On May 7, 2026, Leilma, an Ismaili woman and wife of Salam Maftoon, a local singer, was killed at the Ishkashim Bazaar in the Ishkashim District of Badakhshan Province. The attacker used a hunting rifle. Salam Maftoon had previously been detained by the Taliban and was later released following mediation by local elders.
On April 28, 2026, Farid Nosrat, an Ismaili employee of the Taliban Ministry of Interior, was killed by individuals affiliated with the group, inside one of the departments of the Taliban Ministry of Interior in Kabul.
On January 22, 2026, two Ismaili men, Shah Nazar and Ghulam Hussein, were wounded after being shot by unidentified armed assailants in the Dasht-e-Qargh area of Faizabad, the capital of Badakhshan Province.
On January 1, 2026, armed men shot and killed Mohammad Shah, an Ismaili resident in the Dasht-e-Qargh area of Faizabad, the capital of Badakhshan Province. Shah, was attacked while returning home from a bakery.
On December 30, 2026, an Ismaili man, Khodaydad, was shot dead in front of his wife and children in the Warsuj District of Takhar Province.
Though, the incidents of direct acts of violence against the Ismailis seem to be sparse, the planned and systematic process of their subjugation and eventual obliteration appears very much on the scheme of things under the Taliban regime.
The Human Rights Situation of Ismaili Shias in Afghanistan report, published by Rawadari, an Afghan human rights organization, in December 2025 states:
Through public takfir (accusations of apostasy), intimidation, death threats, detention, and torture, the Taliban have coerced members of this community to abandon their faith and convert to Sunni sect of Islam. Ismaili community is being subjected to systematic religious persecution that may be considered an instance of crimes against humanity.
Roughly 90 per cent of Ismailis in Afghanistan are ethnic Hazara; some Ismaili communities are also classified as ethnic Tajiks. Ismailis are primarily located in the Bamiyan, Badakhshan, Uruzgan, Kabul, Baghlan, Takhar and Ghor provinces; in the Sheikh Ali District of Parwan; the Behsud District of Maidan Wardak; the Khulm District in Samangan; and the Mazar-e-Sharif District in Balkh. Their highest concentration is in the Badakhshan Province, in the areas of Yamgan, Shughnan, Jurm, Wakhan, Zebak, Yamgan, Darwaz, Karan wa Manjan, and Roshan.
The European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), in its Afghanistan: Country Focus Country of Origin Information Report, published in January 2026, notes:
A local ban on intermarriages between Shias, including Ismailis, and Sunnis was reported in Paktia, Nimruz, and Badakhshan provinces… The battle for local influence and political survival in Badakhshan ‘also plays out in the field of education’, and the de facto [Taliban] authorities have emphasised control of religious schools nationally, especially in this province, ‘arguably because of concerns about rival or untrusted groups promoting “wrong” tenets or loyalties’. The de facto authorities have established several madrassas across Badakhshan Province, in predominantly Ismaili-populated areas, requiring Ismaili children to enrol and follow religious education based on the Sunni faith. They have banned the construction of Ismaili mosques and other Ismaili religious sites in Badakhshan Province.
Ismailis face harsh restrictions on their choice of educational centres. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) report, Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan, July-September 2025, in the Nusai, Shakai and Meyamai Districts, of Badakhshan Province, Ismaili families are required to enrol their children in Sunni madrasas or face a fine ranging from AFN 20,000 (USD250) to AFN100,000 (USD1,260). As reported on October 5, 2025, Juma Faateh, a Taliban Commander, established a madrassa at Jamerch village in the Maymay District of Badakhshan, home to around 500 Ismaili families, and used threats and firearms to compel parents to send their children to this religious school. If families refused, they were fined AFN10,000.
Ismailis also suffer forcible religious conversions. Between January 17 and February 3, 2025, for instance, at least 50 male members of the Ismaili community were forced to convert to the Sunni faith in Badakhshan Province by Taliban’s Department for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. Those who refused to convert were subject to physical assaults, coercion and death threats. As reported on January 23, 2026, Taliban’s Council of Clerics in Badakhshan Province offered financial rewards and security guarantees to Ismailis who convert to Sunni Islam. Ismaili converts are promised security guarantees, cash rewards and other forms of financial assistance.
Ismailis also witness the destruction and conversion of their places of worship. As reported on October 25, 2025, a shrine to the revered Ismaili mystic Diwana Shah, also known as Shah Darvishan, at Khalkhan village in the Zebak District of Badakhshan Province, was destroyed by fire. Also reported on January 24, 2026, Taliban announced plans to convert the Jamaatkhana (Ismaili place of worship) of Zebak, Ishkashim, Wakhan, and Shughnan, into mosques. Earlier, in August 2023, Taliban converted the Panj Jamaatkhana into a mosque, prohibiting Ismailis from worshiping in these places.
On January 4, 2026, the Taliban officially approved a new Criminal Procedure Code for Courts (De Mahakumu Jazaai Osulnama), signed by Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada, designed to govern judicial authority, evidentiary standards, and the application of punishments (ta’zir) in Taliban-controlled courts. In Clause 8 of Article 2 of the Code, followers of the Hanafi school are described as Muslims, while followers of other schools are described as mubtadi or ‘innovators’. This decree is the final nail in the coffin of an equal status for Ismailis in Afghanistan.
Since the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021, the persecution of Ismailis in Afghanistan has become systematic and multi-dimensional, involving religious coercion, forced conversion, institutional discrimination, and socio-economic exclusion. These practices appear organised and rooted in the regime’s ideological framework and ‘othering’ of various religious sects.
