On February 17, 2026, Tarique Rahman took the oath as Prime Minister (PM) of Bangladesh, as Bangladesh Nationalist Party-BNP-alliance won 212 seats out of 297 declared seats in Jatiya Sangsad. After the ouster of Sheikh Hasina, and the uninterrupted mayhem and violence of 18 months under Mohammad Yunus’ Interim Government, Bangladesh saw an elected Prime Minister.
Within few days, Rahman has brought sweeping changes in the leadership of the military, intelligence, Police, and civil administration in two major reshuffles, on February 22 and again on February 26. The scale, speed, and institutional spread of the reshuffles point to a deliberate attempt to reconfigure the state’s power architecture after a major political transition. The most significant changes were in the Army Command, and included the Chief of General Staff, Principal Staff officer and Division Commanders; the Chief of the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI); the top Police leadership, including the Inspector General of Police and the Commissioner of the Dhaka Metropolitan Police; the Governor of Bangladesh Bank, the country’s central bank; and various Secretaries, including the Secretary to the Prime Minister’s Office, among others.
These are the core instruments of state power. The appointment of a new DGFI chief and reshuffling of operational commands suggests an effort to secure regime loyalty and control over intelligence flows. There are indications that officers perceived as aligned with previous regimes or foreign linkages are being replaced. One report explicitly noted that an officer was removed due to “perceived close ties with Pakistan.” Simultaneously, “Yunus-era” appointees have reportedly been sidelined, reflecting political consolidation. The reshuffles may also be partly intended to insulate security agencies and the administration from ideological penetration by radical Islamist formation, particularly including the Jamaat e Islami (JeI), not the largest party in opposition.
Significantly, following the reshuffles, both JeI and Islami Andolan Bangladesh (IAB) fiercely criticised the government. On February 26, JeI Chief, Rahman stated that the situation created at Bangladesh Bank seems to be the “formal beginning of a government-backed mob culture”, calling it unfortunate and completely unacceptable. Likewise, on February 26, IAB Joint Secretary General and Spokesperson Gazi Ataur Rahman stated, “The financial sector was pushed into chaos by appointing such a person as governor.”
Earlier, on February 23, JeI Secretary General, Mia Golam Porwar, criticised the BNP-led Government for appointing party-affiliated individuals as administrators to six city corporations. Porwar protested the decision, noting that a notification issued on February 22, by the Local Government Division, named administrators for Dhaka North City Corporation, Dhaka South City Corporation, Khulna City Corporation, Sylhet City Corporation, Narayanganj City Corporation and Gazipur City Corporation.
As discussed with the writer, experts and academics from Bangladesh, [on condition of anonymity] have sketched out some possibilities with respect to these transfers. First, Rahman is trying to consolidate his political position as Prime Minister and also secure BNP’s political standing amidst strong presence of Jamaat and its cohorts. Secondly, he is trying to root out elements with Jamaat backing or its sympathisers from important positions. Thirdly, because a sizable portion of BNP supporters are also sympathetic to the Jamaat and its ideology, (JeI is an old ally of BNP, and had earlier backed BNP-led coalitions in 1991 and 2001), not much analytical discussions are occurring in the public domain regarding these transfers and shuffles. Fourthly, with the absence of Awami League from the political landscape, Rahman remains very cautious, since his return to the country, he is constantly criticized and targeted by Islamists, especially JeI and IAB leaders. He seeks to avoid constant political combat with these organisations. Moreover, Rahman’s priority is to maintain a basic level of peace and curb the violence that has become commonplace since Sheikh Hasina’s ouster. Within this context, experts believe that the coming six months to one year will be a crucial period for Bangladesh’s democracy and also for Tarique Rahman.
Significantly, pre-election violence, principally clashes between BNP and JeI, signal dangers lurking over his party leaders and members. Since the declaration of the election date on December 11, 2025, according to partial data collated by Institute for Conflict Management (ICM), six BNP members were killed and 77 injured (data till February 28, 2026) in such clashes. Among the dead were:
- On December 17, BNP leader, Biru Mollah, President of the Lokhmikunda Union unit, was shot dead by unidentified assailants inside his residence in Ishwardi Upazila (Sub-District) of Pabna District.
- On January 3, unknown assailants shot dead BNP leader Alamgir Hossain in the Shankarpur area of Jashore town in Jashore District. He was joint secretary of Jashore Municipality BNP’s Ward No. 7 unit.
- On January 5, a local leader of Jatiyatabadi Jubo Dal (JD), the youth wing of BNP, Jane Alam Sikder, was shot dead by unidentified gunmen in Purba Gujra Union of Raozan Upazila in Chattogram District.
- On January 7, Azizur Rahman aka Musabbir, former General Secretary of the Dhaka Metropolitan North branch of the Swechchhasebak Dal, BNP’s volunteer wing, was shot dead by unidentified miscreants in the Tejturi Bazar area of Tejgaon in Dhaka city.
- On January 24, Hasan Molla, General Secretary of the Hazratpur Union BNP, died after being shot by motorcycle-borne assailants in Dhalikandi area of Keraniganj Upazila in Dhaka District.
- On February 16, the body of Joynal Abedin Dhali, a local BNP worker, was recovered hanging from a tree in Gosairhat Upazila of Shariatpur District.
In his first weeks in Government, Rahman has given clear evidence of a systematic consolidation of state power, particularly focused on its coercive apparatus. Internationally, there are suggestions that he is seeking to reduce alignment with any single power, and is moving towards strategic autonomy and balance. These strategies are likely to yield stabilisation through control of institutions in the short run, though, in the longer term, they may risk politicisation and internal friction.
Bangladesh remains politically and economically fragile, and the challenges facing the Rahman Government will persist. Nevertheless, the early days of the regime have seen a measure of calm and deliberate action that have the potential of steadying the chaotic trajectory that the country has followed over the recent past.
