The attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II in St Peter’s Square on 13 May 1981 became one of the most consequential and enduring mysteries of the Cold War. The gunman, Mehmet Ali Agca, was quickly arrested, but the question of who had sent him to kill the Polish pontiff continued to fuel speculation for decades. A new investigation by Harvard University historian Serhii Plokhy challenges the widely circulated theory that the Soviet Union orchestrated the attack through Bulgaria, arguing instead that Agca was primarily driven by his own ambitions and received logistical assistance from Turkey’s ultranationalist Grey Wolves movement.
In Killing the Pope: John Paul II and the Last Battle of the Cold War, Plokhy examines declassified archives, intelligence assessments, court records and the competing accounts surrounding the shooting. His central conclusion is that there is little convincing evidence of a powerful international conspiracy behind the attack. Agca, he argues, was not the instrument of a sophisticated Soviet operation but an unreliable assassin whose claims helped sustain a politically useful narrative during the confrontation between East and West.
The shooting itself took place before thousands of people gathered in St Peter’s Square for the Pope’s weekly public audience. Agca, then 23, had arrived in Rome after spending months moving through Europe and the Middle East. Shortly after 5pm, as John Paul II travelled through the crowd in an open-top white vehicle, Agca drew a concealed pistol and fired several shots. The Pope was struck and collapsed. Agca attempted to escape but was arrested.
John Paul II was rushed to hospital and underwent an operation lasting approximately six hours. He survived the attack and later made clear that he had forgiven the gunman. “I pray for the brother who struck me, whom I have sincerely forgiven,” he said. In the years that followed, the Pope even visited Agca in prison, creating one of the most extraordinary encounters in the history of modern papacy.
Agca’s background offered investigators an initial explanation for the attack. He was a member of the Grey Wolves, an ultranationalist Turkish movement hostile to both the Soviet Union and the United States. He had already committed a political assassination in 1979, killing a left-wing Turkish journalist before being imprisoned and subsequently escaping. During his 18 months on the run, he received assistance from Grey Wolves networks and maintained connections with members of the Turkish underworld.
When questioned by Italian police after the shooting, Agca initially appeared unusually composed. Investigators described him as cold, lucid and silent. He insisted that he had acted alone, explaining that his intention was to draw attention to victims of imperialism and conflicts involving the two superpowers. His explanation was consistent with the Grey Wolves’ hostility towards both Washington and Moscow, although it offered little insight into why he had chosen the Pope as his target.
The Italian judicial authorities were unconvinced. Two months after the attack, Agca was sentenced to life imprisonment, but the court concluded that he was probably only the visible part of a wider conspiracy whose full extent remained unclear. That assessment opened the way for a much larger investigation, during which Agca changed his account and began identifying supposed organisers behind the shooting.
He eventually accused the Bulgarian secret services of arranging the operation on behalf of the Soviet KGB. According to the version he presented, Moscow wanted John Paul II eliminated because of his opposition to communism and his influence among Catholics living behind the Iron Curtain. The Pope’s Polish origins were particularly significant. Since his election in 1978, he had become an important source of inspiration for the Solidarity movement, which challenged communist rule in Poland.
The alleged chain of responsibility was presented as a complex arrangement in which the Soviet leadership commissioned the Bulgarians, who then relied on Turkish criminal networks and the Grey Wolves to carry out the assassination. The theory attracted considerable attention in Western media and became a defining episode in the intelligence and propaganda battles of the Cold War. John Paul II himself believed that the KGB had been behind the attempt on his life.
Plokhy’s examination of the evidence, however, points in a different direction. He argues that Agca had strong personal reasons to carry out the attack, particularly the prospect of becoming one of the most notorious assassins of his generation. The Grey Wolves provided practical assistance, but there is insufficient evidence to establish the involvement of Bulgarian or Soviet intelligence services.
The historian also questions the role played by Western intelligence agencies in allowing the conspiracy theory to gain credibility. The CIA had concluded as early as 1983 that the Grey Wolves were the only identifiable perpetrators, yet American officials continued to circulate the possibility of Soviet involvement. Former Italian prime minister Giulio Andreotti later suggested that the theory had served a political purpose during the Cold War. “They needed it then,” he observed.
Agca’s changing testimony further weakened the case. He appeared to recognise what Italian investigators wanted to hear and supplied accounts that supported their suspicions, even identifying supposed Bulgarian accomplices from photographs. The allegations led to a second trial in 1985, but the proceedings became increasingly chaotic when Agca claimed in court that he was Jesus Christ. His credibility as a witness had effectively collapsed.
Now free, Agca remains an unreliable source for reconstructing the events. Plokhy chose not to interview him, preferring to test the available documentary evidence rather than depend on the shifting recollections of the gunman himself.
While the book offers a substantial reassessment of the historical record, its narrative execution receives a more critical assessment in the review published by The Times. The reviewer describes the investigation as impressive detective work but argues that Plokhy fails to convey the drama of the events or the personality of John Paul II. The Pope, despite his enormous historical influence, appears in the book as a distant figure rather than the charismatic leader who became a central force in the political and religious changes of the late twentieth century.
John Paul II’s significance extended well beyond his opposition to communism. During his pontificate, he worked to improve relations between the Catholic Church and Judaism and became the first Pope to visit Israel, where he prayed at the Western Wall. His survival after the shooting allowed him to continue a pontificate that would leave a lasting mark on international affairs and interfaith relations.
Plokhy’s investigation therefore shifts attention away from the familiar image of a Soviet-directed assassination plot and towards a more limited, but better-supported, explanation involving an ambitious gunman and his ultranationalist associates. Four decades after the shooting, the full circumstances may never be known with absolute certainty. But the evidence assembled in Killing the Pope suggests that one of the Cold War’s most persistent conspiracy theories may have obscured a less elaborate reality.

