As tensions between Washington and Tehran threatened to escalate into a wider regional confrontation, the United States once again found itself relying on a familiar intermediary: Pakistan. The episode exposed a contradiction that has shaped American policy for decades. While successive U.S. administrations have publicly questioned Pakistan’s reliability and criticised aspects of its security policies, they continue to engage Islamabad whenever regional crises demand communication with actors beyond Washington’s immediate reach.
The latest Iran crisis is merely the most recent example.
For years, Pakistan has occupied an uneasy position in American strategic thinking. It has faced persistent criticism over its role in the Afghanistan conflict, recurring disagreements with Washington on regional security issues, and periodic questions regarding the reliability of the bilateral partnership. Yet despite these accusations, Pakistan repeatedly re-emerges whenever diplomacy requires a state capable of maintaining channels with rival camps that often refuse to speak directly to one another.
Regional media reports and diplomatic accounts surrounding the recent Iran crisis suggested that Field Marshal Asim Munir and Pakistan’s military leadership were engaged in efforts aimed at reducing the risk of a broader confrontation between the United States and Iran. While the full extent of Pakistan’s diplomatic engagement remains outside the public domain, the broader significance lies in the fact that Islamabad was once again viewed as a useful intermediary. States do not become diplomatic bridges through public relations campaigns. They become diplomatic bridges because competing actors find them valuable.
The notion that Washington continues to engage Pakistan during periods of regional instability is not unique to the Iran crisis. It reflects a broader pattern that has persisted despite decades of tension in bilateral relations.
Pakistan was widely viewed as an important facilitator during the diplomatic efforts that eventually contributed to the Doha process. Following the withdrawal from Afghanistan, Islamabad remained one of the few regional actors maintaining channels with both Western governments and the authorities in Kabul. More recently, reports surrounding the Iran crisis suggested that Pakistan was among a small group of countries maintaining communication with both Washington and Tehran while encouraging restraint and de-escalation.
Although much of this diplomacy occurs away from public view, the broader pattern is difficult to ignore. Successive American administrations have frequently expressed concerns regarding aspects of Pakistan’s regional policies, yet they have also continued to engage Islamabad whenever regional crises required access, communication channels, intelligence cooperation, or dialogue with actors beyond Washington’s immediate reach.
This is the paradox at the centre of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship: persistent mistrust has never translated into strategic disengagement.
Indeed, Field Marshal Asim Munir cannot be separated from this discussion because the original criticism is directed primarily at his leadership and diplomatic role. Yet the article underestimates a fundamental question: if Munir’s diplomacy was merely an exercise in image management, why were major regional and international actors willing to engage Islamabad during one of the most dangerous crises in the Middle East in recent years?
Diplomatic relevance is not self-declared. It is conferred by other states when they believe engagement serves their interests.ch Pakistan’s involvement did not emerge because Islamabad demanded attention. Rather, it emerged because Pakistan possessed channels of communication, strategic access and regional relationships that made it useful at a moment when dialogue was becoming increasingly difficult.
The question is not whether Field Marshal Asim Munir should be criticised or praised, but whether assessments of his diplomatic role should be based on evidence rather than assumption. The suggestion that diplomatic engagement should be interpreted primarily as a search for relevance overlooks a more plausible explanation: Pakistan’s leadership was responding to a regional environment in which few states possessed the ability to communicate simultaneously with Washington, Tehran, Gulf capitals and other key stakeholders.
This is where much of the criticism directed at Pakistan’s recent diplomatic activity becomes unconvincing.
A recent commentary by Srijan Sharma in Sri Lanka Guardian dismisses Islamabad’s engagement as little more than an attempt to manufacture relevance and argues that Pakistan’s military establishment may eventually resort to external confrontation to offset domestic pressures. The argument reflects a familiar tendency to interpret contemporary developments primarily through the lens of historical grievances rather than present geopolitical realities.
The central weakness in this analysis is its assumption that diplomatic relevance and political popularity are the same thing. They are not.
History is filled with examples of states whose strategic utility exceeded their popularity. Diplomacy has often relied on countries capable of maintaining communication with multiple sides of a dispute, particularly when direct engagement becomes politically difficult. During periods of crisis, utility matters more than reputation.
Pakistan’s continuing relevance stems from structural realities that remain largely unchanged. It borders both Iran and Afghanistan. It maintains relationships with Gulf Arab states while preserving channels with Tehran. It has deep ties with China, ongoing engagement with Washington, and growing cooperation with regional actors across the Middle East and Central Asia. Pakistan remains among a relatively small group of states capable of maintaining meaningful relationships across several competing geopolitical camps simultaneously.
This strategic position cannot be dismissed as a public relations exercise.
The article’s historical comparison between Asim Munir, Pervez Musharraf and Ashfaq Parvez Kayani presents another problem. The argument suggests that previous military leaders responded to domestic and international pressures through external confrontation and that similar behaviour should therefore be expected today.
Historical analogies can provide context, but they do not constitute evidence.
Demonstrating that previous leaders faced internal pressures during periods of regional tension does not prove that contemporary policymakers are pursuing an identical strategy. Correlation should not be mistaken for causation. Such claims require direct evidence rather than inference drawn from historical parallels.
Moreover, Pakistan’s strategic environment today differs significantly from that of the early post-9/11 period. Economic recovery, regional connectivity projects, energy cooperation and trade integration increasingly shape Islamabad’s long-term priorities. Stability is not merely desirable; it is essential for achieving many of Pakistan’s economic and diplomatic objectives.
Escalation would undermine those objectives rather than advance them.
None of this suggests that Pakistan is free from criticism. Like many states in the region, Pakistan continues to navigate economic pressures, political contestation and complex security challenges. Nor does diplomatic engagement automatically validate every decision taken by Pakistan’s military or civilian leadership.
However, acknowledging these realities is very different from dismissing Pakistan’s regional significance altogether.
The broader lesson from the Iran crisis is not that Pakistan has suddenly become a major power. Rather, it demonstrates that geopolitical relevance is determined by geography, access and strategic utility rather than by prevailing narratives.
American policymakers may continue to hold differing views regarding aspects of Pakistan’s regional approach. They may continue to disagree with elements of its regional policies. Yet when crises emerge across the Middle East, Washington repeatedly discovers that Pakistan remains one of the few states capable of engaging multiple sides simultaneously.
That reality deserves greater attention than familiar debates about whether Pakistan should or should not be relevant.
The real paradox is not Pakistan’s continued importance. The real paradox is that after decades of criticism, major powers continue to rely on Islamabad whenever regional crises threaten to spin beyond control.
While public diplomacy undoubtedly contributes to how states project influence, Pakistan’s relevance cannot be explained solely through image management or diplomatic theatre. The Iran crisis did not create Pakistan’s relevance. It merely reminded observers that strategic utility often outlasts political distrust. Whether critics approve of it or not, moments of regional instability continue to demonstrate a reality that Washington has repeatedly recognised: when communication becomes difficult and tensions rise, Pakistan remains a country that cannot easily be ignored.
