The annual appearance of a senior Chinese Communist Party official at the seaside resort of Beidaihe has once again drawn attention to the inner workings of China’s leadership, but this year’s timing carries particular significance. Cai Qi, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and the fifth-ranked official in the Communist Party hierarchy, appeared in Beidaihe, Hebei province, on Aug. 3, signalling the beginning of a period traditionally associated with informal discussions between serving leaders and retired party elders.
The appearance, reported by state-run China Central Television, has become an annual marker. Cai has appeared in Beidaihe on Aug. 3 for four years in a row, although members of his entourage, including a Politburo member concurrently serving as head of the party’s Organization Department, have changed. Nikkei Asia, which reported the developments, noted that one source familiar with Chinese politics said intraparty coordination on economic management, foreign policy and other important issues “is being conducted ahead of schedule” this year.
Cai’s role makes his presence particularly significant. He is widely regarded as the closest aide to Xi Jinping, China’s president and the Communist Party’s general secretary. He joined the Politburo Standing Committee at the party’s 20th national congress in the autumn of 2022. The Politburo consists of the 20-plus most senior party officials, including seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee, the party’s top decision-making body.
Each year, official reports of Cai’s arrival at Beidaihe are regarded as heralding the start of the Communist Party’s annual “Beidaihe meeting”, during which incumbent leaders and retired elders informally discuss important issues. The resort’s restricted coastline, where many beaches are reserved for government officials and marked with signs prohibiting public access, provides a secluded setting for such discussions.
This year, however, the meeting comes against an unusually crowded political calendar. Xi is to make an official visit to the U.S. in the second half of September for talks with President Donald Trump. In October, the fifth plenary session of the Communist Party’s 20th Central Committee is scheduled to take place. Against this backdrop, intraparty coordination on important diplomatic and domestic political issues began as early as July.
It remains unclear whether the exchange of views with retired party elders at Beidaihe is directly connected to this earlier coordination. Yet developments in Beijing during the second half of July provide an indication of the issues confronting the leadership.
On July 24, Xi presided over a symposium in Beijing’s Zhongnanhai area, where Xi and other Chinese leaders have their offices. The meeting was organised by the Central Committee of the Communist Party to solicit opinions and suggestions from representatives of outside organisations, including other political parties and the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce.
The discussion focused specifically on China’s current economic situation and economic work for the second half of the year. Xi acknowledged that China’s economy “still faces certain difficulties and challenges”, according to the state-run Xinhua News Agency. He also called on participants to “actively fulfill their duties and responsibilities and put forward targeted suggestions based on in-depth research, thereby contributing their wisdom and strength to promoting the steady and sound development of the economy.”
The remarks were made public on July 30, when members of the Communist Party’s Politburo met and decided that the fifth plenum of the Communist Party’s 20th Central Committee would be held in October.
The emphasis on consultation was notable because Xi has, since becoming China’s top leader in 2012, concentrated power in his own hands, creating an impression of a political system in which major decisions are made from the top down. His appeal for “targeted suggestions”, however, suggested a willingness to seek views beyond the Communist Party itself.
China has eight minor non-opposition, officially recognised “democratic parties” that support the Communists’ one-party rule but are not part of it. Leaders of all eight parties attended the symposium. More significantly, Xi himself spoke openly about the “difficulties and challenges” facing the Chinese economy while seeking cooperation and advice from the participants.
The economic pressures are substantial. China, the world’s second-largest economy, remains constrained by the prolonged slump in the property sector, subdued consumer spending and stubbornly high youth unemployment. Official figures released in mid-July showed that gross domestic product in the April-June quarter grew by a real 4.3% from a year earlier, down from 5% in the January-March quarter and below the lower end of the Chinese government’s 4.5% to 5% annual growth target for this year.
Yet there has been no indication that Xi intends to make a major reversal of the economic model. An announcement following the Politburo meeting on July 30 suggested that the leadership would continue to prioritise advanced industries rather than shift decisively towards measures intended to address consumer wariness. The meeting called for efforts to strengthen stable support for basic research and improve the governance system for artificial intelligence, according to Xinhua.
The apparent tension between Xi’s acknowledgement of economic difficulties and the continuation of existing priorities has a political dimension. A major policy reversal could amount to an admission of past mistakes. For the Xi administration, such an acknowledgement could potentially lead to growing demands for a broader leadership change and generational shift at the Communist Party’s national congress in 2027.
Instead, the leadership has chosen the theme of the fifth plenum as “the Party’s full and rigorous self-governance”, a formulation that is difficult to oppose and closely connected with the anti-corruption campaign pursued since Xi’s inauguration.
By demonstrating the results of his efforts to promote self-governance, Xi is poised to seek re-election for a fourth five-year term as Communist Party chief at next year’s national congress, further extending his reign. But unresolved questions within the party remain.
Among the most important is the fate of two senior military leaders who have been under investigation for more than six months. Massive purges targeting the upper echelons of the People’s Liberation Army took place before the fourth plenum of the Communist Party’s 20th Central Committee in the autumn of 2025.
In January, it was announced that Zhang Youxia, the PLA’s top uniformed officer and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Liu Zhenli, a CMC member, had been placed under investigation for suspected serious disciplinary violations. More than half a year later, the results of their investigations have not been made public. The announcement about the Politburo’s meeting last week did not mention the two generals.
Another senior figure, Ma Xingrui, a Politburo member who also once served as party secretary of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, was placed under investigation in April. On June 30, the Politburo decided to strip Ma of Communist Party membership for corruption, with final approval to come at the fifth plenum in October.
Both Zhang Youxia and Ma Xingrui were considered close allies of Xi. Zhang and Xi are “second-generation reds”, or children of revolutionary-era party leaders, and old acquaintances. Zhang also has strong connections to party elders. Ma is more of a political outsider, but one who rose rapidly in the Xi era.
Against this backdrop, Cai Qi’s arrival in Beidaihe assumes significance beyond the annual rituals of China’s political calendar. With a US presidential meeting approaching, economic difficulties continuing and unresolved questions surrounding senior military figures, the traditional exchange between current leaders and retired party elders takes place at a moment of considerable consequence for Xi Jinping’s administration.
The central question now is whether, and how, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli will be punished before the upcoming Central Committee plenum, following an exchange of views with party elders at this summer’s Beidaihe meeting.
