As the US-Iran war enters its 13th day, there are no strong visible signs of disengagement or exiting from the conflict. Both sides seem to be following a risky escalation strategy aimed at reaching a peak that might force de-escalation. However, even these escalatory tactics are failing to impose caution. Iran is ensuring its survivability despite facing severe blows while simultaneously maintaining the power to retaliate against US and Israeli strategic positions, further destabilizing the region and inflicting economic pain.
The common strategy for finding an exit through superior power is to dominate and establish superiority over the enemy, forcing them to negotiate. The risky gamble begins with full escalation to a level where the enemy cannot sustain the fight, exhausting their will to resist. This tactic has historically been the US’s key exit strategy whenever it becomes stuck in a conflict. Sledgehammer tactics and climbing the escalation ladder to dominate have led to successful, honorable exits for the US.
In the Iraq War, when the US toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime, a power vacuum was soon filled by sectarian tensions, culminating in widespread violence. By 2006, the US was desperately seeking an exit. Instead of pursuing negotiations, the Bush administration escalated to dominate and stabilize the situation. What was initially planned as a rapid withdrawal and negotiation strategy became a calibrated offensive campaign, backing one sect against the other. In Iraq, the US supported Sunni groups against Shia militants, leading to the Anbar Awakening, which drove Al-Qaeda and other hardliners out and created space for a responsible US exit. Though this later facilitated the rise of ISIS, tactically, it was a success.
Similarly, during the Bosnian War in 1995, when peacekeeping missions and negotiations with the Serbs were failing, US-NATO launched a sustained air campaign and backed Croat ground operations to recapture territory. This organized offensive forced the Serbs to negotiate, leading to the Dayton Accords, which ended the war. However, such escalatory tactics can backfire if ground realities are misread, as seen in Vietnam. Massive air campaigns, chemical bombings, and even nuclear threats failed to break North Vietnam’s will, as the conflict was viewed as a struggle for national survival, prolonging the war and resulting in one of the US’s most significant military failures.
During the Korean War, the US aimed to escalate the conflict through major offensives to unify the peninsula and end the war by Christmas. However, China intervened in large numbers, trapping US and UN forces in a two-year bloody, static trench war. Even then, the US misread the possibilities for conflict expansion and strategic outcomes.
The ongoing US-Iran war presents a similar quagmire. The US and Israel had implicit objectives of regime change, masked by concerns over Iran’s nuclear program. However, neither implicit nor explicit objectives seem achievable. Large-scale targeted strikes meant to eliminate Iran’s leadership and weaken its will have failed. Iran’s massive retaliatory measures destabilize the region and inflict economic pain, closing an immediate exit for the US.
US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth recently acknowledged that the US did not anticipate the exact nature of Iran’s retaliation in the Gulf, suggesting a misreading of Iran’s response and conflict management. The US hopes to stage a major attack to weaken Iran strategically and claim a responsible exit, while Iran aims to force the US to negotiate by sustaining missile and drone strikes and blocking the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has also outlined conditions for negotiation that emphasize strength rather than capitulation.
Whether the US’s escalation strategy will succeed in achieving objectives is doubtful. Any exit is likely to be a face-saving maneuver rather than a genuinely substantive resolution, reflecting a strategic stalemate. History shows that US misreadings and knee-jerk reactions, rather than clear planning under doctrines like Powell’s—which emphasize force as a last resort, clear objectives, and an exit strategy—often lead to actions driven more by power than foresight.
