Guns have fallen silent along the Af-Pak border after deadly clashes between the Taliban and Pakistan, with only limited skirmishes continuing. The ceasefire maintaining this fragile calm along the border remains precarious, as the conflict in the Af-Pak region has exceeded the limits of strategic patience and restraint, leading to a near-total loss of face for both Islamabad and Kabul. The so-called strategic depth doctrine has now become little more than a symbolic strategy for Pakistan, with no substantive value. In such a scenario, New Delhi has an opportunity to recalibrate its Afghan strategy and develop its own strategic depth. Russia’s decision to sign a mutual pact with the Taliban has revived Cold War memories and highlighted Moscow’s growing pivot toward Afghanistan. However, even this development offers Pakistan little room to deepen US-Pak ties, especially regarding Afghanistan, as there is no longer any Cold War-era strategic advantage for Pakistan, nor any high-value leverage capable of reviving its strategic relevance or restoring its strategic depth against the Taliban.
The Camaraderie and Dual Strategy
The Taliban enjoyed Pakistan’s patronage for decades, from the Afghan-Soviet period until 1999, when the Taliban became a key component of Pakistan’s strategic depth strategy against India. They allowed the Pakistan-based terrorist group LeT to operate along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, using Afghan territory as a training and logistical base for carrying out terrorist activities in India. This strategic depth approach proved effective in destabilizing Jammu and Kashmir from the late 1980s through the 1990s. The provinces of Khost, Jalalabad, and Kandahar became key training centres for terrorist organisations.
After 9/11, the Taliban was ousted by the US-led War on Terror, particularly through the CIA’s Operation Jawbreaker. Even after this ouster, Pakistan managed to reorganise its strategic depth approach through the Haqqani Network. The Haqqanis and the Taliban’s core leadership were redeployed to the FATA region, particularly North Waziristan, with significant assistance from Pakistan’s ISI.
While Pakistan publicly supported the United States in its War on Terror, it covertly nurtured and strengthened the Haqqani Network through criminal syndicates and financial networks in the Persian Gulf. Pakistan revived its strategic depth strategy when the ISI’s S Division, responsible for managing proxy groups, established a network of operations linking the Haqqanis with other militant organisations, including LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed, in the FATA region.
The Haqqanis’ first major attack against Indian interests was the bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul in July 2008, followed by a second attack in October 2009. Until 2011, the Haqqani Network, with support from Pakistan’s ISI, continued targeting India’s strategic assets, including consulates, infrastructure projects, and training centres. As a result, India scaled back its presence and missions, reducing its strategic and tactical footprint in Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s dual strategy of publicly supporting the US while covertly backing militant groups yielded favourable outcomes on two fronts. First, it helped Pakistan maintain plausible deniability by exploiting the Haqqani Network’s complex web of operations and links with other militant groups, making attribution difficult. Pakistan also argued that it lacked effective control over the tribal areas. Second, it enabled Pakistan to preserve its strategic depth strategy even after losing direct Taliban influence in Afghanistan. Later, Pakistan relied on the Haqqanis to moderate the TTP, which had become a serious threat to the Pakistani state. Until 2021, Pakistan pursued a hybrid strategy that combined political engagement with logistical and financial support for the Haqqanis and other proxy groups.
Breaking Strategies and Camaraderie
The fall of Kabul in 2021 was celebrated in Pakistan, and expectations of renewed strategic depth resurfaced. However, Pakistan soon realised that it was not dealing with the old Taliban; it was confronting a new Taliban shaped by different strategic realities. The new Taliban sought autonomy and international legitimacy, becoming increasingly assertive. This shift led to border clashes, economic and political tensions, and, most importantly, disputes over the TTP issue.
Pakistan expected the Taliban to restrain the TTP. However, it did not receive the response it had anticipated from Kabul, contributing to the collapse of the ceasefire between Pakistan and the TTP.
The ISI’s last hope was its most trusted partner, the Haqqani Network, which had previously acted as a mediator with the TTP. However, this strategy also failed because the Haqqanis lost influence due to growing tensions within the Taliban leadership. These tensions intensified after clashes with the Taliban’s supreme leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, over issues such as taxation in Haqqani-controlled areas and the treatment of women. The Haqqanis, often viewed as relatively more pragmatic, opposed Akhundzada’s hardline policies. Sirajuddin Haqqani, the network’s leader, now stands at significant ideological and political odds with Akhundzada.
The loss of influence over the Haqqanis, the ongoing conflict with the Taliban, and the persistent threat posed by the TTP have effectively ended Pakistan’s strategic depth doctrine. The recent deadly clashes and full-scale military offensives have officially marked the collapse of Pakistan’s strategic depth in Kabul. Nevertheless, Pakistan is attempting to adapt to this new reality, though the task remains difficult, especially as India appears prepared to expand its own influence in Kabul and further limit Pakistan’s strategic options.
Old but a Failed Playbook
The strategic relocation of Taliban and Haqqani leaders to the FATA region, combined with the expansion of cross-border jihadist networks, gradually produced severe blowback for Pakistan. A culture of autonomy and hardline ideology spread throughout the broader global jihadist ecosystem rooted in the tribal areas.
Al-Qaeda likely played a significant role in the emergence of the TTP and in persuading various militant groups to turn against Pakistan. The Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), an Islamist militant organisation founded in 1992 with the objective of overthrowing the Pakistani government, resurged after 2001 under the leadership of Sufi Mohammad. In 2002, however, the government of Pervez Musharraf launched a crackdown that resulted in Mohammad’s arrest.
Despite this, the organisation revived under Mohammad’s son-in-law, Maulana Fazlullah, who gained notoriety through his “Mullah Radio,” a pirate FM station used to promote Sharia law and extremist ideology. One of the most significant developments occurred in 2003 when Al-Qaeda launched two failed assassination attempts against Pervez Musharraf from bases in South Waziristan. During the same period, groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi carried out major attacks, including Shia mosque bombings in Quetta.
By 2004, local tribal militants in the Shakai Valley had come increasingly under Al-Qaeda’s influence. Nek Mohammad transformed the local jihadist movement into part of a broader global network. This attracted Central Asian militant leaders, including Tahir Yuldashev of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, to South Waziristan, introducing new militant tactics and strengthening transnational jihadist cooperation.
This development alarmed both Pakistan and the United States, which feared the re-emergence of a sustainable global jihadist network. Under increasing American pressure and already strained by the War on Terror, Pakistan negotiated the Shakai Agreement of 2004 with local tribal militants. The agreement required militants to lay down their arms and expel Al-Qaeda and Uzbek fighters. However, Nek Mohammad reneged on the agreement, continuing to shelter foreign militants and support cross-border militant operations.
The Turnaround
Recognising that it had lost control over many of its proxies, Pakistan’s ISI developed a turnaround strategy in cooperation with the United States. This resulted in a stronger US-Pakistan counterterrorism partnership and led to the CIA’s first drone strike inside Pakistan, which killed Nek Mohammad in 2004.
The ISI continued supplying intelligence on tribal militant leaders, while the United States expanded its drone campaign, inflicting substantial damage on Al-Qaeda and associated militant networks operating in Pakistan. By 2007, however, US attention began to shift elsewhere, and Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts became less central to American priorities.
Ironically, 2007 also witnessed the formation of the TTP, which rapidly emerged as a major domestic security threat. Between 2008 and 2014, several peace agreements were negotiated between the TTP and the Pakistani military, but all eventually collapsed because of ideological and tactical disagreements.
Following Operation Neptune Spear in 2011, which killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, the US-Pakistan counterterrorism partnership suffered severe damage. Operational trust deteriorated significantly, reducing Pakistan’s role in American intelligence and cross-border operations in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.
However, the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 partially revived US-Pakistan cooperation. A notable example was Pakistan’s assistance in the US drone strike that killed Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Afghanistan. The arrest and transfer of ISIS-K operative Mohammad Sharifullah, linked to the Abbey Gate bombing, further strengthened counterterrorism cooperation between Washington and Islamabad.
By 2025, Pakistan faced threats from two directions: the Taliban and the TTP. Air strikes in Afghanistan, conducted while the Taliban’s foreign minister was visiting New Delhi, may have represented Pakistan’s first attempt to demonstrate its willingness to confront the Taliban directly, much as it had confronted Al-Qaeda decades earlier. Pakistan’s continued air strikes and ground operations in Afghanistan may also have been intended to revive the kind of US-Pakistan cooperation that existed between 2004 and 2007.
For the United States, weakening the Taliban and increasing operational leverage in Afghanistan may offer certain advantages. The recurring discussion surrounding Bagram Air Base during Donald Trump’s presidency is one example of this strategic interest.
The Russian Factor
Russia’s growing engagement with Afghanistan has revived memories of Cold War competition. Moscow’s interests in Afghanistan have gained renewed momentum following its mutual pact with the Taliban. However, the central question remains whether this development automatically pushes Pakistan closer to the United States.
At first glance, conventional geopolitical logic might suggest such an outcome. Yet, through the lens of realism, Pakistan now possesses far less strategic value than it did during the Cold War. Its ability to provide critical support or leverage to the United States has diminished significantly.
Pakistan’s military operations and air strikes have largely failed to establish meaningful deterrence against the Taliban. Russia’s involvement further complicates the situation, although Moscow’s role remains largely focused on countering ISIS-K. While logistical and tactical assistance can strengthen Taliban capabilities, the broader strategic environment offers only limited opportunities for renewed US-Pakistan cooperation.
The United States is increasingly investing in over-the-horizon capabilities and moving away from the light-footprint strategy that characterised earlier phases of its Afghan engagement. In this context, strategic depth is no longer a source of security for Pakistan; it has become a source of vulnerability.
India’s Strategy
India now has an opportunity to learn from its earlier approach, which emphasised minimal functional cooperation and generated more tactical than strategic gains. Moving beyond such a limited framework could help India build its own strategic depth vis-à-vis Pakistan, not only tactically but also strategically, while reinforcing its Look West and Central Asia policies.
Such an approach would also strengthen counterterrorism cooperation and intelligence capabilities in the Af-Pak region. The recent decision to upgrade India’s technical mission in Kabul reflects a move beyond a purely functional relationship with the Taliban.
Beyond the diplomatic and political benefits, India could also revisit its “double squeeze” strategy, which seeks to keep Pakistan strategically occupied along both its eastern and western borders. Such a strategy could increase Pakistan’s economic and military burdens while simultaneously raising the costs of US engagement with Pakistan. Creating this triple-layered strategic dilemma may become a central pillar of India’s emerging strategic depth strategy in Afghanistan.
