On the 17th July 2025, the National Police Commission (NPC) set a new world record by dismissing the senior most Police Officer in the country, namely Nilantha Jayawardena, who was the Director of the State Intelligence Service at the time the Easter Sunday which took place on 21st April 2019, for dereliction and failure to act to prevent the heinous crime. It is the first time ever in the world history that an intelligence officer was found guilty for not taking action to prevent a terrorist attack, after having repeatedly informed the defence authorities in the country, even in the last hour. Such decision made and substantiated by the NPC is the menial most blatant fundamental rights violation, ever perpetrated on a senior public official with an unblemished track record, since 1948 in Sri Lanka. It is a clear reflection of the ignorance, imprudence and mediocracy of the policy makers and administrators in the country.
The prime objective of this article is to ascertain the reality that employees of the State Intelligence Service (SIS) do not possess any powers, authority, skills and resources to take preventive action, despite the fact that they have been seconded from the Police Department to the SIS they hold a rank in the Police Department.
As per definition, the Intelligence Community in a country is a federation of executive branch agencies and organizations that work separately and together to conduct intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of the national security. In view of such, the Intelligence Community in Sri Lanka comprises five following agencies.
- State Intelligence Service (SIS)
- Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI)
- Directorate of Naval Intelligence (DNI)
- Directorate of Air Force Intelligence (DAFI)
- Special Branch of the Police Department (SB)
The State Intelligence Service (SIS), previously known as the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB), serves as Sri Lanka’s principal intelligence organisation. It is the country’s sole civilian intelligence agency, entrusted with both domestic and foreign intelligence operations, and operates directly under the authority of the Ministry of Defence.
SIS is functioning under the Ministry of Defence and it reports directly to the Secretary Defence.
Prior to 1984, responsibility for internal intelligence rested with the Sri Lanka Police, initially through the Special Branch and later via the Intelligence Services Division. However, the shortcomings of the division during the July 1983 riots prompted President J.R. Jayewardene’s government to reassess the national intelligence framework. This led to the establishment of the National Intelligence Bureau in 1984, which consolidated intelligence units from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police. In 2006, the organisation was restructured and renamed the State Intelligence Service.
SIS is responsible for the collection of intelligence in regard to National Security, on emerging threats from internal and external sources to be used in the formulation of government policies and preventive strategies. The scope of duties carried out by the SIS can be broadly classified as follows.
- Collection and analysis of information.
- Conducting covert operations (undercover investigations).
- Conduct background checks on applicants recruited to sensitive institutions including the Armed Forces, Police and other selected state institutions.
- Issue threat assessment reports on VVIP and VIP security and governmental affairs.
- Conducting training programs for other institutions.
- Maintaining foreign relations on national security issues
The overall responsibility of coordinating the five agencies stated above is the responsibility of the Chief of National Intelligence (CNI). The functional responsibilities for the five agencies are vested upon the respective Directors of the agencies.
SIS is functioning under the Ministry of Defence and it reports directly to the Secretary Defence. The other four agencies report directly to the Commanders of the Tri-forces and to the Inspector General of Police, respectively.
Appointment of CNIis made by the Cabinet of Ministers and the appointment to the position of Director – SIS is made by the Secretary Defence, with the consent of the government.
However, only the CNI is a member of the National Security Council. The President of Sri Lanka is responsible for convening National Security Council Meetings. The CNI is responsible for convening inter-agency meetings, in which the heads of agencies and a few designated senior officials, meet periodically, for the CNI to brief the President and the Secretary Defence, either by way of a Weekly Report or at the National Security Council Meetings. Both these meetings were customarily held once a week in the past.
The CNI is expected to brief the President and the Secretary Defence at policy level and the Director – SIS is expected to brief them on any matter concerning national security, virtually on a daily basis.
Traditionally, the Director and the Directorate Members of the SIS (Deputy Director and above) have been Police Officers since its inception. In 1998, a civilian had been appointed as a Deputy Director from outside, to head the newly formed Research Division under the instructions of the experts sent by Government of France, in the process of revamping and restructuring the intelligence network. In 2019, a Major General from the DMI was appointed as the Director of SIS. Both these appointments are exceptions to the tradition. In addition, a retired Deputy Inspector General of Police also had been appointed as the Director SIS in late 1990s. Except for these three appointments, all Directorate Members of the SIS have been Police Officers who have been released by the Police Department on Secondment, even now.
DMI, DNI, DAFI and SB are staffed by members of the respective organizations and they hold a rank and report directly to the Commanders of the Forces and to the Inspector General of the Police, respectively. On the contrary, SIS is staffed by Police Officers seconded from the Police Department coming under the span of control of the Ministry of Security Law and Order. In contrast, SIS comes under the purview of the Ministry of Defence and its prime most responsibility is collecting and gathering information concerning National Security in advance and sharing such information with relevant Defence and Police Authorities, who possess the operational capability and capacity with appropriate power and authority to act on such information, especially in contingencies subject to sever time constraints. Most importantly, the SIS never carries out operational activities, based on the information they gather.
In addition to SIS, the Police Department provides Police Officers to the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC), which comes under the purview of Ministry of Justice and also to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to serve as Defence Attaches in the Sri Lankan Diplomatic Missions in overseas. Whenever, a Police Officer is assigned to a different functionality under a different Ministry, such Police Officers relinquish their Police duties, in entirety.
Further, if a Police officer is seconded to the SIS, the Ministry of Defence pays the salaries and an incentive of 50% on the basic salary. Nevertheless, the Police Department preserves the seniority and the rank of the respective officers, in the event that they need to either come back or to be sent back to the Police Service.
The foremost foundational concept underlying the functionality of an intelligence organization is Covert Operations. Two comprehensive definitions of covert operations are as follows.
- Covert operations are those done in secret without the knowledge of those being observed. Blending with the surroundings is critical to the success of these operations.
- Activities carried out in a concealed or clandestine manner, in order to make it difficult, if not impossible to trace those activities back to the sponsoring intelligence agency.
Those who are seconded to the SIS from the Police Department do not wear uniforms. They carry a separate Identity Card issued by the SIS, to be used only if a need arises. They are not allowed to use the identity card issued by the Police Department under any circumstances, except for the purposes of deriving fringe benefits such as use of the Police Hospital etc. Among them, those who are designated to carry out covert operations and surveillances, SIS at its best endeavours to disguise their Police identity by ways of having them to grow beards, wear ear studs, grow long hair to look like punks etc. all at individual discretion. If the situation demands, they may even play the role of a beggar. Such officers are kept in a secret location and they do not even come to the Head Office of the SIS. Depending on the nature of the task assigned to them, the SIS officers are entitled to carry a fire-arm, only for self-defence and they are strictly proscribed from using such fire-arms for any other purpose, even if a crime takes place either in front of them or in their presence.
The two main Human Intelligence (HUMINT) agent types used to gather information are termed as INFILTRATION and PENETRATION agents. An Infiltration Agent (also known as a Plant Agent) is someone who is inducted into the target operation under a suitable pretext of being suspected for espionage. A penetration agent (also known as a Recruit Agent) would already be in place in the target area and is recruited by the handler. Most importantly, it is an important fact that the intelligence provided by an infiltration agent is much more reliable than the information provided by a penetration agent.
The SIS officers are entitled to carry a fire-arm, only for self-defence and they are strictly proscribed from using such fire-arms for any other purpose, even if a crime takes place either in front of them or in their presence.
The Supervisory Officers of the State Intelligence Service (SIS) in Sri Lanka can designate and task any employee of the organization to be used as an infiltration agent. If the need arises, they themselves can infiltrate organizations. In 1999, a Deputy Director was tasked to infiltrate into a very strong anti-government campaign to identify the high-profile persons organizing the campaign, which was beyond the penetration capability of an ordinary SIS officer.
At this juncture, the reader may wonder whether stating facts is an exposure of craft and trade secrets. All such facts revealed above are standard practices of every intelligence organization in the world. A few decades ago, the textbooks bought from bookstores in overseas and placed in intelligence libraries have been classified and given access only on need-to-use basis. However, with the rapid development of the Internet, nothing is a secret concerning modes operandi of an intelligence agency. Hundreds of pages of literature are available on any topic in the Internet, what used to be of secret nature. For example, the drug traffickers use some vital intelligence techniques such as the Dead Letter Box, more effectively and extensively above the intelligence agencies.
As I was briefed by a peer officer who handled a covert option in 1988 to counter southern subversion, a young Sub Inspector seconded from the Police Department and working for the NIB had been planted in the target organization as an infiltration agent, who was able to win the trust and confidence to the extent that he became a leading regional activist. One day, he informed the NIB that the leaders have taken a decision to shift an armory form one location to another secret location in the night, based on a suspicion that the security forces have gotten to know the current location. The arrest was planned through the operational organizations and at the last moment, the infiltration agent who also was the informant, was asked to take part in the process of shifting. All those who were involved have been apprehended and there is no trace of them since then. Nevertheless, this officer who risked his life and passed on the information reported back to duty after having changed his name, once the subversion ended.
The concern here is could he have executed any Police Authority in this situation? If he did that, it would have been a suicidal mission. There is no better example to establish the fact that no employee in the SIS possess any Police Authority and Powers.
Unfortunately, in the aftermath of Easter Sunday Attack in 2019, the Director of SIS was found guilty for not preventing the attack and he was ordered to pay a compensation of Rs. 75 million. As a former Deputy Director of the SIS, I am of the perception that Intelligence Organizations cannot prevent any such attacks, as they do not possess any legitimate powers and authority to do so. Also, they do not possess any skills and resources to carry out ground operations, for which they are not trained. Therefore, penalizing intelligence officers is a grave injustice perpetrated for not initiating preventive action and in fact it is a violation of their fundamental rights. In this situation, it is reported and affirmed that the intelligence officers have informed all the officials well in advance, those who had powers and authority to initiate ground operations and prevent the attack but failed to do so. In order to further substantiate this fact, two Retired Officers held the position of Director – State Intelligence Service in the past. One was appointed a few years after his retirement as a Deputy Inspector General of Police and the other was a Major General who was asked to continue, immediately after his retirement. If the Easter Sunday attack took place during the tenure of such a Retired Officer, would they have been found guilty for not having executed their Power and Authority in regard to Public Security?
The NPC is alleged to have taken the decision to dismiss Nilantha Jayawardena based on a report submitted by a three-member committee appears to have not had even a minute understanding of the scope of intelligence.
There is no precedence set by any other country in the world for having penalized the Intelligence Officers for operational failures by the others to act, based on the intelligence provided well in advance. If an international committee is appointed to investigate in to the Easter Sunday Attack and if it gets revealed that the Director of the SIS is not guilty based on the line of argument maintained in this document, the credibility and effectiveness of our country will get severely undermined, for not being able to understand the basics and fundamentals of the scope of intelligence operations.
The NPC is alleged to have taken the decision to dismiss Nilantha Jayawardena based on a report submitted by a three-member committee appears to have not had even a minute understanding of the scope of intelligence. The committee has completely failed to realize the fact that intelligence officers who are seconded to the Ministry of Defence have no police authority and powers to carry out operations. Also, in implementing such a decision, it is evident that the NPC has not even an opinion from the Secretary to the Ministry of Public Security, who is a veteran intelligence officer with over a decade of experience at the SIS. As a consequence, the only person who did his job responsibly had to pay the price with is career, image and retirement benefits, for the apathy of the defence authorities then and for the mediocracy and irrationality of the present administrators.
In the event of an injustice being perpetrated on a person, a damage control exercise must be carried out immediately. Alfred Dreyfus, an officer of the French Army had been charged for treason and court-marshalled in 1894, concerning an espionage activity, based on suspicions of his Jewish origin. After a brief unfair hearing, he had been found guilty, dishonorably discharged and deported to Devil’s Island. Three years later, the French Army found that he is completely innocent, but only his punishment had been extenuated. Subsequently, he was pardoned and reinstated. Later, he was exonerated and rewarded. At last, after 101 years, the French Army cleared his name in 1995, sixty years after his death.
In order to further supplement the above fact, on the 12 September 2024, the former President of Sri Lanka posthumously pardoned Henry Pedris, who was executed for treason on 12th July 1915, 109 years after his death.
In conclusion, decisions can be revoked upon realizing that a vital fundamental aspect had not been factored at length and depth, previously. It is never too late to correct a mistake.
