Once seen as the crown jewel in a potential Middle East realignment, the prospect of diplomatic normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia has faded dramatically since the Gaza war. Despite continued enthusiasm from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former U.S. President Donald Trump, Saudi Arabia’s stance has hardened — reflecting a major recalibration of its regional priorities and public sensitivities after the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack and Israel’s devastating response.
“Leave it to me,” Netanyahu told Israeli media last week regarding potential peace with Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations. But the appetite in Riyadh has cooled significantly. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, once open to the idea of normalisation in exchange for a U.S. defense pact, is now insisting on concrete steps toward Palestinian statehood and a ceasefire before any such agreement can proceed.
Gaza Changed Everything
The scale and intensity of Israel’s offensive in Gaza have triggered a reputational reckoning across the Arab world — particularly for a kingdom positioning itself as a leader of the Islamic world. “The reputational cost for Saudi Arabia [of normalisation with Israel] would now be much higher,” said Hasan Alhasan, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “Both domestically and for its regional and Islamic leadership credentials.”
Prince Mohammed has described the war in Gaza as “genocide,” and analysts say he now sees Israel less as a potential partner and more as a volatile actor. Images of destruction have inflamed public opinion, especially among younger Saudis — the same demographic central to the crown prince’s Vision 2030 economic reform plan.
Pivot to Iran
In parallel, Saudi Arabia has strengthened its detente with historic rival Iran. What began with the restoration of diplomatic ties in March 2023 — after years of proxy conflict and mistrust — has grown into a pragmatic relationship aimed at regional stability.
Since the Gaza war, the two countries have deepened security and diplomatic engagement. Prince Khalid bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s defense minister, visited Tehran in April and has maintained high-level contact with Iranian officials, even after the June death of Iran’s top military commander in an Israeli airstrike.
“The Gulf states will maintain their rapprochement with Iran. It’s a wise policy to have with your biggest neighbour across the Gulf,” said one source familiar with Saudi thinking. And that closeness makes normalisation with Israel “less likely.”
Paradoxically, the weakening of Iranian influence in places like Lebanon and Yemen — outcomes of Israel’s regional military campaign — has, in Riyadh’s eyes, made Tehran less of an immediate threat. Yet, analysts warn that a cornered Iran may now be more inclined to pursue nuclear deterrence.
Trump’s Push and Saudi Calculus
Donald Trump, now campaigning to return to the White House, has been vocal in his desire to bring Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords — the 2020 agreements that saw the UAE and Bahrain normalise ties with Israel during his first term. “It’s going to be something special,” Trump said on a visit to Riyadh in May, adding that he expects more countries to join.
But Saudi officials are in no rush. “The Saudis, unlike Trump, aren’t under the same time pressure to strike a deal,” Alhasan noted. “They are in a sufficiently comfortable geopolitical position not to have to succumb to doing something that they wouldn’t want to do.”
Instead of formal ties, Gulf nations — including Saudi Arabia — are investing heavily in economic and defense partnerships with the U.S. During Trump’s recent regional tour, Gulf states pledged trillions in investments, seeking access to cutting-edge American technologies and advanced weaponry, including AI systems.
A Different Kind of Deal?
Given the obstacles to Saudi-Israeli normalisation, Israeli officials are exploring narrower agreements with other regional players. One possibility: a limited non-belligerence pact with Syria under its new government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa. While far from full normalisation, such a deal could signal regional thaw and reinforce security cooperation without the political cost of formal recognition.
Still, the dramatic shifts post-Gaza war have complicated the Abraham Accords’ expansion. As the region recalibrates, Riyadh is prioritising a more cautious, balanced approach — one that reinforces its regional stature while avoiding domestic backlash.
With Middle East alliances in flux, Saudi Arabia appears less interested in rushed diplomacy — and more focused on reshaping the region on its own terms.
