Sri Lanka’s Shadow War in Canada

Canadian Tamil diaspora organizations have clearly demonstrated that they are not monolithic, even among those still supporting the idea of Tamil Eelam (a separate state for Tamils in Sri Lanka). After the historic disaster that struck Sri Lanka, the Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC)—once considered pro-LTTE—requested immediate humanitarian assistance from Ottawa for Colombo, recognizing the crisis.

Just weeks earlier, Colombo urged Ottawa to prevent events and campaigns that seek to revive separatist narratives or create divisions among Sri Lanka’s ethnic communities. Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath raised this matter with Canadian High Commissioner Isabelle Katharine following the City of Brampton’s recognition of November 21 as Tamil Eelam National Flag Day. The minister further stated that groups in Canada run counter to the Sri Lankan government’s efforts to promote national unity and reconciliation. Notably, Brampton had recently attracted attention for unveiling a Tamil Genocide Memorial, established by a section of the Tamil diaspora in May 2025.

The Canadian federal government does not maintain a policy that supports separatism in other countries, nor does it endorse organizations that promote such causes. However, as a liberal society that welcomes migrants, Canada also upholds freedom of expression for its citizens, which can result in a variety of viewpoints being voiced.

Following the failure of the Norway-led peace process, Canada listed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as a terrorist group, effective April 8, 2006. While the United States designated the LTTE as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 1997, several Western countries—including Canada, a member of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance—continued to permit pro-LTTE campaigns, even while maintaining strict policies on global terrorism. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) concluded in 2000 that at least eight non-profit organizations and five companies were operating in Canada as fronts for the LTTE.

On closer examination, the Western policy of leveraging the diaspora as a tool to encourage the LTTE to pursue a democratic path proved unsuccessful. When Canada announced the decision to ban the LTTE, then-Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay pointed out that “the LTTE’s repeated use of violence since signing a ceasefire agreement is unacceptable and seriously calls into question its commitment to the peace process.” Many in Sri Lanka believe that the Tamil diaspora played a key role in the LTTE’s decision-making, but the LTTE in Vanni used them primarily for fundraising. After the LTTE’s defeat, a few diaspora front organizations attempted to play leading roles in Tamil politics and to establish influence on the ground. However, as expected, they could not exert significant influence on the Sampanthan-led Tamil National Alliance (TNA).

Against this background, the Tamil diaspora is fragmented. Some factions support the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK), while others back the Gajendrakumar-led Tamil National People’s Front (TNPF). There are persistent disagreements over whether Prabhakaran is still alive and even over the precise date to mark his death—May 17, 18, or 19. Assertions that Prabhakaran’s daughter is alive and leading a movement appear to be a product of these divisions.

From a political perspective, most flag-waving diaspora groups appear willing to endorse the TNPF, which presents itself as the continuation of the LTTE’s Tamil nationalist ideals. Within the TNPF, including its leader Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam and other key members, LTTE terminology is frequently used: Prabhakaran is often referred to as the Thesiyathalivar (National Leader).

Canada has permitted the use of LTTE flags as a non-violent symbolic gesture; notably, the original LTTE flag featuring two rifles was subtly modified for use as a Tamil national flag within Canada. Despite legal restrictions, pro-LTTE organizations still display LTTE flags, including those with rifle imagery, at various events and demonstrations in both Canada and the UK. For instance, at a recent anti-Tilvin demonstration in the UK, most of the flags present were original LTTE flags bearing crossed rifles.

Tamil expatriates are not unique in advocating causes related to their homelands while living in Western countries; Sikh and Palestinian supporters also use Western soil as a platform for political activism. Local politicians often appeal to these communities as part of their electoral strategies. As Professor Kim Nosal noted, this reflects the “primacy of the ballot box,” suggesting that a country’s foreign policy is shaped primarily by electoral considerations—a phenomenon evident during Harper’s administration. Thus, the official position of the Canadian federal government may differ from the actions of some local politicians, a dynamic well known to the Sri Lankan government.

Colombo’s complaints about the Western-based Tamil diaspora are not new. After the civil war ended, Tamil diaspora groups increasingly focused on voting and influencing politics in southern Sri Lanka. During the war, Colombo regarded only the LTTE as a threat; after its defeat, pro-LTTE diaspora organizations were branded a national security threat. In 2014, the Mahinda Rajapaksa government, for the first time, domestically designated 16 Tamil diaspora organizations (including the defunct LTTE) and 424 individuals under paragraph 4(2) of United Nations Regulations No. 1 of 2012.

The ban has been revised repeatedly, with organizations and individuals removed and re‑listed over time. After Mahinda Rajapaksa left office in 2015, the “Yahapalana” government delisted several groups and individuals. Gotabaya Rajapaksa reinstated the ban after his 2019 election, restoring previously delisted entities. Ranil Wickremesinghe later reviewed the list again, and the current NPP government appears to be following the same approach taken under Maithripala’s administration. This cycle of listing and delisting raises a key question: are these decisions driven by electoral calculations or by genuine national‑security concerns?

One thing is clear: there is no consistent policy in Colombo for handling the Tamil diaspora in the post-war context. Before complaining about Canada, Colombo should look inward. If some Tamil diaspora groups in Canada and other Western countries (though most do not participate) are promoting separatism, it is Sri Lanka’s ruling elite that have created opportunities for such activism. So far, the National People’s Power (NPP) government has not proven itself an exception compared to previous governments.

Another controversial issue is Sri Lanka’s policy stance on supporting the LTTE. When making complaints about the use of “insignia” or flags associated with separatist ideology overseas, Colombo should also consider its own domestic political environment. Members of Parliament representing Tamil parties associated with Tamil nationalism have been vocal in their support of LTTE leader Prabhakaran, openly celebrating his birthday and praising him in Parliament. Why did the Speaker hesitate to take action against these parliamentarians?

For the first time since the end of the war, Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK) parliamentarians commemorated the LTTE’s Maaveerar Naal (Great Heroes’ Day) inside the Parliament compound and posted the event on social media. While some Tamil MPs invoke Prabhakaran and LTTE memorials for political gain, other actors are also exploiting these for their own political business. I recently found a diaspora YouTube video of a Maaveerar Naal speech by Prabhakaran’s alleged daughter, Thuvaraka, broadcast from Kutchaveli, Trincomalee — a strategic asset in Sri Lanka. The source says the event was organized by the “Rehabilitated United Liberation Tigers Front.” If such political uses are tolerated at home, Sri Lanka has limited grounds to object when similar activities occur among the diaspora in Canada and other Western countries.

One year has passed since the NPP assumed power. A significant number of Tamils voted for them—in fact, the NPP won three parliamentary seats in Jaffna district, despite coordinated campaigns by northern and eastern Tamil parties urging voters to oppose the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). Yet the central question remains: how much progress has the NPP made toward a political settlement for Sri Lankan Tamils or toward delivering justice for victims?

There remains uncertainty about whether provincial council elections will be held. The government has yet to show concrete steps toward fully implementing constitutional provisions. Against this backdrop, some diaspora groups grow increasingly restless. Separatist forces exploit the gaps when meaningful progress stalls in Sri Lanka. However, compared to the past, many diaspora activists concerned about their home country have adopted a more moderate stance. I spoke with several such individuals during my recent visit to Canada.

Historically, separatism became part of mainstream Tamil political discourse only after the repeated neglect of moderate Tamils’ legitimate demands. For example, if the Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact of 1957 had been implemented, the polarization of Sri Lankan ethnic politics might have been avoided. As a former rebel group now committed to democracy, the JVP-led National People’s Power (NPP) government is uniquely positioned to understand and address these issues; however, it has not demonstrated sufficient political will. In this context, the government should focus on fulfilling the aspirations of Sri Lankan Tamils through existing constitutional provisions rather than worrying about the Tamil diaspora abroad.