Decades ago, during the intense US–Soviet standoff of the Cold War, a deterrence competition was unleashed through both covert and overt means. From strategic firepower to nuclear deterrence, the Soviets and the Americans tested their best efforts to outdo each other. The world order witnessed an arms race, a space race, and more, but what kept the bipolar global order on edge was the danger of nuclear calculations. Beyond this, what was particularly striking was the Soviets’ success in achieving complete strategic deterrence against the US, which kept the Americans on tenterhooks. Decades later, perhaps history repeated itself when the Russians outmanoeuvred the US in nuclear strategy rubrics by recently launching the 9M730 Burevestnik—a nuclear-powered cruise missile.
The American Desperation
The US fully entrusted its covert operations to secret programmes designed to closely monitor Soviet military and nuclear plans. However, the CIA often misinterpreted Soviet tactical behaviour and responses as strategic intentions, leading to serious misjudgements and a drain on US military and economic resources.
The first major instance was the “bomber gap” in the mid-1950s, when the US believed that the Soviets were building a large fleet of long-range strategic bombers far exceeding American numbers. During the 1955 Soviet Aviation Day air show, Soviet pilots repeatedly flew the same Myasishchev M-4 Bison bombers past the reviewing stand to create the illusion of a large operational fleet. The Soviets staged a perfect deception, which the CIA fell for, prompting the US to embark on a costly military build-up of its bomber forces.
A second instance was the “missile gap” in the late 1950s, when the US again misjudged the Soviets’ ICBM strength and channelled its resources and economic capacity towards heavy nuclear spending. Later, satellite intelligence revealed that the US had, in fact, maintained strategic superiority. From U-2 spy planes to satellites, the CIA did everything to checkmate the Soviets in the deterrence game, but it failed, as the Soviets were reading the strategic nuclear picture differently from the Americans—who were focused primarily on the tactical nuclear picture, deploying counter-responses and matching the nuclear race.
The Gap in Deterrence Thinking
The US outlined its nuclear doctrine—Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)—based on the idea that any nuclear attack by one superpower on the other would inevitably lead to the complete destruction of both nations. Overall, the MAD doctrine emphasises nuclear survivability, creating deterrence through fear and preventing nuclear war.
The US’s second-strike capability relies on two key principles: absorbing an attack and ensuring an annihilating counterstrike capable of potentially destroying the other superpower. This nuclear strategy aims to establish general deterrence and prevent a superpower from launching a first strike, thereby providing a safeguard against nuclear crises in the global order.
However, the Soviets had a different approach to nuclear strategy. While the US focused on the logic of un-survivability and unwinnability, the Soviets developed a warfighting doctrine that prioritised survivability and the possibility of winning nuclear conflicts through pre-emptive nuclear actions.
The US’s MAD Doctrine Challenge
The US’s Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine only becomes active when a first strike occurs; there was no pre-emptive element within it. While MAD is based on assured destruction, it also involves “pause and preventive diplomacy”, through which the US can enforce credible deterrence via negotiations and diplomatic leverage. This approach aims to instil fear of annihilation and un-survivability, eliminating the possibility of a first strike or nuclear miscalculation by either side. Overall, MAD contained both first and last options—de-escalation and escalation to the point of annihilation.
The Soviet Union’s warfighting doctrine developed an automated nuclear strike system called Perimeter within the USSR, codenamed “Dead Hand” by NATO. The Dead Hand system operates on the principle of automatic retaliation. First, in response to nuclear threats from the US, it can launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike if it detects seismic, radiation, or atmospheric signals. Second, the Dead Hand system can fire ICBMs even if Soviet leadership and command centres are destroyed, thanks to its automation.
In short, it guarantees mutual destruction even in a “decapitation” scenario, something MAD does not guarantee, as executing a second strike depends on the survivability of leadership and the absorption of the first strike. The Dead Hand system is said to be located deep underground in hardened bunkers, making it highly resistant to US strikes, even if the US attempts to destroy it in a first or second strike. The Soviets successfully challenged the US’s nuclear strategy, which relied on eliminating pre-emptive nuclear warfare through doomsday logic—a credible second strike leading to annihilation.
The Doctrine Mismatch
The US’s nuclear and strategic thinking during the Cold War against the Soviets focused on two main goals: first, achieving superiority, and second, gaining complete dominance. Before adopting the MAD doctrine, the US proposed a “massive retaliation” strategy that included a first strike and pre-emptive massive retaliation, even involving nuclear attack if the Soviets invaded Europe or threatened to do so.
The Massive Retaliation doctrine lacked credibility because it raised a serious question: would the US launch nuclear strikes over skirmishes and minor conflicts with the Soviets? The US and its allies faced a dilemma of “suicide or surrender”, as the doctrine was inflexible and failed to respond effectively when the Soviets expanded their proxy warfare network during the Cold War.
The unrealistic nature of massive retaliation was later addressed through a flexibility clause in 1961 that included conventional military and unconventional responses to Soviet actions. However, this too failed to deliver the desired results, as the Soviets upgraded their conventional military, nuclear, and unconventional warfighting capabilities—the US’s failure in Vietnam against Soviet-backed proxy forces being a classic example.
Conversely, the Soviets had graded and planned response postures based on long-warfighting and Deep Battle doctrines. Soviet thinking was based on two premises: survivability and winability during conflict, including nuclear ones. They focused on fighting in-depth conventional and unconventional battles—multi-layered responses and systemic attrition—unlike the US doctrine, which capitalised on instantaneous responses, with speed and tempo as crucial elements of warfighting and conflict management.
This speed–tempo thinking led the US to repeated failures, ranging from overestimation to underestimation. Decades later, Russia perhaps outmanoeuvred the US in the strategic deterrence game as it successfully developed a nuclear-powered cruise missile—something the US failed to achieve when it pursued a similar programme, codenamed Pluto, during the Cold War.
The Skyfall
Russia recently tested its nuclear-powered cruise missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead—Burevestnik, codenamed Skyfall by NATO. This missile provides an effective strategic deterrent against the US. Its lethality can be gauged from the fact that it can remain airborne for extended periods, potentially days, and has global reach due to its nuclear-powered design and independence from conventional fuel.
The missile can fly very close to the ground (reportedly between 50 and 100 metres), allowing it to use terrain masking to remain below the radar horizon of ground-based detection or defence systems. With no fixed range, an unpredictable flight path, and near-zero detectability, Russia has developed what may be an invincible nuclear-capable cruise missile—the first of its kind in the world, according to President Vladimir Putin’s statement on the day of the launch.
Although this missile is not yet fully operational and is largely viewed as a strategic nuclear deterrent against the US, Russia has once again signalled to the West, especially to Washington, that it retains the capability to effectively counter American deterrence strategies and challenge the US’s full-spectrum dominance in warfare—echoing its earlier success with the Dead Hand system, and now with Skyfall.
