The debate over extending the retirement age of Sri Lankan judges—from 65 to 67 in the Supreme Court, from 63 to 65 in the Court of Appeal, and by two years in the lower courts—has drawn sharp resistance from the Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL). Opponents argue that the move threatens judicial independence and lacks sufficient justification.
While the legal fraternity’s defence of the judiciary is essential, opposing this reform is misplaced. Strip away the rhetoric, and extending judicial tenure is not an attack on the rule of law. It is a practical, modernising measure that strengthens judicial capacity and protects the public interest.
The objections fail to withstand careful scrutiny.
First, critics claim that applying the extension to sitting judges creates a perception of political favouritism. However, this conflates arbitrary patronage with standard constitutional reform. The proposed amendment applies uniformly across all judicial tiers, establishing a neutral rule rather than conferring a selective benefit on specific individuals. Furthermore, raising the retirement age brings Sri Lanka into closer alignment with international benchmarks, such as the UK (70/75), Australia (70), and Canada (75), reflecting modern life expectancy and improved health standards.
Second, opponents raise the issue of conflict of interest, noting that sitting Supreme Court judges who rule on constitutional challenges to the amendment stand to benefit from it. However, constitutional law routinely addresses such situations through the established Doctrine of Necessity. Institutional governance cannot be paralysed simply because a law of general application affects the judiciary as a whole. Requiring the extension to apply only to future appointees would create a fragmented two-tier judiciary operating under different terms—an administrative nightmare that would undermine collegiality and legal consistency.
Third, the argument that the government should focus solely on filling vacancies overlooks a pressing reality: Sri Lanka’s justice system is burdened with more than 1.1 million pending cases. Forcing seasoned appellate judges into retirement at 63 or 65 deprives the nation of vital institutional memory and jurisprudential expertise at precisely the moment when court backlogs demand high case disposal rates. Extending judicial tenure preserves experienced talent while new judges are recruited and integrated into the system.
Fourth, critics dismiss the reform as an ad hoc measure introduced without years of consultation. Yet practical governance requires timely solutions to urgent operational bottlenecks. A constitutional amendment is not an executive decree; it requires a two-thirds parliamentary majority, ensuring public debate and legislative scrutiny before it can be enacted.
Finally, while opponents correctly point out that extending judicial tenure does not resolve infrastructural or procedural deficiencies, human capital and modern infrastructure are not mutually exclusive. Courtroom digitisation and physical expansion will take years to complete. Retaining experienced judges serves as an immediate bridging strategy to keep the courts functioning effectively while long-term structural reforms are implemented.
An independent judiciary requires stability, predictability, and adequate operational capacity. By establishing a modern retirement framework, Sri Lanka is not compromising its judiciary—it is strengthening it. The legal community should recognise this amendment for what it truly is: a necessary step towards delivering timely justice to the public.
