by Our Economic Affairs Editor
There is something deeply misleading about the way Sri Lanka’s economic recovery is being presented to the public. The Government’s 2027 Budget Speech is filled with impressive percentages, record surpluses, billions in allocations, ambitious infrastructure programmes and promises of technological transformation. On paper, the country appears to be moving towards an economic renaissance. Revenue has supposedly reached historic levels, debt has fallen dramatically, State-owned enterprises have turned profitable, foreign remittances have broken records and the economy has supposedly emerged from its worst crisis. Yet the most important question is conspicuously absent from this triumphalist presentation. How much better off is the ordinary Sri Lankan, and what precisely has changed in the productive foundations of the economy to ensure that the country will never again descend into the catastrophe of 2022? The Government appears increasingly comfortable confusing the restoration of macroeconomic stability with the achievement of economic prosperity. These are two entirely different accomplishments. Stabilisation is necessary, but it is not transformation. A country can collect more taxes, reduce its fiscal deficit, accumulate foreign reserves and satisfy international creditors while its population continues to struggle with expensive food, inadequate wages, limited employment opportunities, declining purchasing power and deteriorating public services. The 2027 Budget should therefore be judged not by the theatrical presentation of impressive statistics but by the credibility of its assumptions, the economic value of its proposed investments and, above all, its capacity to translate national recovery into measurable improvements in people’s lives.
To be fair, the Government cannot simply be accused of inventing the economic recovery. Sri Lanka recorded real GDP growth of approximately 5 per cent in 2025, following the 5 per cent expansion in 2024, and the economy continued growing during the first half of 2026. The Central Bank and international institutions have acknowledged the improvement in macroeconomic conditions. The IMF has also recognised that fiscal performance exceeded programme targets. However, acknowledging recovery does not require accepting the Government’s political interpretation of it. Much of the improvement reflects the stabilisation programme initiated following the 2022 sovereign debt crisis, the restoration of access to essential imports, the relaxation of monetary conditions, the resumption of economic activity and the effects of policies implemented under the IMF-supported programme. The present administration inherited an economy in which the most painful adjustments had already begun, although it also inherited enormous institutional, social and financial problems that required difficult decisions. The question is whether the Government has used the breathing space created by stabilisation to build a fundamentally stronger economy. The World Bank’s October 2026 Sri Lanka Development Update projected growth of 4.4 per cent for 2026 and 4.2 per cent for 2027, indicating that the extraordinary recovery rates cannot simply be extrapolated indefinitely. More importantly, the Bank explicitly warned that the recovery remained incomplete and uneven. Its assessment estimated poverty at 16.9 per cent in 2025, compared with 11.5 per cent in 2019. The country may have recovered the aggregate size of its pre-crisis economy, but that does not mean it has recovered the living standards, purchasing power or economic security that existed before the crisis. The Government’s claim of having emerged from the worst recession is therefore not the same as having restored the economic wellbeing of the population. The distinction is fundamental, and the Budget repeatedly attempts to blur it.
The celebrated primary surplus of 5.4 per cent of GDP in 2025 provides an even more revealing example of how economic achievements can be presented without adequate explanation. The IMF’s May 2026 review specifically observed that the exceptional primary surplus was supported by unusually strong motor-vehicle-related revenue, robust domestic VAT collection and the under-execution of capital expenditure. In other words, the Government’s fiscal achievement was not simply the result of a more efficient administration or a dramatic expansion of productive economic activity. A substantial part of the improvement came from collecting more taxes and spending less than budgeted on public investment. The distinction becomes even more important when examining the Treasury’s own October 2026 Mid-Year Fiscal Position Report. During the first six months of 2026, the Government collected approximately Rs. 2.954 trillion in revenue, but capital expenditure and net lending amounted to only Rs. 276.6 billion against an annual estimate of Rs. 1.719 trillion. This represented just 16.1 per cent of the annual allocation after half the financial year had elapsed. The primary surplus during the same period reached Rs. 1.244 trillion, substantially exceeding the IMF programme’s end-June target of Rs. 72 billion, with the Treasury itself identifying lower execution of capital expenditure as one of the contributing factors. This is not a minor accounting detail. It raises a serious question about the Government’s ability to implement the very development programmes it announces. What is the economic value of allocating billions to infrastructure, education, healthcare and industrial development if the public administration cannot convert those allocations into completed projects? A government that consistently underspends its development budget can congratulate itself on improving the fiscal balance while simultaneously weakening the country’s long-term productive capacity. The danger is that fiscal discipline becomes an excuse for administrative paralysis, and the appearance of financial responsibility conceals the failure to invest in economic growth. A primary surplus achieved through higher revenue and disciplined expenditure is desirable, but a surplus partly generated by failing to execute essential capital investment should not be celebrated as an unqualified success.
The Government’s revenue figures also require a more serious political and economic examination. The increase in revenue from 8.2 per cent of GDP in 2022 to 16.6 per cent in 2025 is unquestionably significant. Yet this should not be interpreted as proof that Sri Lanka has suddenly developed an efficient, equitable and sustainable taxation system. The increase followed the collapse of the previous tax structure, the restoration and expansion of VAT, changes to income taxation, higher indirect tax collections and the implementation of IMF-mandated fiscal consolidation. Much of the burden has fallen on consumers and salaried individuals who have limited capacity to absorb additional costs. The real question is not simply how much revenue the Government collects but where that revenue comes from, who bears the burden and how effectively it is converted into public services. A tax system that depends heavily on consumption taxes can increase Treasury revenue while disproportionately affecting households that spend most of their income on essential goods. Raising the personal income tax-free threshold to Rs. 162,500 is therefore a welcome proposal, but it does not automatically compensate for the accumulated effects of inflation, indirect taxation and the cost of essential services. Nor does it resolve the fundamental problem of a narrow productive economy in which a relatively small section of businesses and individuals generates a disproportionate share of formal economic activity. The Government must demonstrate that its revenue expansion is accompanied by a fairer tax structure, stronger compliance, a reduction in tax evasion and a genuine improvement in public expenditure. Otherwise, the country risks developing a fiscal system that is increasingly successful at extracting revenue from an economically vulnerable population without delivering a proportionate improvement in the quality of government.
The debt narrative is equally vulnerable to political exaggeration. The Budget celebrates the reduction of central government debt from 114 per cent of GDP at the end of 2022 to approximately 95 per cent by the end of 2025. That is a substantial improvement, but the ratio must be understood in the context of debt restructuring, changes in nominal GDP, exchange-rate movements and the wider reorganisation of public liabilities. A reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio does not mean that the country has repaid a corresponding proportion of its outstanding obligations. Sri Lanka has undergone a painful sovereign debt restructuring precisely because it could not meet its contractual commitments. The IMF’s May 2026 review continued to identify debt sustainability risks, notwithstanding the substantial progress made in restructuring. The Government should therefore resist presenting the reduction in the ratio as if the country’s debt problem has been solved. It has been managed, restructured and partially stabilised, but the underlying challenge remains formidable. Interest payments still consume a substantial proportion of government revenue, even after declining from 79.1 per cent in 2022 to 45.9 per cent in 2025. The reduction to 39.6 per cent by September 2026 is encouraging, but it does not mean that the country has escaped the structural consequences of excessive borrowing. A significant portion of future revenue will continue to be committed to servicing public debt rather than financing education, healthcare, research, transport and productive investment. The more pertinent question is whether Sri Lanka can generate sufficient export earnings, investment returns and sustainable fiscal surpluses to service its obligations without repeatedly imposing additional economic hardship on its citizens.
The Government’s celebration of the record US$8.1 billion in workers’ remittances is another example of a genuine achievement that deserves a much more uncomfortable interpretation. Remittances are an indispensable source of foreign exchange, and their contribution to economic stability cannot be disputed. However, they are not evidence of a transformed domestic production system. They represent money earned by Sri Lankans working abroad, often in circumstances involving family separation, difficult working conditions and considerable personal sacrifice. The country’s dependence on migrant workers to sustain foreign exchange inflows should be a matter of serious national economic reflection rather than an occasion for unqualified celebration. Why must so many Sri Lankans seek employment overseas to secure a reasonable income when the country continues to struggle to create sufficiently productive and adequately remunerated employment at home? The same concern applies to the current account surplus. The Central Bank’s own reporting identifies remittances and services exports as important contributors to external stability, even as the merchandise trade deficit widened. The Treasury’s Mid-Year Fiscal Report further reveals that merchandise imports increased from US$9.762 billion in the first half of 2025 to US$12.392 billion in the corresponding period of 2026, while exports rose from US$6.492 billion to US$6.903 billion. The trade deficit consequently widened from US$3.27 billion to US$5.49 billion. This is an uncomfortable reality behind the celebratory external-sector figures. Sri Lanka is still importing substantially more merchandise than it exports, and the country’s capacity to finance that imbalance depends heavily on remittances, tourism receipts, external financing and other foreign exchange inflows. A sustainable economic transformation requires a considerably stronger export base, higher domestic value addition, technological sophistication and competitive manufacturing. Remittances can support an economy, but they cannot substitute for an export strategy.
Tourism presents another contradiction that the Budget cannot afford to overlook. The Government repeatedly promotes Sri Lanka’s international tourism potential, yet the Treasury’s own Mid-Year Fiscal Position Report recorded tourism earnings of approximately US$1.51 billion in the first half of 2026, compared with US$1.71 billion during the corresponding period of 2025. The report also recorded a decline in tourist arrivals and identified a downward revision in estimated average daily tourist spending as a contributing factor to the reduction in earnings. This should prompt a more sophisticated discussion about the quality of tourism development. Arrivals alone do not determine the economic contribution of the industry. What matters is how much visitors spend, how long they stay, how widely tourism income circulates through local businesses and communities, and how much foreign exchange remains within the domestic economy. A country cannot build a durable tourism industry simply by celebrating arrival targets while ignoring productivity, service quality, infrastructure, environmental protection and the development of higher-value tourism products. The same problem extends to the plantation sector’s target of increasing export revenue from US$3 billion to US$5 billion by 2030. Such a target is politically attractive, but where are the detailed productivity projections, investment requirements, processing strategies, technological improvements and market diversification measures that would make it achievable? Tea, rubber and coconut cannot be transformed into higher-value export industries through ambitious revenue targets alone. The country needs investment in research, processing, logistics, product innovation and global market development. Without those structural changes, the Government is simply announcing a destination without demonstrating a credible route to reach it.
The proposed Rs. 2 trillion in capital allocations and the promise of the largest investment in highways, expressways and railway development may appear to mark a decisive shift towards economic expansion. Yet the history of Sri Lankan infrastructure development should make the public particularly cautious about announcements of this nature. The country has already accumulated an enormous burden of infrastructure commitments, some of which were undertaken without sufficiently rigorous assessments of economic returns, financial viability and future maintenance costs. The proposed Rs. 251 billion for transport infrastructure, the Rs. 53.45 billion allocation for the stalled Kadawatha–Mirigama section of the Central Expressway and the ambitious plan to invest more than Rs. 1.2 trillion in railway electrification raise important questions about financing, implementation and economic justification. The allocation of Rs. 80 billion for the first phase of railway electrification is not itself evidence that the proposed railway network will be delivered, just as announcing a completion date for a stalled expressway does not guarantee that construction will proceed without further delays or cost escalations. What independent feasibility studies support the electrification programme? What are the projected passenger numbers, operating savings, freight benefits and financial returns? How will the projects be financed, and what proportion will be funded through domestic borrowing, foreign loans or private investment? These are not unreasonable questions. They are the minimum requirements of responsible public investment. Sri Lanka has spent decades constructing infrastructure that politicians have presented as symbols of national development, while the economic returns have frequently fallen short of the original promises. The country cannot afford another generation of expensive projects whose principal achievement is the announcement of their construction.
The energy proposals are similarly ambitious but demand considerably greater scrutiny. The Government’s plan to increase renewable energy capacity, introduce battery energy storage systems and upgrade the national electricity grid addresses genuine structural weaknesses. The proposed expansion of battery storage to 1,245 MW by 2029, the Rs. 26.5 billion investment in grid strengthening and the proposed floating solar projects across ten reservoirs could contribute to energy security. However, the distinction between installed generating capacity, actual electricity generation and reliable electricity supply is essential. A claim that renewable energy represents approximately 62 per cent of installed capacity does not establish that renewables provide the same proportion of electricity consumed throughout the year. Solar and wind generation are intermittent, and their integration requires storage, transmission infrastructure, system balancing and technically competent management. The proposed battery capacity should also be accompanied by transparent information about storage duration, total energy capacity, procurement prices, operating costs and long-term replacement requirements. A megawatt figure alone tells the public very little about how much electricity can actually be stored and delivered when required. The proposal to double the Sapugaskanda refinery’s capacity from 50,000 to 100,000 barrels per day through a public-private partnership is another major undertaking whose economic rationale must be made public. Where will the financing come from, what will be the expected cost of imported crude, what products will be produced, how competitive will the refinery be against imported petroleum products, and what guarantees will the Government provide to private investors? Sri Lanka has already experienced the consequences of poorly evaluated energy investments. It should not repeat those mistakes under the banner of energy independence.
The digital transformation proposals are perhaps among the most fashionable elements of the Budget, but they also reveal the difference between technological announcements and technological development. Establishing a National Artificial Intelligence Centre of Excellence, strengthening GovTech, providing broadband vouchers to 750,000 schoolchildren and increasing allocations for the digital economy are all potentially worthwhile initiatives. Yet an artificial intelligence centre does not create an artificial intelligence industry merely because it occupies a building or brings government officials, academics and private companies together. What matters is the availability of computing infrastructure, research funding, skilled personnel, reliable electricity, data governance, intellectual property protection and a competitive environment capable of attracting international technology investment. Likewise, broadband vouchers are useful only if students have access to suitable devices, affordable connectivity, quality educational content and teachers capable of integrating technology into learning. Digital inequality cannot be solved by distributing vouchers while leaving underlying inequalities in school infrastructure and educational quality untouched. The Government should explain how these initiatives will generate employment, improve public-sector productivity, encourage technology exports and increase the contribution of knowledge-based industries to GDP. Otherwise, digitalisation risks becoming another fashionable policy vocabulary in which the number of announced programmes is mistaken for evidence of technological advancement.
The education allocations deserve particularly serious examination because the Government repeatedly presents education as the foundation of its proposed national renaissance. The Rs. 35 billion allocated for digitalisation, teacher development, training colleges, school infrastructure and science laboratories, together with the Rs. 11 billion capital investment in vocational education, could make a meaningful difference if properly implemented. But the fundamental weakness of Sri Lanka’s education system is not simply the absence of computers, buildings or laboratories. It is the persistent disconnect between education, scientific research, technological capability and the requirements of a modern economy. The country continues to produce graduates without creating sufficient opportunities to employ their knowledge productively. Technical and vocational training remains insufficiently connected to the actual requirements of industry. University research is constrained by inadequate investment, institutional weaknesses and limited collaboration with the private sector. A government genuinely committed to educational transformation must demonstrate how the proposed expenditure will improve learning outcomes, expand research capacity, increase graduate employability and strengthen the country’s technological and industrial capabilities. The same applies to the proposed increases in allowances for trainee teachers and external university lecturers. Better remuneration is important, but it cannot independently resolve institutional deficiencies. Sri Lanka needs an education system that produces engineers, scientists, researchers, technicians, entrepreneurs and skilled workers capable of competing internationally, rather than one that merely expands the number of budgetary allocations attached to educational institutions.
The proposed financial assistance for micro, small and medium enterprises also requires a more realistic assessment. Allocating Rs. 67.687 billion for interest subsidies and refinancing to facilitate Rs. 174 billion in concessionary lending sounds substantial, particularly for businesses that continue to face high borrowing costs and restricted access to finance. The additional Re-MSME Plus facilities and subsidised loans for women-headed households and Aswesuma beneficiaries are also socially desirable in principle. But the central problem confronting many Sri Lankan businesses is not simply the interest rate charged by commercial banks. It is weak domestic demand, high operating costs, inadequate infrastructure, unpredictable taxation, expensive imported inputs, limited access to international markets and the absence of a sufficiently developed industrial ecosystem. Cheap credit cannot make an uncompetitive business competitive indefinitely. Nor can a loan scheme become an instrument of economic empowerment merely because it is administered through Samurdhi Banks. What happens when a borrower cannot repay? What mechanisms will ensure that loans reach viable enterprises rather than politically connected applicants? How will the Government measure the number of businesses that survive, expand, increase productivity and create sustainable employment? The proposed 4 per cent and 3 per cent lending facilities may offer temporary relief, but the country needs a coherent industrial policy that integrates finance with technology, market access, training, infrastructure and export development. Otherwise, the Government risks turning credit subsidies into another cycle of politically attractive lending schemes without a measurable improvement in productive capacity.
The social welfare proposals are similarly difficult to evaluate without examining the wider economic conditions that have made so many households dependent on public assistance. The allocation of Rs. 230 billion for social protection, including Aswesuma, and the proposed increases in allowances for kidney patients and persons with disabilities are necessary measures. However, the existence of substantial welfare allocations should not be presented as proof that the Government has successfully addressed poverty. The World Bank’s October 2026 assessment is particularly uncomfortable for the administration because it shows that poverty remains significantly above pre-crisis levels despite the recovery in GDP. Food prices remain far higher than before the crisis, and the deterioration in household welfare cannot be reversed simply by announcing new assistance programmes. Social protection must be properly targeted, adequately funded and supported by reliable administrative systems. More importantly, it must be accompanied by employment creation and higher real incomes. A welfare programme should protect people from economic insecurity while creating conditions in which fewer households need permanent assistance. The Government must also explain how the proposed 70,000 housing units will be delivered, how land and construction costs will be managed, and how the promised resettlement of displaced families in the North and East will be implemented within the stated two-year period. Housing is not merely a construction target. It involves secure land rights, access to transport, schools, employment, electricity, water and essential services. Without those elements, a house can become another completed project that fails to provide the social and economic security its beneficiaries deserve.
Perhaps the most politically revealing contradiction in the Budget concerns public-sector remuneration and administrative expenditure. The Government proposes further salary revisions, additional allowances for various professional groups, increased transport payments for executive officers and higher food and accommodation allowances for selected public servants. Some of these adjustments may be justified by the cost of living and the need to retain qualified personnel. Yet the Government must explain how these commitments fit into its broader promise of a more efficient, transparent and financially sustainable public administration. Sri Lanka does not merely have a salary problem. It has a serious productivity, institutional accountability and service-delivery problem. Increasing allowances without reforming the systems through which public services are delivered risks increasing recurrent expenditure without generating corresponding improvements in public-sector performance. The proposed monthly transport allowance of Rs. 100,000 for executive officers is particularly deserving of public scrutiny. What criteria will determine eligibility? What level of official travel is expected? How will the allowance be audited? Why should a government that repeatedly emphasises fiscal discipline expand such benefits without providing a clear explanation of the expected public value? The same scrutiny must apply to the proposed increases in allowances across the health, education, police, military and university sectors. Fair remuneration matters, but public money must be allocated according to transparent criteria and measurable institutional needs. The public cannot be expected to accept austerity when it comes to essential services while simultaneously being asked to finance expanding administrative entitlements without adequate accountability.
The claims about State-owned enterprises are another area where the Government needs to exercise greater precision. Turning the combined pre-tax losses of 52 major State-owned enterprises in 2022 into reported profits in 2025 is a significant development, but it does not automatically establish that these institutions have become commercially efficient or financially sustainable. Their performance must be assessed individually, taking account of operating costs, debt, capital expenditure, transfers, pricing policies, accumulated liabilities and the extent to which their profitability depends on changes in administered prices. The Government itself acknowledges the enormous accumulated losses of SriLankan Airlines and the continuing burden it represents for the Treasury. The wider State-owned enterprise sector also requires transparent reporting of contingent liabilities and the risks that may eventually return to public finances. A profitable financial institution cannot necessarily compensate for losses elsewhere in the public enterprise system, and aggregate profit figures can obscure substantial differences between institutions. The country needs professional management, independent auditing, competitive procurement, transparent appointments and clear performance targets. Simply announcing that loss-making institutions have become profitable is not a substitute for demonstrating how that transformation was achieved and whether it can be sustained without passing hidden costs to consumers.
There is also an important question surrounding the Government’s proposed tax concessions. Exempting books and educational publications from VAT is a sensible measure that could support reading and reduce the cost of educational materials. Removing the Tourism Development Levy and exempting international shipping bunker supplies from the Social Security Contribution Levy may also improve competitiveness in their respective industries. But every tax exemption represents revenue that the Government will no longer collect. The public therefore has a legitimate right to know how much these concessions will cost, who will benefit, whether the savings will be passed on to consumers and what economic returns are expected. Removing a levy from tourism establishments does not guarantee lower hotel prices, just as providing tax relief to shipping operators does not guarantee that Sri Lanka will become a regional maritime hub. The Government must explain the conditions under which these concessions will generate additional investment, employment and foreign exchange rather than simply improving the margins of existing businesses. Tax incentives should be instruments of measurable economic policy, not gifts distributed in the hope that private investment will eventually follow.
The most serious weakness of the 2027 Budget, however, lies in the gap between its extraordinary ambitions and the country’s institutional capacity to deliver them. The Government promises a transformed energy sector, a digitally integrated economy, modernised railway infrastructure, an expanded refinery, higher agricultural productivity, a revitalised plantation industry, improved vocational education, a strengthened healthcare system and a more competitive export economy. These objectives are individually defensible. The problem is that a long list of desirable objectives does not constitute a development strategy. Sri Lanka has repeatedly witnessed governments announce ambitious programmes without establishing clear implementation responsibilities, measurable deadlines, transparent procurement arrangements or independent mechanisms to evaluate results. The country does not suffer from a shortage of policy announcements. It suffers from a persistent inability to translate policies into sustained institutional performance. The 2026 capital expenditure record makes this problem particularly difficult for the present administration to dismiss. If the Government cannot adequately execute its existing capital budget, why should the public accept another enormous collection of financial commitments without demanding evidence of implementation capacity? Every major project should have a published feasibility assessment, a financing plan, a procurement timetable, a responsible implementing institution and clearly defined economic outcomes. Every major subsidy should have transparent eligibility criteria and a measurable social or productive objective. Every tax concession should be accompanied by an assessment of its fiscal cost and expected return. These are basic requirements of modern public financial management, not unreasonable demands from a sceptical public.
The Government’s reference to the return of Sri Lanka to upper-middle-income status also deserves careful interpretation. This is an important international classification and reflects the improvement in national income per person. However, an income classification is not a certificate of broad-based prosperity, nor does it establish that the country has overcome the social consequences of its economic collapse. The World Bank’s own poverty assessment demonstrates the distinction between average national income and the actual economic circumstances of households. The Government should not use an international classification to suggest that the country’s economic problems have been resolved. Nor should an improvement in credit ratings be mistaken for proof that Sri Lanka has become a sufficiently competitive destination for productive investment. Credit ratings assess the capacity and willingness of borrowers to meet financial obligations. They do not measure the quality of public education, the availability of skilled employment, the competitiveness of domestic industries or the fairness of income distribution. The real test is whether Sri Lanka can attract long-term productive investment without relying excessively on tax concessions, political assurances and foreign borrowing.
The Government’s most ambitious claim is that it is moving the country from economic stabilisation towards economic transformation. That is precisely where the greatest scrutiny should begin. Transformation requires a fundamental change in the way an economy produces wealth, generates employment, earns foreign exchange and distributes economic opportunity. It requires a larger and more sophisticated export sector, a competitive manufacturing base, productive agriculture, higher domestic value addition, technological innovation, reliable energy, modern logistics and a public administration capable of supporting private enterprise rather than obstructing it. It also requires an honest recognition that some of the country’s existing economic structures are no longer adequate for the demands of the twenty-first century. Sri Lanka cannot become a modern industrial economy by expanding the number of subsidised loan schemes, distributing broadband vouchers, announcing artificial intelligence centres and promising to build more roads and railway lines. These measures can contribute to development, but they cannot substitute for the difficult institutional and economic reforms that genuine transformation requires.
The Government deserves recognition for helping to preserve macroeconomic stability after one of the most destructive economic crises in the country’s history. But that achievement should not become a political shield against criticism. The public did not endure the economic collapse, the loss of purchasing power, the tax increases, the shortages and the painful restructuring of national debt merely to be told that the figures now look better. It expects a different economic future. It expects a country in which employment at home offers a dignified livelihood, public hospitals provide reliable treatment, schools prepare children for a competitive world, businesses can expand without political patronage, and national prosperity is not dependent on the sacrifices of migrant workers or the continued extraction of taxes from ordinary consumers. The 2027 Budget contains numerous proposals that could contribute to such a future, but proposals are not achievements, allocations are not expenditure, expenditure is not necessarily productive investment, and economic growth is not automatically shared prosperity. The most dangerous political deception would be to persuade the public that the country has already completed its economic recovery simply because the Treasury’s accounts have improved. Sri Lanka has not yet demonstrated that it can sustain high-quality growth, expand exports sufficiently, reduce poverty to pre-crisis levels, create productive employment and escape the structural weaknesses that produced the 2022 catastrophe. Until those changes become visible in the lives of ordinary people, the language of economic transformation remains a promise awaiting proof. A government should not demand applause for the recovery of the national balance sheet while millions of citizens are still waiting for the recovery of their own lives.
