Before the end of his term, President Maithripala Sirisena appointed a Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI) on 21 September 2019, headed by Supreme Court Justice Janak de Silva, following a request by Archbishop Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith and a recommendation from the Vijith Malalgoda Committee. Dissatisfied with earlier investigations by both the Malalgoda Committee and the Parliamentary Select Committee, the Archbishop actively participated in the PCoI proceedings through a legal team led by President’s Counsel Shammil Perera, including during in-camera hearings. However, the subsequent Gotabaya Rajapaksa administration largely failed to implement the commission’s recommendations, deepening tensions with the Catholic Church. Notably, two senior police officers criticised by the PCoI—Senior DIG Nilantha Jayawardena and Deshabandu Tennakoon—remained in service, with Jayawardena rising to Deputy Inspector General and Tennakoon later being appointed Inspector General of Police.
Appearing on behalf of retired Maj. General Suresh Sallay, still being held under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), over his alleged involvement in the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage, his Counsel, Sanjeewa Jayawardena PC, told the Court of Appeal how the National Security Council (NSC) disregarded his client’s warnings, pertaining to growing Muslim extremism and the urgent need to take countermeasures.
Jayawardena said so on 21 July during the hearing of a writ petition filed by Sallay against his arrest and detention under the PTA. The bench comprised Court of Appeal President Justice Rohantha Abeysooriya and Justice Priyantha Fernando.
Declaring that his client, in his capacity as the head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), issued the warnings, way back in 2016, Jayawardena alleged that one senior member of the NSC objected to the warnings. Jayawardena stopped short of naming the NSC member concerned.
The National Thowheeth Jamaath (NTJ) was blamed for the attack, led by Zaharan (abbreviation) Mohammadu Cassim Mohammadu Jaharan – Abu Ubaida (name used within the organisation). In addition to the NTJ, the government banned eight other local extremist organisations.
Let us hope that the identity of that particular member of the NSC is revealed during the future proceedings. It would be pertinent to mention that Jayawardena directed a devastating accusation at former President Maithripala Sirisena, the head of NSC in March 2022. Appearing for the Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL), Jayawardena alleged in the Supreme Court, on 16 March, 2022, that the failure on the part of Sirisena to convene the NSC caused security lapses that led to the Easter attacks.
Jayawardena’s direct accusation against NSC Head Sirisena, in July, 2022, and his decision during the Court of Appeal proceedings, not to name the person accused of disregarding Sallay’s warning ,indicated that the learned Counsel was, in fact, referring to another member of the NSC. Had it been Sirisena, perhaps, he would have named the culprit.
Before the end of 2016, the government unceremoniously ousted Sallay and sent him to Malaysia as Minister Counsellor. Against the backdrop of counsel Jayawardena’s allegations against the still unnamed NSC member, let me examine the NSC’s status. Headed by the President, the decision-making NSC is the supreme body that dealt with crucial matters of importance and a place for free and frank exchange of views. Although the NSC hadn’t been constitutionally created, authoritative sources asserted that it came into being either during Premier Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s premiership or JRJ’s tenure as the President.
The NSC consists of the President, Prime Minister, Defence Secretary, Finance Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Secretary to the President, Chief of Defence Staff (the NPP has done away with that post), Service Commanders, Inspector General of Police and Director General State Intelligence Service (SIS). In case someone else, other than the President, holds the defence portfolio, that person becomes a member of the NSC. One-time Attorney General Tilak Marapana, PC, served as a member of the NSC during Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s tenure as the President.
The period in question, referred to by Jayawardena in the Supreme Court, in March, 2022, and July, 2026, was the chaotic and utterly irresponsible Yahapalana administration. Sirisena, who betrayed the Rajapaksas to contest the 2015 presidential election on the hitherto unheard of New Democratic Party (NDF) ticket, was soon at loggerheads with Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe. After a spate of minor disagreements, the Yahapalana partnership suffered irreparable damage, in the wake of Singaporean Arjuna Mahendran’s appointment as the Governor of the Sri Lanka Central Bank. Mahendran received his appointment on 26 January, 2015. By the time Mahendran took over the CB, Wickremesinghe had the institution placed under him. Wickremesinghe held the policy planning and economic affairs portfolios.
When the UNP perpetrated the first Treasury bond scam, in the last week of February, 2015, a month after Mahendran took over the Central Bank, Sirisena’s relationship with Wickremesinghe began to deteriorate. Soon, there were damning public condemnation of each other. The Yahapalana partnership declined so rapidly that the National security would have been the last thing on their minds.
A victim of circumstances
The Permanent Trial-at-Bar last Friday (31 July, 2026) sentenced two Yahapalana time NSC members, namely Defence Secretary Hemasiri Fernando and IGP Pujitha Jayasundara, to death for failing to thwart the Easter Sunday attacks.
They were acquitted of the same charges by a three-judge High Court bench, in 2022. However, the Supreme Court ordered a fresh trial.
Sirisena, during his turbulent period as the President (January 2015 to November 2019) routinely replaced Defence Secretaries, thereby causing uncertainty. Sirisena brought in four civilians, namely B.M.U.D. Basnayake (January 2015 to September 2015), Karunasena Hettiarachchi (September 2015 to July 2017), Kapila Waidyaratne, PC, (July 2017 to October 2018) and Hemasiri Fernando (October 2018 to April 2019). After the Easter Sunday humiliation, Sirisena invited retired Army Commander General Shantha Kottegoda to succeed Fernando.
Perhaps people do not even remember that Hemasiri Fernando hadn’t been a member of the NSC at the time Sallay issued the warning. Karunasena Hettiarachchi, who had been a close confidante of Sirisena, served as the Secretary Defence at that time and was also aware of the circumstances Premier Wickremesinghe removed Sallay from the DMI. The then Army Commander Crishantha de Silva (February 2015 to June 2017) brought in Brigadier Vijendra Gunathilake as head of the DMI. Perhaps his political bosses wanted an outsider to head the DMI, hence the decision to bring in Gunathilake of the Sinha Regiment.
The appointment of Hemasiri Fernando as Defence Secretary on 30 October, 2018, took place close on the heels of the collapse of the Yahapalana partnership. Who advised Sirisena to bring in Hemasiri Fernando as Secretary Defence? Fernando, who held two key government positions as Sirisena’s Chief of Staff, in addition to being Chairman of the Board of Investment (BoI), at the time he received the top defence sector appointment, obviously found that task daunting. In other words, Fernando was not equal to the challenging task.
With Sallay’s departure from the DMI and the Yahapalana leadership’s perceived hostility towards anyone who dared to raise growing Muslim extremism at that time, the Army obviously refrained from taking up the issue. Lt. General Mahesh Senanayake (June 2017 to August 2019), who succeeded de Silva, claimed, at the first post-Easter Sunday media briefing, chaired by Sirisena, at the President’s House, that the SIS refrained from sharing intelligence with the DMI. Brigadier Gunathilake’s successor Brigadier Chula Kodituwakku, who, too, had been at the head table, confirmed that pathetic situation. Kodituwakku, a career DMI officer, explained the NTJ setup, and related outfits, involved in the Easter Sunday massacres. The DMI chief discussed the issue against the backdrop of the international environment.
The writer was among the journalists at that packed briefing where Sirisena claimed he got to know about the attacks, via social media, though he subsequently changed his narrative. The truth is that the President left the country on a pilgrimage to India and then was on holiday, and for medical checkup, in Singapore, when the NTJ struck.
The way the Yahapalana leadership treated Justice Minister Dr. Wiejeyadasa Rajapakshe, PC, shabbily, after he, on the advice of Sallay, warned Parliament, in November, 2016, of the impending danger, which compelled others to keep quiet.
During Sirisena’s presidency, three Sri Lanka Administrative Service officers, namely P.B. Abeykoon (2015-2017), Austin Fernando (2107-2018) and Udaya Ranjith Seneviratne, served as Secretary to the President. Let me name the members of the NSC at the time the NTJ terrorists carried out the devastating coordinated attacks: President Sirisena who also held the Defence portfolio, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, Presidential Secretary Ubaya Ranjith Seneviratne, Defence Secretary Hemasiri Fernando, Chief of Defence Staff Admiral Ravi Wijegunaratne, Army Commander Lt. Gen. Mahesh Senanayake, Navy Commander Vice Admiral Piyal de Silva, Air Force Commander Air Vice Marshal K.V.B. Jayampathy, IGP Pujith Jayasundara, Foreign Secretary Ravinatha Aryasinha, Finance Secretary Dr. R.H.S. Samaratunga and SIS head DIG Nilantha Jayawardena. But, do not forget Hemasiri Fernando hadn’t been in the NSC at the time Sallay issued the warning. It was Karunasena Hettiarachchi. Did anyone bother to ask Hettiarachchi as to why absolutely no action was taken regarding Sallay’s warning.
The Director of DMI was summoned as and when required though he was not officially a member of the NSC. Chief of National Intelligence (CNI), a post created in 2006, was meant to ensure that the intelligence services shared information and acted swiftly and decisively. Maj. Gen. Kapila Hendawitharana, who played an unparalleled role in the war against the LTTE, served as the first CNI, and was replaced by retired DIG Sisira Mendis, in 2015. One-time top investigator, Mendis, failed in his new assignment and contributed to the overall failure of the intelligence services. Obviously, Mendis failed to exercise control over the entire intelligence apparatus as Hendawitharana did. The repercussions were catastrophic.
Pujith beats Acting IGP
After Sallay’s was conveniently sent off from Sri Lanka, the Yahapalana government simply forgot about the Muslim extremist threat. To make matters worse, Sirisena sacked Premier Wickremesinghe and brought in Mahinda Rajapaksa as the UNP leader’s successor. Hemasiri Fernando got the Defence portfolio, thanks to Sirisena’s disastrous political move that probably facilitated the NTJ terror project.
In the wake of IGP N.K. Illangakoon’s retirement, in April 2016, Acting IGP S.M. Wickremasinghe was expected to receive the Constitutional Council’s nod to become the IGP. But, the utterly corrupt political party system deprived Wickremasinghe that opportunity. The CC interviewed Wickremasinghe and two others, Pujith Jayasundera and the late C.D. Wickremaratne (he may have committed suicide recently but controversy surrounds the circumstances of his death) but contrary to expectations CC picked Jayasundera.
The Sirisena-Wickremesinghe combine paid a huge price for picking the wrong man. Wickremesinghe, who retired on 31 December, 2019, declared at his final speech, as a police officer, that the service deteriorated due to the failure on the part of successive governments to appoint suitable persons to head the service. Wickremesinghe was speaking as Pujith Jayasundera was struggling to cope up with his new status as a person on compulsory leave.
Let us get back to Sanjeewa Jayawardena’s declaration, in the Court of Appeal, on 21 July. Of the NSC members who could have discarded Sallay’s warning: Only Sirisena or Wickremesinghe could have dismissed Sallay’s warning at the expense of national security. Perhaps Jayawardena was referring to Sirisena, though he refrained from mentioning the name.
The Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI) that investigated the NTJ operation, in its final report to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, asserted that there was criminal liability on the part of President Sirisena. The PCoI recommended that the Attorney General institute criminal proceedings against Sirisena under any suitable provision in the Penal Code (Final Report Vol 1. Page 265).
However, by then Sirisena had been a member of the SLPP government, representing the Polonnaruwa district, and his SLFP was the second largest party in the government. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa couldn’t have asked the Attorney General to take action in terms of the PCoI recommendations. Possible move against Sirisena could have triggered a crisis within the SLPP’s parliamentary group. The SLFP group, within the government, comprised 13 or 14 MPs and President Gotabaya Rajapaksa couldn’t have risked an internal crisis.
May be the President’s Counsel was alluding to Wickremesinghe whose negligent response to the apparent threat received the attention of the PCoI. But, the PCoI, for some unexplained reason, failed to recommend specific actions against Wickremesinghe. In fact, the National Catholic Committee for Justice to the Easter Sunday Attack Victims, raised the issue with no less a person than the President.
In a letter, dated 12 July, 2021, addressed to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the Committee found fault with the government for the extremely slow pace of investigations, while naming the culprits on the basis of the PCoI findings. Sallay hadn’t been among them. The Committee made its most attention-grabbing observation on Ranil Wickremesinghe. The Committee reproduced the relevant section from the PCoI Report. “Upon a consideration of evidence, it is the view of the PCoI that the lax approach of Mr. Wickremesinghe towards Islam extremism as the Prime Minister was one of the primary reasons for the failure on the part of the then Government to take proactive steps against Islamic extremism. This facilitated the build-up of Muslim extremism to the point of the Easter Sunday attack,” (Final Report.Vol 1. Pages 276-277).
Declaring that Premier Wickremesinghe’s soft approach to what the Committee called Islamic extremism irresponsible, the Committee, in its 19-page letter to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, questioned the failure on the part of the PCoI to make specific recommendations in respect of Prime Minister Wickremesinghe. This was in July 2021. Less than a year later, President Gotabaya, fighting a desperate battle for survival against the Aragalaya chaos, invited Wickremesinghe to accept the premiership. Exactly a year after the intervention made by the Committee, the SLPP elected Wickremesinghe as the President.
No wonder, an irate Catholic Church teamed up with the JVP/NPP in the run-up to showdown at Pangiriwatta, Mirihana, where a violent campaign against President Gotabaya Rajapaksa erupted on the night of 31 March, 2022. The US-Indian-backed sinister campaign continued till President Gotabaya Rajapaksa gave up the presidency and was forced to flee the country.
Two critically important points, mentioned in the Church Committee’s letter to the President were (1) the Church believed that there should have been additional investigations to ascertain as to why Wickremesinghe adopted such lax attitude and (2) Wickremesinghe, in spite of having special powers, in terms of the 19th Amendment to the Constitution, committed a serious act of irresponsibility and neglect of duty.
Indian factor
On Sri Lanka’s part, there had never been a genuine attempt to ascertain the overall Indian factor, though it still remains a mystery. The late IGP C.D. Wickremaratne is on record as having told the CID how Colombo-based top unnamed Indian intelligence officer repeatedly sought information regarding the status of Sarah Jasmin, wife of the Katuwapitiya Church bomber. Wickremaratne disclosed how the Indian emphasised the importance of that particular information for their own investigations. This transpired when the CID questioned Wickremaratne regarding the third DNA conducted on 27 April, 2022, to ascertain Jasmin’s fate, in spite of the previous tests proving she was not among the dead at the site of Sainthamaruthu self-inflicted NTJ blasts, to evade arrest about a week after the Easter Sunday attacks.
Why the then Director CID SSP Shanie Abeysekera and senior DIG in charge of CID Ravi Seneviratne failed to act on specific instructions issued by SIS chief DIG Nilantha Jayewardena. The fact that the SIS Head issued directives, on the basis of intelligence provided by India, is an accepted fact. But, Abeysekera and Seneviratne are back at the CID and the Public Security Ministry, respectively, as the Easter Sunday investigation progressed under controversial circumstances.
Against the backdrop of the Trial-at-Bar imposing capital punishment on ex-IGP Jayasundera and ex-Defence Secretary Fernando, the accountability of the two senior most officers of the CID at the time of the Easter Sunday cannot be ignored. However, it must be stressed that the PCoI never made any adverse comments on them. Both of them appeared before the Parliamentary Select Committee that probed the Easter attacks, as well as the PCoI, but found no lapses on their part.
Special investigation is required to ascertain as to how the NSC handled intelligence received from India. That is of pivotal importance as the Counsel for Sallay alleged, in the Court of Appeal, that a senior member of the NSC disregarded the warning issued by him, over three years before the NTJ mounted attacks.
The disclosure that Mohammed Yusuf Ibrahim, the father of two suicide bombers, Inshaf Ahmed Ibrahim (Cinnamon Grand) and Ilham Ahmed Ibrahim (Shangri-La) had been a political donor and a JVP National List nominee at the 2015 parliamentary election never received the attention it deserved. The issue at hand is whether the wealthy businessman knew of the planned terrorist attacks, particularly because explosives had been stored at his Dematagoda residence that enabled his pregnant daughter-in-law to detonate a suicide vest killing herself, her two children and three policemen raiding their mansion.
Mohammed Yusuf Ibrahim was granted bail by courts during Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s presidency. Sarah Jasmin’s fate, too, remains a mystery. Then Attorney General Dappula de Livera, PC, who created the myth of a grand conspiracy behind the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage, is yet to be questioned. Having caused media furor, in May 2021, over an unproven grand conspiracy claim, he successfully sought court intervention to prevent the Terrorist Investigation Department (TID) from recording his statement. He is unlikely to be questioned ever regarding that claim made in the aftermath of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa refusal to extend his term of office by another year. The country is struggling to find answers in a developing complex situation and the 2019 Easter Sunday plot may never be solved.
