communities fundamentally undermines the confidence-building measures that the Framework Agreement was intended to promote. The contradiction between pursuing negotiations and simultaneously engaging in armed activities raises serious questions regarding the long-term viability of the peace process. Unless the negotiations move towards a credible political conclusion and all stakeholders demonstrate genuine commitment to ceasefire obligations, the risk remains that NSCN-IM will continue to oscillate between political engagement and armed coercion. At a time when the wider security environment in Manipur remains fragile and cross-border dynamics along the India-Myanmar frontier have become increasingly volatile, the persistence of NSCN-IM’s dual strategy represents one of the most significant challenges to durable peace and stability in India’s Northeast.
