After the collapse of the first round of talks, a second round is on the horizon but is already on the brink of failure, as Iran remains unwilling to negotiate further with the US. Amid this tense diplomatic drama, Pakistan is staging its own desperate theatrics to project itself as a key player in Gulf conflict management and to reassert its dwindling influence in the region. However, the broader strategic picture suggests that maximalist interests and coercive approaches are destabilising any effort toward peace in the Gulf.
The Exit Diplomacy
The conflict-exit process driven by diplomacy is a delicate art that requires both a balance of power and flexibility—neither of which either side currently possesses. As a result, the exit is being gradually delayed and is turning into a convoluted drama rather than a genuine episode of diplomacy. A closer examination of the US exit strategy suggests that it seeks to employ limited tactical pressure, with coercive diplomacy toward Iran remaining on the table.
The objective of this strategy appears to have two clear components. First, to coerce Iran by escalating threats and demonstrating limited force in the Strait of Hormuz to attain a position of strength—projecting that the US is forcing Iran back to the negotiating table, largely to influence international opinion. Second, the US appears to be pursuing a “rushed deal framework,” offering Iran a narrow bargaining window through concessions. Under this approach, the US would provide limited economic relief in exchange for Iranian commitments on nuclear and missile development, regardless of whether those commitments are tactical or strategic. The US could then frame this as a successful exit, declaring victory by portraying it as an effective combination of power and diplomacy that pushed Tehran to the margins while securing a deal.
This is not the first time the US has found itself in a situation requiring face-saving diplomacy. Similar strategies have previously been described as coercive diplomacy aimed at creating a “decent interval.” The Paris Peace Accords, in the context of the Vietnam War, ensured the US’s exit from one of its most prolonged and costly wars.
The Paris Peace Accords: Kissinger’s Rush
American society was deeply divided, and Richard Nixon faced mounting pressure to act in order to save face. The reality was stark: the US security establishment understood that the war was effectively lost, but a sudden withdrawal would have appeared as a humiliating defeat. Therefore, a “decent interval” was needed to allow the US to withdraw without appearing to lose, instead projecting the outcome as a form of victory.
Henry Kissinger’s strategy revolved around two key elements. The first was the use of coercive force to bring North Vietnam to the negotiating table. To achieve this, the US launched Operation Linebacker II—also known as the “Christmas Bombing”—during which thousands of tons of bombs were dropped on Hanoi and Haiphong to create a shock-and-awe effect. This pressure was intended to push North Vietnam toward signing the peace agreement while simultaneously bolstering South Vietnam’s political and military standing.
The second element involved face-saving concessions. The US agreed to allow approximately fifteen thousand North Vietnamese troops to remain in South Vietnam. In return, North Vietnam accepted a temporary ceasefire and released some prisoners of war. The US then used this ceasefire to withdraw its forces without active combat. Domestically, this withdrawal was framed as a victory, with Nixon famously declaring that the US had achieved “Peace with Honour.”
In reality, however, the agreement was a rushed compromise that jeopardised South Vietnam’s future. The Nixon administration was aware that South Vietnam would struggle to withstand the presence of North Vietnamese forces. By 1975, the agreement collapsed when North Vietnam launched its final offensive, leading to the fall of South Vietnam. Diplomatically, however, the strategy succeeded in its immediate aim: it enabled a withdrawal framed as honourable, sustained by the illusion of a “decent interval”—a gap between US exit and South Vietnam’s eventual defeat that shielded the US from direct blame.
The Gulf Context and a Second Round of Talks
A similar script now appears to be unfolding in the Gulf, with the US attempting to use coercion and limited force in the Strait of Hormuz to bring Iran back to negotiations. However, the circumstances differ significantly. There is no comparable balance of power or flexibility. Iran’s asymmetrical warfare capabilities remain intact, allowing it to maintain a position of strength and resist coercion—unlike North Vietnam’s situation.
The negotiating positions on both sides remain maximalist. Iran seeks substantial concessions rather than incremental compromises, while the US is willing to offer limited concessions but demands far-reaching commitments, including long-term restrictions or even the complete abandonment of Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes. In such an environment, flexibility is absent, and coercive diplomacy appears ineffective.
This time, Iran is unlikely to settle for symbolic gains. Instead, it seeks an outcome on its own terms—one that delivers credible long-term strategic and security assurances. This makes any US attempt to secure a deal a far riskier and more uncertain endeavour.
The first round of talks collapsed amid US coercive diplomacy, often associated with Donald Trump’s “madman” approach. The second round has followed a similar trajectory, with escalated pressure, including a naval blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, yielding the same result. Iran has shown little willingness to engage, citing deep mistrust and ongoing threats.
At present, Iran has also demonstrated its influence by compelling the US to manage a ceasefire in the Israel–Hezbollah conflict, reinforcing the perception that Tehran is negotiating from a position of strength while Washington continues to seek a breakthrough.
Amid this complex geopolitical dynamic, Pakistan appears to be engaging in largely symbolic diplomacy, advocating for a second round of talks that remains precarious and carries limited practical weight. This approach, associated with Asim Munir, reflects an attempt at face-saving diplomacy following the collapse of the first round.
Beyond its role as a messenger, Pakistan’s coordinated gestures with Saudi Arabia reinforce this performative dimension. For Asim Munir, maintaining diplomatic relevance is critical, as failure could further erode Pakistan’s credibility and weaken its efforts to strengthen ties in the Gulf. Even its limited influence is now at risk, making the stakes significant despite its constrained role.
The Lesson
The lessons of history are clear: even face-saving diplomacy requires tangible leverage to shift the balance of power and introduce flexibility into negotiations. In the present case, however, neither side appears willing to adjust its position. Without such flexibility, the prospects for peace—or even a stable agreement—become increasingly fragile and potentially more dangerous.
