It isn’t enough to talk about peace. One must believe in it. And it isn’t enough to believe in it. One must work at it. ~ Eleanor Roosevelt
Introduction
In the evolving architecture of contemporary conflict resolution, the reported memorandum of understanding between U.S. President Donald Trump and senior Iranian officials marks yet another instance in which international relations oscillate between the formal rigidity of treaty law and the fluid pragmatism of political accommodation. The understanding, as presently described in fragmented public disclosures and mediated statements, seeks to bring an end to hostilities involving the United States and Israel on one side, and the Islamic Republic of Iran on the other, within a broader regional theatre that has drawn in non-state armed actors of considerable influence.
The origins of the conflict, as reported, lie in a series of escalatory military exchanges beginning with strikes attributed to the United States and its ally Israel on Iranian targets on 28 February. This was followed, two days later, by retaliatory action by the Iranian-backed militant formation Hezbollah against Israel, which in turn precipitated Israeli military responses in southern Lebanon, where Hezbollah maintains its operational infrastructure. The result has been a cascading pattern of reciprocal force that is emblematic of modern asymmetric warfare, in which state and non-state actors are bound together in a complex lattice of deterrence, reprisal, and geopolitical signalling.
The reported memorandum of understanding does not, at least in its publicly available fragments, constitute a fully articulated peace treaty in the classical sense. Rather, it occupies an intermediate juridical space between a political declaration of intent and a pactum de contrahendo—a pre-contractual arrangement that binds parties to negotiate in good faith towards a future, more definitive legal instrument. In this sense, the instrument reflects what international law has increasingly accommodated: the substitution of rigid finality with structured temporality.
According to statements attributed to Pakistani mediation efforts, notably those of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, both sides have declared the immediate and permanent cessation of military operations across all fronts, including Lebanon. This inclusion is not incidental. It reflects a long-standing Iranian strategic concern regarding the security architecture of southern Lebanon and the operational latitude of Hezbollah, which functions both as a domestic political actor within Lebanon and as a regional military proxy.
Yet, notwithstanding the apparent breadth of the cessation of hostilities, the memorandum is conspicuously silent on one of the most sensitive and structurally determinative issues in the conflict: Iran’s nuclear programme. The absence of substantive provisions regarding enrichment levels, verification regimes, or dismantlement obligations indicates a deliberate deferral rather than a resolution. Instead, the instrument establishes a 60-day period designated for technical consultations, presumably aimed at addressing the nuclear dossier in a phased and incremental manner.
From a legal doctrinal perspective, such deferral raises important questions concerning the sufficiency of precision required for an international agreement to generate binding obligations. While memoranda of understanding are often characterized by their non-binding or quasi-binding nature, international practice has demonstrated that their normative weight is not insignificant, particularly when accompanied by clear operational commitments such as cessation of hostilities.
The structure of the present arrangement thus reflects a dual-layered architecture: an immediate operational layer, concerned with the cessation of violence, and a deferred normative layer, concerned with strategic armament and verification mechanisms. This bifurcation is increasingly characteristic of modern conflict termination frameworks, where the urgency of humanitarian and security imperatives necessitates immediate stabilization, while deeper structural disputes are relegated to technocratic negotiation channels.
It is also notable that the role of mediation, attributed in part to Pakistan, underscores the continuing relevance of middle-power diplomacy in conflict de-escalation. In an era where great power negotiations are frequently constrained by strategic rivalry, intermediary states often assume a catalytic function in facilitating provisional settlements.
Ultimately, the legal and political durability of this memorandum will depend not upon its declaratory language, but upon its capacity to generate compliance in practice and to evolve into a more comprehensive and enforceable peace architecture. Whether it matures into a binding treaty or dissipates as a transient pause in hostilities will be determined by the sincerity of implementation, the discipline of negotiation within the stipulated 60-day window, and the willingness of the parties to translate tactical cessation into strategic reconciliation.
The Etymology and Evolution of the Memorandum of Understanding
The expression “memorandum of understanding” is etymologically derived from ordinary English usage: a memorandum being a written record intended to preserve matters for future reference, and understanding denoting mutual comprehension or agreement between parties. Combined, the phrase signifies a written articulation of a shared understanding. Historically, international practice has employed a wide spectrum of informal instruments—protocols, agreed minutes, exchanges of notes, declarations, and memoranda—to record diplomatic understandings without necessarily engaging the formal treaty-making apparatus. The widespread use of the term “Memorandum of Understanding” gained prominence particularly in the post-Second World War international order, when the proliferation of international organizations, technical cooperation regimes, defense partnerships, and development frameworks required flexible legal instruments capable of accommodating rapid diplomatic engagement without the procedural rigidity of treaties. The MoU thus emerged as a hybrid diplomatic tool, offering both structure and informality. Yet this very flexibility generated doctrinal ambiguity, as the term acquired no fixed legal meaning: some MoUs are non-binding political declarations, while others function as fully binding international agreements.
The Myth of the “Gentleman’s Agreement”
It is often asserted, sometimes loosely, that a memorandum of understanding is merely a “gentleman’s agreement,” resting upon honor rather than law. Such a characterization is only partially accurate and potentially misleading. A gentleman’s agreement, in its classical sense, is an arrangement governed by trust, reputation, and political reciprocity rather than enforceable legal obligation. Many MoUs do indeed operate at this level, particularly in politically sensitive domains where States prefer to avoid legal formalization. However, to generalize this proposition is erroneous. An MoU may equally embody legal commitments, depending on its terms and context. It may function as a political declaration, a preparatory framework, or a binding international agreement. The label itself is legally neutral. The decisive inquiry is whether the parties intended to create legal rights and obligations, not whether they chose a polite diplomatic terminology.
The Vienna Convention and the Definition of a Treaty
The starting point of legal analysis is Article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which defines a treaty as an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whatever its particular designation. The phrase “whatever its designation” is critical, as it expressly excludes nomenclature from determinative legal effect. A treaty may be called a convention, agreement, protocol, charter, exchange of notes, declaration, or memorandum of understanding. Conversely, a document labelled “treaty” may not be legally binding if the intention to be governed by international law is absent. What matters is not the label but the intention of the parties, the structure of obligations, and the legal context. Thus, an MoU may fall within the definition of a treaty if it demonstrates intent to create binding legal obligations under international law.
Qatar v. Bahrain: The Leading Authority
The jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice in Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain remains the seminal authority on the legal character of informal instruments. In that case, the Court was confronted with “agreed minutes” signed during diplomatic mediation. Bahrain contended that the instrument lacked binding force due to its informal character. The Court rejected this argument and held that the agreed minutes constituted an international agreement capable of creating legal obligations. The Court emphasized that international law does not prescribe any particular form for treaties and that intention must be inferred from the text and circumstances rather than nomenclature. This judgment decisively confirmed that informal instruments, including those resembling memoranda of understanding, may nonetheless be legally binding if the parties so intend. Applied to the United States–Iran MoU, the Qatar v. Bahrain reasoning compels a functional analysis of obligations rather than reliance on terminology.
Other Judicial and Arbitral Approaches
International tribunals and arbitral bodies have consistently adopted a substance-over-form approach in determining the legal status of instruments resembling MoUs. The Permanent Court of International Justice, various arbitral tribunals, and domestic courts in both common law and civil law systems have repeatedly held that informal agreements may nevertheless be binding where intention and certainty of terms are established. Domestic jurisprudence similarly recognizes that preliminary instruments may give rise to enforceable obligations if essential terms are sufficiently definite and the parties manifest an intention to be bound. The consistent doctrinal thread is that legal effect arises from consent and intention, not from formal classification. Thus, MoUs occupy a spectrum ranging from purely political declarations to fully enforceable international agreements.
Pactum de Contrahendo and International Agreements
The concept of pactum de contrahendo, rooted in Roman law and developed extensively in civil law traditions, refers to an agreement obligating parties to conclude a future contract. It is distinct from a mere agreement to negotiate, as it imposes a substantive obligation to reach a definitive agreement in the future. In international law, this doctrine finds expression in framework treaties and staged negotiation instruments whereby States commit themselves to concluding subsequent agreements or implementing progressive obligations. Such instruments are particularly prevalent in complex diplomatic settlements where immediate agreement on all issues is impossible. In this sense, a pactum de contrahendo operates as a juridical bridge between political aspiration and legal finality.
Is the United States-Iran MoU a Pactum de Contrahendo?
On the basis of reported characteristics, the United States–Iran MoU appears to exhibit strong features of a pactum de contrahendo. It is described as a framework instrument designed to terminate hostilities, establish interim stabilization measures, and mandate negotiations toward a comprehensive settlement within a defined period. It defers substantive resolution of critical issues such as nuclear constraints, sanctions relief, verification mechanisms, and security guarantees. In this sense, its primary legal function appears not to be final regulation but the creation of an obligation to negotiate and conclude a future agreement. Whether it ultimately constitutes a treaty under Article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention depends upon whether the parties intended to create immediate legal obligations governed by international law. If such intention is present, the instrument may simultaneously function as both a treaty and a pactum de contrahendo, binding in its procedural commitments while open-ended in its substantive finality. Ultimately, the MoU demonstrates once again that in international law, it is not the nomenclature that governs legal character, but the architecture of intention and obligation embedded within the instrument itself.
My Take: Now What?
The United States–Iran Memorandum of Understanding, as presently reported, stands at the intersection of diplomacy and law, embodying the perennial tension between political expediency and juridical certainty. In the tradition of international legal analysis espoused in my earlier writings on treaty formation, aviation agreements, and institutional frameworks of global governance, it is imperative to reiterate that international law does not elevate form over substance. Whether an instrument is labelled a “treaty,” “agreement,” or “memorandum of understanding” is, in epistemic terms, irrelevant to its juridical character. What matters is the animus contrahendi—the intention to be bound.
In my previous analyses of international instruments, I have consistently maintained that the architecture of treaty law under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is deliberately indifferent to nomenclature. Article 2(1)(a) of the Convention, in its elegant neutrality, confirms that any written instrument between States governed by international law constitutes a treaty “whatever its designation.” This principle has been the cornerstone of my argument that international legal order is not governed by semantic formalism but by the teleology of consent and obligation. The same reasoning applies with equal force to memoranda of understanding, which occupy a fluid doctrinal space between political declarations and binding international commitments.
The present U.S.–Iran MoU illustrates this ambiguity precisely. On its face, it appears to function as a framework arrangement, establishing a temporary cessation of hostilities, reopening strategic maritime routes, and setting out a timetable for future negotiations. In doctrinal classification, such an instrument is best understood as a pactum de contrahendo, namely an obligation to conclude a future definitive agreement. It does not, in its apparent structure, exhaustively regulate substantive rights and obligations but rather binds the parties to a process of negotiation and progressive settlement. This is a category well recognized in civil law traditions and increasingly acknowledged in international jurisprudence as an intermediate legal form.
However, as I have argued in earlier work on aviation treaties and liability regimes under the Montreal Convention, the existence of a framework instrument does not preclude its simultaneous qualification as a treaty. A pactum de contrahendo may itself be a treaty if it creates enforceable procedural obligations under international law. Thus, the dual character of the MoU must be acknowledged: it may be both a binding procedural treaty and a substantive pre-contractual arrangement for future agreement.
The critical question, therefore, is not whether the MoU is legally meaningful, but whether it is legally credible in the sense of producing normative certainty. International practice, as confirmed by the International Court of Justice in Qatar v. Bahrain, has decisively rejected the proposition that form or nomenclature determines legal status. The Court held that even instruments styled as “agreed minutes” may constitute binding international agreements if the intention of the parties so indicates. This jurisprudence reflects a broader doctrinal consensus: international law privileges intention and effect over form and terminology.
Yet, the problem with many contemporary MoUs, particularly in high-stakes geopolitical contexts such as U.S.–Iran relations, is not their legal potential but their indeterminacy of intent. In my earlier writings on international aviation agreements and institutional governance, I have cautioned that ambiguity in treaty intention leads to epistemic instability in international legal relations. Where it is unclear whether States intend to be legally bound or merely politically aligned, the instrument risks becoming a hybrid devoid of enforceable certainty.
The question then arises: is an MoU merely a gentleman’s agreement? The answer is categorically negative. A gentleman’s agreement, in the classical sense, is entirely extra-legal, relying on honor and reciprocity. A modern MoU, however, exists within the juridical ecosystem of international law and may give rise to enforceable obligations depending on its content. It is equally incorrect to describe it universally as non-binding. The legal reality is more nuanced: an MoU may be binding, non-binding, or partially binding depending on its clauses, context, and the conduct of the parties.
Similarly, the notion that an MoU is a mere “de facto agreement” is analytically insufficient. De facto arrangements may have operational consequences, but international law is concerned with de jure obligations. A de facto arrangement may evolve into a de jure obligation if State practice and intention converge, a principle consistent with customary international law formation and treaty interpretation.
The historical evolution of the MoU further reinforces its functional ambiguity. The term gained prominence in the post–World War II era, particularly with the expansion of multilateral diplomacy, technical cooperation, and institutional frameworks. Its etymological simplicity—memorandum of understanding—belies its doctrinal complexity. It was never intended to constitute a fixed legal category but rather a pragmatic diplomatic instrument adaptable to varying degrees of legal commitment.
Against this background, the United States and Iran, if they seek to transform their MoU into a legally credible and internationally acceptable instrument, must undertake several critical steps.
First, they must clarify legal intent explicitly. The instrument must state whether it is governed by international law and whether the parties intend to create binding obligations. Absence of such clarity leaves the instrument in a liminal space, vulnerable to divergent interpretations and political opportunism.
Second, they must ensure precision of obligations. As I have consistently emphasized in my analyses of international regulatory frameworks, indeterminacy of obligation is the Achilles’ heel of international agreements. If the MoU is to function as a pactum de contrahendo, it must clearly specify the obligation to negotiate, the timeline, the subject matter, and the consequences of non-compliance.
Third, they must establish institutional mechanisms for implementation and dispute resolution. Without monitoring structures, verification procedures, and interpretative mechanisms, even a well-intentioned MoU risks becoming a symbolic rather than juridical instrument.
Fourth, and most importantly, they must consider formalization under the Vienna Convention framework. Registration, publication, and recognition as a treaty under Article 102 of the UN Charter would significantly enhance legal credibility and transparency. Such formalization would remove ambiguity and anchor the instrument firmly within the corpus of international law.
Finally, both parties must recognize that in contemporary international relations, especially in matters involving peace and security, legal certainty is itself a form of diplomatic capital. A carefully structured treaty is not an impediment to political flexibility but a guarantor of sustained compliance and predictability.
In conclusion, the United States–Iran MoU occupies a juridically hybrid space. It is most plausibly characterized as a pactum de contrahendo with potential treaty effects, depending upon its final formulation and the demonstrated intention of the parties. As I have argued throughout my academic work, international law is not a domain of semantic formalism but of structured intention. The future of such instruments lies not in their nomenclature but in their capacity to transform political understandings into legally cognizable commitments. Only through clarity, precision, and institutionalization can the MoU transcend its provisional character and achieve the normative dignity required of an instrument affecting international peace and security.
