On October 5, 2026, an active cadre of the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), Laishram Bishal Singh alias Naocha (29), was arrested by a combined team of the Commando (CDO) Unit, Imphal West and CDO Thoubal, from the Mayang Imphal Thana Mamang Leikai in Imphal West District, Manipur. Police alleged that he was involved in recruiting new cadres for the outfit. On October 7, 2026, however, PREPAK Publicity Officer Mangal Khuman denied that Bishal was associated with the organisation or its armed wing, the Red Army. The denial illustrates the continuing contest over attribution surrounding alleged PREPAK activities.
On October 4, two alleged active cadres of the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak-Progressive (PREPAK-Pro), Mohammad Siddequee (26) and Shekar (45), were arrested by CDO Kakching from Sora Bazar in Kakching District. Police alleged that they were involved in transporting newly recruited cadres to Myanmar.
On the same day, seven alleged PREPAK-Pro cadres, including two women and a juvenile, were arrested by CDO Imphal West, in connection with the August 28, 2026, bombing at the residence of Konthoujam Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) Sapam Ranjan Singh, and for alleged recruitment activities. Another juvenile recruit was rescued. PREPAK-Pro subsequently denied links to six of the arrested youths. The arrests brought recruitment, the alleged involvement of young operatives and cross-border movement into focus, although the competing claims underline the need to distinguish Police allegations from established organisational links.
On October 1, two alleged PREPAK-Pro cadres, Sanjenbam Sanju Singh (27) and Laishram Rohit Meitei (22), were arrested by CDO Bishnupur, in separate incidents from Khabi Mayai Leikai and the Kumbi Sagolpat area, respectively. Police alleged that Sanjenbam was involved in extortion.
The arrests added to a series of operations targeting suspected members of PREPAK and its factions, underlining recruitment and coercive revenue collection.
According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least 113 cadres of PREPAK, including its factions, have been arrested in 89 separate incidents in Manipur during the current year, so far (data till October 11, 2026). During the corresponding period in 2025, at least 125 cadres were arrested in 102 incidents, while another 52 cadres were arrested in 41 incidents during the remaining period of 2025. Since March 6, 2000, SATP has recorded 1,437 PREPAK cadres, including members of its factions, arrested in 1,046 incidents.
Since March 6, 2000, at least 11 PREPAK cadres have surrendered to the Security Forces (SFs) in six separate incidents. No surrender involving PREPAK or its factions has yet been recorded in 2026 (data till October 11, 2026).
SATP data also records nine incidents of the recovery of arms-caches associated with PREPAK and its factions during 2026. Since March 6, 2000, a total of 332 such incidents have been recorded.
The reported recruitment cases suggest that PREPAK and PREPAK-Pro continue to depend on local contacts and intermediaries to identify and bring new members into their organisations. On January 4, 2026, three minors were reportedly rescued from Kakching Khunou Ngaikhong Leikai under Waikhong Police Station in Kakching District in a case involving alleged PREPAK recruitment; two women identified as PREPAK cadres, Khundrakpam alias Ningthoujam Roshidiya (24) of Khangabok Khulakpam Leikai and Lisham alias Bidya (30) of Thoubal Haokha Maning Leikai, were arrested on January 5 in connection with the case. The October 2026 cases involving alleged recruitment and the rescue of another juvenile indicate that the issue has not been confined to a single operation. These incidents raise concerns about the vulnerability of young people to insurgent recruitment and the ability of local networks to remain active despite arrests. They do not, however, establish the number of successful recruits or demonstrate that the organisations have replenished their losses at a sustainable rate.
The arrest of two alleged PREPAK-Pro cadres accused of transporting recruits to Myanmar is particularly relevant to understanding how recruitment may connect with external support networks. Such movement, if substantiated, would indicate that the faction’s activities are not limited to isolated local cells. It also raises questions about the intermediaries, transport arrangements and logistical links required to move recruits across the border. However, the arrest of two persons cannot establish the scale or reliability of the wider network, and the current condition of PREPAK-Pro’s external infrastructure remains unclear.
Extortion provides another indicator of the networks that may sustain the organisation. On February 26-27, 2026, four alleged PREPAK-Pro cadres were arrested in separate operations in Thoubal and Imphal West, with extortion implicated in at least some of the reported cases. On May 12, 2026, an alleged PREPAK cadre, Nepram Dijamani Meetei, was arrested in Imphal West, where Police recovered 11 demand letters bearing the name of PREPAK’s ‘department of finance’ and the signature of a purported ‘revenue chief’, Changkhonba Meitei. The documents suggest the use of formalised demands in the organisation’s name, although their recovery does not establish the scale of operations, the number of affected individuals, or the extent to which the demands were authorised by the leadership.
The reported use of explosives against residential and political targets suggests that PREPAK retains, or seeks to project, a capacity for coercive violence, despite sustained pressure on its cadres. In July 2026, PREPAK claimed responsibility for grenade attacks on the residence of Bijoy Koijam, former MLA from Thongju Assembly Constituency and former Manipur Minister, on June 28 and July 4, and an explosion at another residence on June 26. The outfit reportedly accused Koijam of ‘anti-revolutionary activities’ and threatened further action against him. On July 12, alleged PREPAK cadre Ningombam Amuthoi Meitei was arrested in Imphal East District with eight hand grenades.
The G-5, a coalition of five proscribed insurgent groups in Manipur, claimed responsibility for the grenade attacks targeting the residences of two MLAs and a fuel station in August and September 2026. The coalition claimed attacks on BJP MLA S. Ranjan’s residence at Konthoujam Awang Leikai in Imphal West on August 28, 2026, Congress MLA K. Meghachandra’s residence at Yairipok Bishnunaha in Thoubal District on September 3, 2026, and Sorojini Oil Pump at Wangbal in Thoubal on August 29, 2026. G-5 alleged that the targets had refused to comply with its demands and warned of further action. The coalition comprises the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP), Kanglei Yawol Kanba Lup (KYKL), PREPAK, PREPAK-Pro, and United National Liberation Front (UNLF-K). Although PREPAK and PREPAK-Pro are members of the coalition, the collective claim does not establish which constituent group planned or carried out any individual attack.
The persistence of such incidents, alongside repeated arrests, highlight a central counter-insurgency challenge: detaining individual operatives may disrupt immediate activities without dismantling the local relationships that facilitate recruitment, generate funds through extortion or transmit instructions.
The August 28, 2026, bombing at MLA Sapam Ranjan Singh’s residence and subsequent arrests of alleged PREPAK-Pro cadres highlighted the continued use of explosives and threats for intimidation. Police linked the arrests to the blast and recruitment activities, while PREPAK-Pro denied links to the arrested youths. The incidents point to a continuing risk of episodic violence.
The September 30, 2026, arrest of senior alleged PREPAK-Pro cadre Moirangthem Boboy Singh alias Laingam in Kamjong District, reportedly after he entered Manipur from Myanmar, points to the cross-border dimension, raising questions about the continued movement of cadres and recruits across the border.
Overall, security operations continue to constrain these groups, while their recruitment, financial and logistical networks remain a concern. Their ability to sustain the flow of recruits, funds and matériel will be critical to their continued operational relevance. The available evidence indicates persistence, but not a demonstrated capacity to regenerate lost strength.
The organisations’ recent statements also offer an insight into their continuing propaganda activities and responses to counter-insurgency operations. On October 8, 2026, PREPAK Interim Council Chairman Aheiba Angom issued a statement ahead of the outfit’s 49th Foundation Day, scheduled for October 9, 2026. The statement called for an end to hostilities between Manipur’s Hill and Valley communities and urged people to examine what PREPAK described as the underlying causes of the continuing conflict. It also reiterated the organisation’s stated objective of restoring Kangleipak’s sovereignty. The message sought to position PREPAK within the wider political crisis and maintain its public presence, but it does not independently demonstrate popular support.
PREPAK’s Foundation Day statement and the factions’ responses to arrests indicate continuing propaganda activity, but do not establish popular support or a recovery in military strength. The available evidence supports an assessment of persistent organisational networks operating under sustained security pressure, with the potential for episodic violence but no conclusive evidence of a broader resurgence. The organisation’s trajectory will depend less on the number of arrests alone than on whether the networks that facilitate recruitment, coercive revenue collection and the movement of personnel can continue to function despite those losses.
