More than eight months after the United States and Iran launched Operation Epic Fury, neither side appears willing to make the concessions needed to end the conflict, with both Washington and Tehran convinced they hold the strategic advantage. The resulting stalemate is forcing regional governments to prepare for a prolonged period of confrontation without full-scale war, while diplomatic efforts to secure an agreement face renewed uncertainty following President Donald Trump’s decision to shift away from negotiations.
The operation, launched by Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, was intended to remove the Iranian regime that has governed the country since 1979. Washington and Tel Aviv viewed the major domestic unrest in Iran in January as evidence that the leadership had been weakened. However, successive rounds of attacks and retaliation have failed to produce a decisive outcome. Both governments now appear reluctant to take the remaining steps towards a settlement, concerned that concessions could be interpreted as weakness. Their leaders also recognise that further escalation is unlikely to fundamentally change the strategic balance or force the other side to abandon its negotiating position.
Trump offered some reassurance to regional governments last week by indicating that he would not carry out further threats of military escalation against Iranian or Houthi targets unless provoked. Following a meeting at the White House with Qatar’s Prime Minister, Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, on Monday, Trump said US military operations against Iran were “effectively over”. In subsequent interviews, he indicated that regional leaders had pressed him not to escalate, fearing Iranian retaliation against their countries and infrastructure.
However, the absence of a settlement and the continued build-up of US military capacity off Iran’s coast have left Gulf governments preparing for renewed hostilities. Anwar Gargash, diplomatic adviser to the President of the United Arab Emirates, said in a speech last week that the region should “prepare for a long period of uncertainty in which neither a decisive resolution nor a stable regional order can be taken for granted.”
Regional anxiety has intensified following Trump’s apparent decision to prioritise economic pressure over renewed diplomatic engagement. His administration, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, intends to use sanctions and a naval blockade to force Tehran to adopt more flexible negotiating positions before pursuing an agreement. Trump also announced on Truth Social that he was ending Vice-President J.D. Vance’s renewed outreach to Iranian officials. Vance had represented Washington in negotiations preceding the failed June Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and had recently initiated direct written exchanges with Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Major General Mohsen Reza’i, a hardliner heading Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).
Trump justified the shift by declaring: “We don’t need a deal with Iran. Those days have long since passed. We’ve got their money, Hundreds of Billions of Dollars, and we’ve got their Strait!” He added that he had instructed Vance to concentrate fully on a task force established to address fraud in US social welfare programmes. The withdrawal from diplomatic engagement has disappointed Qatar and Pakistan, the principal regional mediators, particularly because officials involved in the negotiations believe the substantive differences between Washington and Tehran have narrowed considerably.
Trump’s reference to the Strait of Hormuz reflects his administration’s assessment that the United States has gained strategic leverage through its naval operations. Global energy experts estimate that oil exports passing through the strait have recovered to nearly 80 per cent of pre-war levels, despite the blockade preventing Iran from exporting oil from the Gulf. Nevertheless, attacks on commercial shipping continue. Iran struck at least 10 ships during the first 10 days of November, following 37 attacks in October, the highest monthly total since the conflict began in late February.
According to officials close to the mediation efforts, the central negotiating demands of the two countries are no longer substantially far apart. Washington has acknowledged that any agreement would require significant sanctions relief, including the release of blocked Iranian assets. Iranian leaders, meanwhile, have indicated that they would accept verifiable restrictions ensuring their nuclear programme could be used only for peaceful purposes, including the dilution of their stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 per cent.
Reports in regional media about the latest exchanges also suggest that Iranian negotiators were prepared to fully reopen the Strait of Hormuz as part of a settlement. This would represent a possible relaxation of Tehran’s previous insistence on managing commercial shipping through routes along Iran’s Persian Gulf coast. However, Iranian officials have denied changing their core negotiating positions, leaving uncertainty over how close the parties are to an agreement.
The dispute over Washington’s ultimate objectives presents another obstacle. Although Trump has repeatedly identified preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons as the central purpose of the military campaign, he has also continued to invoke regime change. US officials are demanding that any settlement address the nuclear issue directly rather than postponing it for subsequent negotiations, which they regard as a major weakness of the June MOU. Yet, in an interview with commentator Hugh Hewitt on Thursday, Trump returned to the question of Iran’s political leadership, saying that if the regime remained in power when his presidency ended in early 2029, “Yes, that would be a [U.S.] defeat. I would say that would be a defeat. Absolutely.”
This inconsistency reinforces Tehran’s perception that the conflict threatens the survival of its political system, potentially reducing its incentive to compromise and increasing the possibility of pre-emptive military escalation.
The Soufan Center, in its assessment of the regional confrontation, identifies a prolonged “no war-no peace” situation as the most likely planning scenario for Gulf governments, potentially lasting until the end of Trump’s term in January 2029 or beyond. Regional leaders are consequently working towards a new security architecture designed to protect their countries against an Iranian government that remains in power, potentially hardened by the conflict and determined to remove US forces from the region. The uncertainty is also restricting new investment and threatening the Arab Gulf states’ economic diversification programmes.
The future US military presence is expected to be more limited than before the conflict, although Washington is likely to remain the Gulf’s principal security guarantor because regional governments have not identified alternative partners capable of replacing it. Experts anticipate fewer than the 40,000 US troops previously forward-positioned in the region, while US-manned bases are unlikely to be rebuilt to their former scale because of their vulnerability to Iranian drones and short-range missiles. Proposed alternatives include an “over the horizon” military presence or a more flexible arrangement allowing Washington to deploy forces rapidly during crises and reposition them as required. Experts are advising regional governments to begin developing this security framework before their available options become more restricted.

