Can a political system be undermined by its own success? That is the argument advanced by proponents of post-liberalism, a broad and internally divided school of thought that has gained increasing attention in recent years. In an article published by Die Zeit, the debate is presented as a contest over whether liberalism can be renewed or whether its perceived failures require a fundamentally different political order.
The diagnosis shared by post-liberal thinkers is that liberalism has been in decline for years. Its emphasis on individualism, they argue, has weakened social bonds and encouraged isolation. Political decisions have increasingly been transferred to courts and administrative bodies, producing what they regard as a process of depoliticisation and, ultimately, diminished democracy. At the economic level, they argue that neoliberal markets have widened inequality and concentrated wealth among relatively small elites.
Taken together, these developments are seen by post-liberals as consequences inherent in liberalism itself. They argue that liberal societies have become increasingly atomised, populated by self-interested individuals who can be held together only by an ever more regulatory state. Liberalism, in this view, has undermined the conditions that once enabled its own success and can no longer deliver on its promise of a limited state.
The argument comes at a time when confidence in liberal institutions has been declining and principles such as minority protection, a free press and the rule of law are increasingly contested. Economic inequality, criticism of globalisation and the rise of economic nationalism have further challenged the assumptions associated with liberalism. Hard-power geopolitics has gained importance relative to institutions such as the World Trade Organisation, while parties advocating antiliberal positions have advanced in countries around the world.
But there is little agreement among post-liberals about either the causes of the crisis or what should replace the existing order. Veith Selk, a political scientist at the University of Vechta, told Die Zeit that conservative thinkers such as Patrick Deneen and more reactionary authors such as Adrian Vermeule seek to construct a stronger state capable of reshaping society according to particular moral principles. Selk and his colleague Julian Nicolai Hofmann are publishing a collection on post-liberalism with Suhrkamp Verlag that attempts to reflect the breadth of the debate.
The term itself predates its recent prominence. In Europe, Maurice Glasman helped establish the Blue Labour movement in 2009, combining left-wing economic policies with socially conservative positions within British social democracy following the financial crisis. The concept became substantially more prominent in 2018 through the work of Patrick Deneen, whose book was recommended at the time by former US president Barack Obama. US Vice-President JD Vance has also sought Deneen’s advice.
Deneen represents one of the most conservative strands of post-liberal thought and, according to the Die Zeit account, is regarded by some as reactionary. While the pluralist tradition associated with Blue Labour seeks to constrain or reform liberalism, Deneen’s approach envisages a different political system. Failed liberal elites would be replaced by new elites distinguished by their commitment to the common good and to what they regard as the genuine will of the majority, which liberal institutions are accused of weakening or obstructing.
His proposals include reducing the influence of international organisations such as the United Nations and the WTO, weakening elite universities and pursuing Christian-paternalist policies affecting society, families, media and culture. In his 2023 book Regime Change, Deneen describes this approach through the term Aristopopulism. Individual freedom is subordinated to the interests of the community, while traditional and explicitly Christian values would be advanced by a new elite or aristocracy.
The combination of elite rule and populism is one reason critics see the approach as potentially opening the way to authoritarian forms of politics. Yet post-liberalism also attracts attention because it brings together criticisms traditionally associated with different parts of the political spectrum. Deneen combines criticism of capitalism with highly conservative moral positions, while other post-liberals emphasise inequality, weakened communities and the perceived distance between political elites and working people.
Elif Özmen, a philosopher teaching in Giessen, told Die Zeit that this ability to combine different grievances helps explain the appeal of post-liberalism. Left-wing concerns about impoverishment and political elites’ estrangement from workers can be combined with conservative or reactionary ideas about community and family. Yet Özmen considers post-liberalism philosophically and theoretically weak, arguing that its proponents create a distorted historical picture of liberalism and attribute too many social problems to it.
Economic inequality, weakened social bonds and the increasing legalisation of political decisions, she argues, are not unique to liberal political systems. She therefore questions whether post-liberalism represents a genuinely new political theory or simply a new framing of older right-conservative ideas. In her assessment, the project is fundamentally authoritarian and antiliberal, particularly in Deneen’s version, because it envisages rule by an allegedly virtuous elite claiming access to permanent moral truth.
The debate, however, extends beyond the political right. Left-wing thinkers have also begun questioning liberal individualism and exploring stronger ideas of community and collective responsibility. Ricarda Lang, a Green politician, argued after the most recent state elections in Baden-Württemberg for less liberal individualism and a stronger understanding of community, belonging and collectivity. Journalist Nils Schniederjann has similarly explored how a left-wing politics centred on the common good and a revival of political participation might operate beyond liberal democracy.
Adrian Pabst, a German political and religious scholar researching at the University of Kent and one of the prominent European representatives of post-liberalism, offers another variation. His proposals combine elements of traditional social democracy with Catholic social teaching. He argues that liberalism should be restrained economically and socioculturally, that markets should become more socially oriented, particularly in relation to the power of technology companies, and that decision-making should become more democratic.
Pabst also emphasises the protection of education, nature and housing from market pressures. Yet he sharply distances himself from Deneen’s vision. Rather than seeking an antiliberal system, he argues for greater pluralism and more democracy. He says he would welcome any change capable of producing greater solidarity, community, freedom and responsibility, including a renewed form of liberalism if liberalism itself could deliver it.
That distinction highlights one of the central difficulties of the post-liberal debate. Its proponents may agree that existing institutions are failing to meet important social expectations, while disagreeing fundamentally over whether the answer is reform, stronger community institutions or a new political system altogether.
The practical experience of the United States has added another dimension to the discussion. According to Selk, the hope associated with the Trump administration for a more community-oriented form of politics has produced disappointment among some post-liberals. Many now argue that what Selk describes as Trump’s “sultanist and kleptocratic” governing style is incompatible with the ideal of politics directed towards the common good.
For critics, this experience illustrates the central danger of abandoning liberal institutions. Independent courts and minority protections can be weakened in the process of pursuing systemic alternatives, potentially further damaging already fragile public confidence in liberal democracy. Selk told Die Zeit that widespread dissatisfaction can make consideration of political alternatives particularly difficult and unpredictable.
Özmen goes further, describing post-liberalism as a return to the pre-modern past and arguing that it provides conceptual and normative tools for an antiliberal transformation of democratic societies. Yet the debate may also serve a different purpose: forcing societies to examine the weaknesses of liberal institutions precisely in order to preserve them.
That leaves the fundamental question at the centre of the debate. How did liberalism, a political tradition long associated with individual freedom, prosperity and the institutional foundations of Western democracy, become a source of distrust and even hostility for so many people? The answer remains contested. But the growing post-liberal movement makes clear that the argument over liberalism is no longer simply an academic dispute. It has become a broader struggle over how democratic societies should organise power, community, freedom and responsibility in the years ahead.
