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Tripura’s Post-Insurgency Paradox

Organised militancy has ended, but structural vulnerabilities in reintegration, borders, and radicalisation persist into 2026.

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Chief Minister of Tripura, Dr. Manik Saha, met Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Tripura sustained its status as a “zero-insurgency” State through 2025 and into 2026, with no reported insurgency-related fatalities and no active militant violence. The gains achieved through the September 4, 2024, Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) with the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) ‘ remained intact, reinforcing a broader trajectory of conflict de-escalation that has been underway for over a decade. However, beneath this apparent stability, emerging concerns relating to rehabilitation deficits, cross-border vulnerabilities, residual militant networks, and new radicalisation linkages, indicate that the State’s security landscape remains fragile and requires sustained policy attention.

The most significant indicator of enduring peace has been the absence of insurgency-linked killings since January 4, 2023, which marked the last recorded fatality in the State. Long-term data further underscores this decline: between 2010 and early 2026, only 17 fatalities were recorded across 13 incidents, and several years within this period reported zero fatalities. The MoS of September 2024 accelerated this trend by facilitating mass surrenders and formal disengagement from armed struggle. The agreement was followed by the laying down of arms ceremony on September 24, 2024, and a total of 902 cadres had joined the mainstream by December 2024. This trajectory continued into 2026, with official disclosures indicating that 1,245 militants surrendered between April 1, 2023, and March 17, 2026. These included cadres from multiple factions of the NLFT and the ATTF, collectively surrendering 147 weapons, including AK-series rifles and grenades.

Despite the quantitative success of surrender and demobilisation, the qualitative dimensions of reintegration remain deeply problematic. Discontent among surrendered militants has emerged as one of the most persistent internal security concerns. Throughout 2025 and early 2026, multiple protests were organised by former insurgents demanding the fulfilment of rehabilitation commitments. On February 25, 2025, the Tripura United Indigenous Revolutionary Peoples’ Council (TUIRPC) staged a blockade of the Assam-Agartala National Highway, reiterating long-standing grievances relating to housing, land allotment, withdrawal of legal cases, and access to basic infrastructure. These protests continued into 2026. On January 7, organisations representing surrendered militants accused the State Government of failing to honour financial commitments under earlier rehabilitation packages, including the non-release of INR 230 million from a sanctioned INR 450 million package. They also highlighted delays in promised benefits such as fencing support under livelihood schemes and the withdrawal of pending cases.

The persistence of such grievances raises concerns about the sustainability of the peace process. While the rehabilitation policy promises a fixed deposit of INR 400,000 and a monthly stipend of INR 6,000 for three years, implementation gaps risk eroding trust between former militants and the State. Incomplete reintegration can lead to recidivism or the emergence of splinter groups, and although no large-scale return to militancy has been observed in Tripura, isolated developments suggest such risks persist. The arrest of two suspected members of the newly formed Tripura United National Front (TUNF) in August 2025, along with the recovery of explosives, indicates that residual militant tendencies have not been entirely extinguished. Intelligence inputs suggesting plans to target police installations further underline the need for vigilance.

Another area of concern is the shifting pattern of arrests in the State. Since 2024, there have been no significant arrests linked directly to established insurgent outfits. Instead, law enforcement actions have increasingly focused on illegal arms possession. Several such arrests were recorded in 2025, including the seizure of pistols and ammunition in West Tripura, Sepahijala, and North Tripura Districts. This trend suggests that, while organised insurgent structures have weakened, the circulation of small arms persists, potentially sustaining a latent capacity for violence. The continued availability of weapons, even in the absence of active insurgent groups, constitutes a critical vulnerability in the State’s security framework.

Tripura’s 856-kilometre-long international border with Bangladesh remains a major structural challenge. Significant portions of the border remain unfenced due to terrain and local disputes and this porous boundary facilitates illegal migration, smuggling, and cross-border militant movement. While bilateral cooperation between Indian and Bangladeshi border forces has improved, the security environment in Bangladesh continues to have spillover effects. In 2025, the Border Security Force (BSF) reported significant enforcement activity along the Tripura frontier, including the detention of illegal immigrants – part of a broader trend in which at least 3,518 illegal migrants were apprehended in the State between 2022 and August 2025. According to data presented by Chief Minister Manik Saha in the State Assembly on September 23, 2025, this included 982 migrants in 2022 (965 Bangladeshis and 17 Rohingyas), 1,072 in 2023 (1,014 Bangladeshis and 58 Rohingyas), 1,007 in 2024 (947 Bangladeshis and 60 Rohingyas), and 406 up to August 2025 (390 Bangladeshis and 16 Rohingyas). In addition, a small number of other foreign nationals, including individuals from Nigeria and France, were also detained for illegal entry. Of the total apprehended, 2,739 were subsequently pushed back to their respective countries.

Developments during 2025 and 2026 further illustrate the evolving nature of cross-border threats. On June 3, 2025, Tripura Police arrested cadres of the Bangladesh-based Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS), who had crossed into Indian territory following clashes in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh. Such incidents highlight the continued relevance of cross-border ethnic insurgencies and the potential for conflict spillover. Additionally, the recovery of drones near the India-Bangladesh border in April and August 2025 raised concerns about surveillance and possible reconnaissance activities. The use of unmanned aerial vehicles suggests a technological evolution in cross-border operations, which could be exploited for smuggling or intelligence gathering.

More troubling is the emergence of Islamist radicalisation networks with linkages to neighbouring States. On December 30, 2025, a suspected operative of the Imam Mahmuder Kafila (IMK), linked to the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), was arrested in West Tripura as part of a wider operation led by the Assam Police. Investigations revealed that the network was involved in online radicalisation, recruitment, and facilitation of cross-border movement for training. The use of encrypted platforms and digital propaganda indicates a shift from traditional insurgency to more diffuse, networked forms of extremism. Although such activities remain limited in scale within Tripura, their presence signals an emerging dimension of security risk that requires proactive counter-radicalisation strategies.

The State has also witnessed sporadic incidents involving foreign nationals and illegal transit networks. The arrest of a suspected Pakistani national at Sabroom Railway Station in October 2025, allegedly attempting to cross into Bangladesh using an agent network, underscores the complexities of transnational mobility in the region. While not directly linked to insurgency, such incidents highlight the vulnerabilities of border management systems and the potential for exploitation by criminal, extremist or subversive networks.

At the policy level, the Government has sought to consolidate peace through development-oriented initiatives. The approval of an INR 2.5 billion package in August 2025 for tribal development and rehabilitation reflects an attempt to address the socio-economic roots of insurgency. The focus on employment, education, healthcare, and infrastructure is consistent with broader counter-insurgency strategies that emphasise inclusive growth. However, the effectiveness of these initiatives will depend on timely implementation and equitable distribution. The persistent dissatisfaction among surrendered militants suggests that existing mechanisms are inadequate or poorly executed.

The political context also plays a significant role in shaping Tripura’s security environment. Ethnic and identity-based issues, particularly those relating to land rights, language, and cultural recognition, continue to influence local dynamics. Demands such as the adoption of the Roman script for the Kokborok language and the provision of land for rehabilitation reflect deeper concerns about identity and marginalisation. If left unaddressed, these issues could create fertile ground for future mobilisation, even in the absence of armed insurgency.

In assessing Tripura’s security situation in 2026, it is essential to distinguish between the absence of active insurgency and the presence of underlying vulnerabilities. The State has undoubtedly achieved a significant milestone in eliminating organised militant violence. The successful implementation of peace agreements and the large-scale surrender of cadres represent important achievements. However, the transition from conflict resolution to sustainable peacebuilding remains incomplete.

Three interrelated challenges are particularly salient. First, the rehabilitation and reintegration of former militants require urgent attention. Delays and deficiencies in this process risk undermining the credibility of the State and could potentially lead to renewed instability. Second, the porous international border continues to facilitate a range of security threats, including illegal migration, smuggling, and cross-border militancy. Strengthening border infrastructure and surveillance capabilities is critical. Third, the emergence of new forms of extremism, particularly Islamist radicalisation networks, necessitates a recalibration of security strategies to address non-traditional threats.

Tripura’s security landscape in 2026 is characterised by a paradox of stability and latent risk. The State has effectively transitioned out of an era of insurgency, but the foundations of lasting peace remain fragile. Addressing the grievances of surrendered militants, strengthening border management, and countering emerging extremist networks will be essential to consolidating the gains achieved thus far. Without sustained and coordinated efforts across these domains, the possibility of relapse, though currently remote, cannot be entirely discounted.

Afsara Shaheen

Dr. Afsara Shaheen is a Research Associate at the Institute for Conflict Management in New Delhi, India

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