American military assistance has become the backbone of Israel’s modern war machine, even as political pressure in Washington grows to scale back the decades-long subsidy. The current 10-year aid agreement, worth $38 billion and expiring in two years, must now be renegotiated at a moment when both the American left and the Trump-aligned right are questioning whether the U.S. should continue bankrolling Israel’s arsenal at current levels. Yet Israel’s strategic dependence on U.S. systems has only deepened after two years of high-intensity conflict stretching from Gaza and Lebanon to Yemen and Iran.
Israel’s fleet of U.S.-made F-15s, F-16s and F-35s has carried out long-range strikes thousands of kilometers from its borders. On the ground, Israeli-designed tanks and armored carriers still rely on American-funded engines, transporters and spare parts to reach the battlefield. The United States now provides roughly 20 percent of Israel’s annual military procurement budget, allowing the IDF to sustain and modernize its capabilities even in peacetime. The recent war accelerated this trend dramatically, with U.S. assistance surging to an estimated $32 billion in two years, far beyond the standard annual $3.8 billion.
A massive list of purchases underscores the scale of Israel’s dependence. A $19 billion deal for up to 50 F-15IA fighter jets and upgrades to existing models sits alongside a $3.4 billion order for CH-53K heavy helicopters, supported by new U.S.-funded infrastructure at Tel Nof Airbase. Israel has also committed $3 billion for an additional F-35 squadron, $2.4 billion for KC-46 refueling aircraft and billions more for precision bombs, glide munitions, bunker busters, Hellfire missiles, AMRAAM air-to-air missiles and artillery shells. The shift is structural: by 2028, none of the annual American aid will be usable for purchases inside Israel. Every dollar will go to U.S. defense manufacturers.
This deep reliance arrives at a politically unfavorable moment. Among Democrats, criticism of Israel has expanded beyond the party’s progressive wing after two years of devastating warfare in Gaza. On the right, isolationist and “America First” sentiment continues to grow, with many Trump supporters viewing Israel as a financial burden or geopolitical risk. In some cases, opposition is entangled with antisemitism. Public opinion surveys show Israel’s standing at record lows, even among conservatives. Trump himself has repeatedly questioned the scale of U.S. aid, even as he ordered the strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities and later unfroze a shipment of heavy bombs halted by the Biden administration.
Adding to Israeli anxiety, Trump has signaled a strategic reorientation toward the wealthy Gulf states. His recent decision to sell F-35 jets to Saudi Arabia alarmed Israeli defense officials, who warn it could erode Israel’s legally protected qualitative military edge. Past crises over Israeli arms sales to China serve as reminders of how dependent Israel remains on Washington’s political goodwill: pressure from Congress forced Israel to cancel major programs, overhaul its export controls and retreat from lucrative deals.
Meanwhile, the United States has poured billions into Israeli infrastructure, constructing new bases, bunkers, runways and underground facilities to accommodate the weapon systems financed by American taxpayers. This expanding physical footprint underscores how tightly integrated the two defense establishments have become. Yet it also complicates Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s occasional calls to “wean off” American aid, as Israeli defense exports and core capabilities depend on access to U.S. funding, components and diplomatic cover.
With negotiations beginning quietly, Israeli officials are divided over strategy. Some advocate a shift to joint development projects that might appeal to Trump, while others prefer extending the current framework. But the starting point is weaker than in past decades. A new Congress could impose stricter conditions, reduce the overall package or demand changes to Israeli policy. And as Israel’s procurement pipeline shows, the country has little room to maneuver. Nearly every major aircraft, missile, shell and armored platform central to the IDF’s operations originates in the United States, purchased in dollars, and supported by American technicians, infrastructure and political oversight.
If Washington changes course, Israel’s military and industrial ecosystem would face an unprecedented shock. For now, the country enters negotiations armed with a shopping list built in America—and a political climate that may no longer be willing to pay for it.
