Manipur entered 2026 in a deeply unsettled political and security context, marked by an uneasy transition from a prolonged period of direct central administration under President’s Rule to the restoration of representative government with the election and swearing-in of a new Chief Minister. The State had been under President’s Rule since February 13, 2025, after the resignation of the former Chief Minister N. Biren Singh and the collapse of a viable political majority amid continuing ethnic violence and institutional paralysis. The Union Government extended central rule through February 2026 because, in its judgment, the state’s fractious social landscape and sustained law and order challenges precluded the safe functioning of an elected government. After nearly a year of direct governance by the Centre, the political vacuum formally ended when Yumnam Khemchand Singh was elected leader of the ruling coalition and sworn in as CM on February 4, 2026. While the formation of a new government marked a significant political milestone intended to restore democratic legitimacy and rebuild inter-community confidence, the structural fault lines that had precipitated the crisis remained deeply entrenched.
The opening weeks of 2026 underscored the fragility of the security environment. On January 5, a series of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) blasts in Bishnupur District injured two civilians, prompting the transfer of the case to the National Investigation Agency (NIA). On January 8, a bomb was hurled at a fuel station in the same District, causing no casualties but generating widespread alarm. On the same day, cadres of the Zeliangrong United Front-Kamson (ZUF-K) engaged in a heavy exchange of fire with armed Kuki militants in Kangpokpi District, reportedly linked to disputes over drives against poppy cultivation and alleged encroachments into Zeliangrong areas. On January 21, a Meitei civilian was allegedly abducted and killed by suspected Kuki militants in Churachandpur District, reflecting the continuing vulnerability of civilians in mixed or contested zones. These incidents, though limited in scale, reveal the persistence of retaliatory violence, territorial assertion and symbolic attacks intended to project influence.
The insurgency landscape in 2026 registered a marked decline in fatalities, compared to the preceding three years, though this statistical moderation masked persistent volatility. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), the State recorded one insurgency-linked fatality (a civilian) in a single incident in 2026, as against 58 fatalities [52 terrorists, four civilians and two Security Force (SF) personnel] in 16 incidents in 2025, and 87 fatalities (51 civilians, 30 terrorists and six SF personnel) in 46 incidents in 2024. Since the outbreak of ethnic violence in May 2023, Manipur has recorded a cumulative 299 insurgency-linked fatalities in 134 separate incidents, including 121 civilians, 152 terrorists, 25 SF personnel and one fatality in the not-specified (NS) category. The downward trend in 2026 reflects the cumulative effect of sustained counter-insurgency pressure, the partial stabilisation of frontlines between rival armed formations, and fatigue among communities exhausted by protracted conflict.
Arrests remained a central feature of the security response. In 2026, 149 terrorists have been arrested in 123 separate incidents (data till March 7, 2026). This followed 1,146 arrests in 797 incidents in 2025 and 378 arrests in 162 incidents in 2024. Since 2000, a cumulative 10,621 terrorists have been arrested in 6,628 separate incidents in the State, underscoring the long duration and entrenched character of insurgent activity in Manipur.
Surrenders, in contrast, remained limited in recent years. There was one surrender in 2025, compared to 38 in 2024 and 92 in 2023. Since 2000, 1,561 terrorists have surrendered in 149 incidents.
A Manipur Government report released on August 11, 2025, indicated that, since the imposition of President’s Rule in February 2025, SFs had arrested around 665 cadres from 25 militant outfits and seized 3,134 weapons. Of these arrestees, only 19 belonged to hill-based groups such as the United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF), United Kuki National Army (UKNA), Kuki National Front (KNF), United Kuki Revolutionary Army (UKRA), Chin Kuki Mizo Army (CKMA), Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF), and Manipur Naga Revolutionary Front (MNRF), while the overwhelming majority were affiliated with valley-based outfits, including factions of the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP), the Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF)/People’s Liberation Army (PLA), People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak-Progressive (PREPAK-PRO), PREPAK, United People’s Party of Kangleipak (UPPK), United National Liberation Front (UNLF) factions, Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), Socialist Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (SOREPA), and National Revolutionary Front of Manipur (NRFM). This asymmetry in arrests reflected both operational priorities and the geographic distribution of armed activity, as valley-based outfits historically pursuing secessionist objectives, remained active in extortion, targeted attacks and propaganda, while hill-based formations were deeply entangled in ethnic territorial contestations, which have been moderated as a result of the near-complete separation of populations.
Arms recovery figures illustrated the scale of militarisation unleashed since May 2023. 50 incidents of arms recovery have already been recorded in 2026, following 390 in 2025, 310 in 2024 and 139 in 2023. The dramatic rise since 2023 is directly linked to the looting of police armouries and civilian weapon stockpiles during the initial phase of ethnic violence, when large quantities of firearms and ammunition were diverted into the hands of militants and civilians. The recovery of 3,134 weapons during President’s Rule, including 2,035 from valley groups and 1,099 from hill groups, indicates a concerted effort by Manipur Police, Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs), the Assam Rifles, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and the Indian Army, to gradually reassert control over the means of violence. The persistence of IED attacks and ambushes in early 2026, however, demonstrates that significant arsenals remain in circulation.
Factional violence remained a destabilising factor throughout 2025. On June 30, three Kuki National Army (KNA) cadres and a civilian were killed in Churachandpur District in what was described as a factional attack by UKNA cadres. On July 22, five UKNA militants were reportedly killed in a gunfight with the Chin Kuki Mizo Army (CKMA) in Tamenglong District. On December 14, a ZUF cadre was killed in a gunfight with militants of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) in Noney District. These internecine clashes, often between non-signatories to the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement, complicate the security calculus, as they blur the lines between ethnic, criminal and organisational rivalries.
Further, the pattern of incidents along the Indo-Myanmar frontier underscores the growing salience of cross-border militancy operating from sanctuaries and shifting tactical alignments across the Myanmar border. Recurrent engagements involving outfits such as the Kuki National Army-Burma (KNA-B), PREPAK, KYKL, PLA, UNLF – Koireng (UNLF-K) and the UKNA, illustrate a fluid conflict theatre marked by ambushes, sniper attacks, drone strikes and large-scale firefights near border pillars and remote villages. The scale of violence was evident during the January 27-30, 2025, clashes near Border Pillar 87 in Kamjong District, where 24 militants were killed in inter-group fighting, including 19 KNA-B cadres. Similarly, on May 14 2025, at least 10 suspected KNA-B militants were killed in a gunfight with Assam Rifles at New Samtal village in Chandel District. Such high-casualty engagements highlight the intensity of cross-border militant rivalries and the persistent use of Myanmar-based safe havens to regroup, rearm and launch operations into Manipur.
The Union Government’s management of the conflict combined coercive and accommodative measures. On September 3, 2025, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) and the Manipur Government signed a renewed SoO agreement with Kuki-Zo insurgent groups, introducing revised ground rules, relocation of designated camps, verification of cadres and commitments to deposit weapons under supervision. The agreement reaffirmed Manipur’s territorial integrity and required insurgent groups to shift camps away from conflict zones, reflecting concerns about the militarisation of sensitive areas. This was the first substantive revision of the SoO framework since 2008 and came against the backdrop of continuing demands from some Kuki-Zo formations for a separate administrative arrangement.
At the same time, extraordinary legal measures remained in force. On September 26, 2025, the UMHA extended the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) for six months across the entire State, excluding the jurisdictions of 13 police stations across five districts, declaring the remaining areas “disturbed.” The continuation of AFSPA underscores the Centre’s assessment that the security situation remains abnormal, particularly in hill districts and border regions. The selective exemption of certain police station jurisdictions suggests incremental improvement in parts of the Imphal Valley, but the broader security grid continues to rely heavily on central forces.
Judicial and investigative processes also advanced during the period under review. On December 16, 2025, the Union Government extended the mandate of the three-member Commission of Inquiry, headed by former Gauhati High Court Chief Justice Ajai Lamba, to investigate the causes and spread of the May 2023 ethnic violence, extending its deadline to May 20, 2026. The Commission is tasked with examining administrative lapses and recommending measures to prevent recurrence. The NIA remained active in prosecuting high-profile cases, including the framing of charges on February 2, 2026, against the ‘chief’ of KNA for alleged conspiracy to secede and wage war, and the taking of cognizance on January 29, 2026, of charges related to the abduction and killing of six Meitei civilians in Jiribam District in November 2024. These proceedings indicate an effort to reinforce legal accountability and address exemplary cases that had inflamed public sentiment.
Crime data from 2023, the peak year of violence, continues to cast a long shadow. The National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) reported 14,427 violent crimes in Manipur in 2023, a dramatic increase from 631 in 2022, with 24 civilians killed by extremists and 15 police personnel killed, including 11 by riotous mobs. Six people were killed in Police lathi charge during riots. Despite the surge in crime, only 247 cases were sent for trial in 2023, while 5,594 cases remained pending.
Symbolic resistance to the Indian State also persisted. On January 22, 2026, seven underground outfits under the Coordination Committee (CorCom), along with SOREPA, called for a boycott of Republic Day, declaring it a “colonial reconsolidation day” and announcing shutdowns. Such calls, linked to opposition to Manipur’s merger with India in 1949, demonstrate that secessionist narratives retain resonance within sections of valley-based insurgent formations, even as their operational capacity has been constrained.
Manipur in 2026 thus stands at a transitional moment. Fatalities have declined, arrests and arms recoveries have increased, and political institutions have been partially restored. Yet insurgent networks, factional rivalries, secessionist rhetoric, and unresolved ethnic cleavages continue to define the security landscape. The durability of peace will depend not merely on coercive success but on the capacity of the State and its new political leadership to transform a conflict-driven equilibrium into a framework of negotiated coexistence, accountable governance and inclusive development.
