Editor’s Note: The following article is based on excerpts from an in-depth interview conducted by Christian Smith with George Friedman, chairman and founder of Geopolitical Futures. The interview explores the geopolitical implications of recent US foreign policy decisions under President Donald Trump, particularly the imposition of tariffs on India in response to its purchase of Russian oil, and situates these actions within the broader strategic context of US relations with Russia, China, and emerging powers. The article synthesises Friedman’s insights, using his direct quotations to elucidate the reasoning behind these policies and their potential ramifications for international relations, while presenting an academic-style analysis of the issues at hand.
The imposition of tariffs by the United States on India in response to its purchase of Russian oil represents a striking example of the complex interplay between economic leverage and geopolitical strategy. As George Friedman notes, “The decision by Donald Trump to threaten India with 25% tariffs due to its purchase of Russian oil was a bold one.” The United States’ rationale, ostensibly to punish India for engaging in trade with Russia, belies a far more intricate strategy involving signalling to both Russia and China simultaneously. Friedman emphasises that while the primary motivation was to exert pressure on Russia, there was an equally significant diplomatic calculus aimed at China: “One was to threaten the Russians. The second was to ease relations with China somewhat.”
India’s geopolitical position, therefore, functions as both a strategic lever and a subordinate variable in the calculations of larger powers. Despite its emerging status and membership in the Quad alongside the United States, Australia, and Japan, Friedman argues that India is “a useful ally, but precisely not indispensable. And in fact, not really able to give us what we want.” The contrast between the perceived indispensability of India by some institutions, such as the CSIS Institute, and the American strategic assessment underscores the asymmetric nature of global alliances. Friedman observes that “while we had good relations, this was an opportunity at the cost to India, which we didn’t much mind, to both signal things to the Chinese and the Russians, which we do mind.” In this framing, India becomes a platform for signalling power rather than a core participant in shaping US strategic outcomes.
The notion of selective indispensability reflects a broader pattern in US foreign policy, wherein the hierarchy of allies is determined by the intersection of military, economic, and strategic utility. Friedman situates India’s position within this hierarchy by highlighting the limitations of its military and economic capabilities: “They do participate in the Quad, but their naval force is not significantly needed. The Quad being an alliance basically against China at sea. And simultaneously, it was discovered that their economic capacity is far below what we need.” Consequently, while India’s actions, such as increased oil purchases from Russia—from 5% to 35% since 2021—may prompt accusations of hypocrisy against the United States, they fall within a broader calculus of strategic prioritisation: “Certainly. Definition of hypocrisy is hypocrisy. In other words, you can simultaneously condemn someone for doing something you did. And that’s what human beings do and nation states do too.”
Friedman’s analysis suggests that the US approach to India reflects a pragmatic, interest-driven conception of diplomacy rather than one constrained by notions of moral consistency or long-term trust. He emphasises the instrumental use of tariffs and threats as mechanisms to influence behaviour: “If you can signal to the Russians that we will raise tariffs on anyone who trades with you, and we’ll start with one of your biggest customers and the strongest. That’s helpful. Same with the Chinese side.” India, in this context, becomes a low-risk means to an end—a tool by which larger strategic objectives vis-à-vis Russia and China are pursued. Friedman encapsulates this dynamic by stating, “India was, in this sense, a victim. A minor, relatively minor cost to the Indians. Certainly nothing to break relations over.”
The implications of this approach extend to the management of China-US relations, particularly regarding Taiwan and broader regional stability. Friedman elucidates that the primary US objective is not to provoke military conflict but to modulate Chinese behaviour through a combination of economic integration and strategic signalling: “The fundamental interest of the United States with China is not going to war with China. That’s just number one, the same imperative as there is with Russia, do what we can, but don’t go to war.” He further contextualises China’s vulnerability by highlighting the asymmetry of economic dependence: “The Chinese in a way have a weaker hand in the sense that their economy is their gold, their reputation is everything. But you have to remember that economy began to grow based on exports to the United States and investment from the United States. It’s very heavily tied into the United States in fundamental ways.”
The selective application of economic coercion, such as tariffs on India, exemplifies Friedman’s broader thesis regarding the strategic utility of unpredictability in international relations. He contrasts the highly predictable policies of the Cold War era with Trump’s approach, arguing that excessive predictability allows adversaries to manipulate outcomes: “On the other hand, it didn’t necessarily benefit us to be so predictable. We constantly allowed the other side to determine what we were going to do.” By introducing ambiguity, Friedman asserts, the United States enhances its leverage: “The most powerful nation should be the most unpredictable… Accessibility of reliability in foreign policy is not necessarily the best way to go. You want the other guy to be guessing. Is it risky? It’s very risky to be predictable.”
This embrace of strategic unpredictability is further illustrated by Friedman’s commentary on the Trump administration’s integration of trade and non-trade instruments. He notes that the combination of economic sanctions, tariffs, and diplomatic signalling constitutes a novel approach to exerting influence over multiple actors simultaneously: “Trump has made it central to his strategy of tying non-trade issues with trade issues and tariffs and conducting diplomacy like that. He pulls one lever over here, even though typically you wouldn’t be expected to do that for something that’s happening over here.” In this framework, policy instruments are not isolated tools but interconnected levers calibrated to produce maximum leverage across multiple theatres of international engagement.
Friedman’s discussion of US-Russia relations further reinforces this multidimensional calculus. He highlights the paradoxical opportunity presented by Russia’s economic and demographic profile in the absence of war: “Russia is a very interesting country if it’s not at war. It has a large sophisticated workforce. It has cheap land all over the place, many resources we could buy. There are hedge funds, as I’ve said, growing for investments in Russia finally.” The imposition of tariffs on India, therefore, serves both to apply pressure on Russia to cease hostilities in Ukraine and to demonstrate the United States’ capacity to act decisively in defence of its interests. The action is deliberately calibrated to be low-risk while sending high-impact signals: “Well, when you think about it, one of the great problems of the Cold War was the hyper predictability of the United States… What Trump is doing is trying to reduce the threat militarily by using his economic power. And that’s something we didn’t do.”
The interview also illuminates the nuanced relationship between economic power and diplomatic signalling. Friedman stresses that tariffs are not intended as punitive measures for their own sake but as tools to shape behaviour in the global strategic environment. By imposing a 25% tariff on India, rather than a more extreme measure, the United States communicates both resolve and restraint: “At the moment, they’re only 25. I mean, was the reason he’s done it like that, was that to protect the relationship with India? No, I think Trump babbles. But it’s not a bad thing to be incomprehensible and untrustworthy because that increases the other side’s anxiety.” The strategic calculus here relies on the psychological dimension of unpredictability and the management of perceptions, rather than on the material cost of sanctions alone.
Friedman’s analysis also situates India within the broader architecture of US-China-Russia interactions. He notes that while India may respond to economic coercion by seeking closer ties with China, the structural imbalance of power ensures that any confrontation with the United States is constrained: “Can the Indians do without the United States? Probably not. Can China do without the United States? Hasn’t been able to.” This asymmetry underlines the persistent relevance of economic interdependence as a stabilising factor in international relations.
Moreover, Friedman situates these developments within a historical perspective, contrasting the present strategic environment with the conventional Cold War model. The predictability of US policy during that period, while valued by allies and adversaries alike, limited American strategic flexibility. By contrast, Trump’s approach introduces a dynamic in which the United States can signal its intentions without being fully constrained by precedent: “In fact, none of these were unpredictable. It was not unpredictable that we did not want Russia to continue the war in Ukraine. We had negotiated with them. They refused to do so. We did something that they thought we wouldn’t do.”
The intersection of economics, diplomacy, and strategic signalling extends to US relations with China as well. Friedman underscores that the tariffs on India were intended to convey a broader message regarding the United States’ military intentions and commitment to regional stability: “It did signal to the Chinese that we’re not going to go to war with them, which they worried about India, and to the Russians that we really are going to impose tariffs.” By manipulating perceptions, the United States simultaneously discourages aggression and maintains the flexibility to respond to evolving threats, reflecting Friedman’s broader thesis regarding the strategic utility of unpredictability in international relations.
Friedman further explores the philosophical underpinnings of this strategy, emphasising the primacy of interest over trust in global diplomacy: “Trust is not a major term in international relations. Interest is.” In this light, the tariffs on India are less a punitive measure than a calculated exercise in managing strategic relationships. They exemplify the utilitarian logic of geopolitics, wherein weaker states may be used instrumentally to influence the behaviour of more powerful actors. India, as Friedman notes, is “a minor, relatively minor cost to the Indians. Certainly nothing to break relations over.”
The broader implications of Friedman’s analysis extend to the management of emerging powers. While India is currently the largest country by population and an emerging power, its strategic weight relative to the United States remains limited. Friedman observes, “The United States is the largest economy. The Chinese is second, but its per capita income is terrible. It’s like 69th in the world. This is the market you have to have if you’re going to be a global economic power.” By situating India within this comparative framework, Friedman elucidates the differential calculus applied to established and emerging powers in US foreign policy.
