The British government has secretly paid foreign YouTubers to produce and publish videos as part of a covert propaganda operation orchestrated through a £10 million contract with a private media agency, Declassified UK has revealed. The operation, run by London-based firm Zinc Network Ltd on behalf of the Foreign Office, involved recruiting social media influencers across Europe—particularly in regions viewed as strategically significant in the West’s information war with Russia. These influencers were made to sign non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) that prevented them from revealing the UK government’s role in shaping the content. Whitehall officials also reviewed and gave feedback on each video before it could be released, ensuring that the messaging aligned with British foreign policy interests.
Zinc Network, co-founded by a former Conservative Party spin doctor, has become a key player in Western influence campaigns, previously operating covertly under other names such as Breakthrough Media. In recent years, it has been awarded major contracts by the UK, US, and Australian governments for influence operations targeting foreign audiences. Zinc’s work with Muslim communities in the UK under the Prevent counter-extremism strategy has already drawn controversy. However, the scale and secrecy of its international efforts, now exposed through whistleblower testimony, leaked documents, and Freedom of Information disclosures, point to a far more expansive and opaque propaganda enterprise than previously understood.
One particularly controversial case involved Zinc’s role in the 2023 Slovakian elections. According to former employees, the company’s campaign targeted younger voters in Slovakia with content designed to appeal to pro-European sentiments, indirectly undermining the left-wing nationalist Smer party led by Robert Fico, which was ultimately victorious in the election. Fico’s party, perceived as pro-Russian and reliant on older voters, was seen by British officials as a threat to Western-aligned democratic narratives in the region. By shaping the messaging of local influencers and aiming it at youth demographics, Zinc’s operation crossed into what one insider described as “interference in a sovereign country’s internal affairs,” raising questions about ethical boundaries and democratic integrity.
Despite these concerns, Zinc continued to operate with substantial government backing. A heavily redacted version of its £9.45 million contract with the Foreign Office was eventually released under pressure from the Information Commissioner’s Office, following repeated attempts by the government to block public access. The documents revealed that Zinc’s mission was to counter disinformation in 22 countries across Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe, as well as the Baltics. The stated goal was to promote “balanced, independent voices” and build resilience to foreign propaganda, particularly from Russia. Yet, in practice, the influencers recruited were bound by NDAs and received heavy editorial oversight from both Zinc and British officials, casting doubt on the independence of the content.
The influencers themselves were often young and relatively inexperienced, making them vulnerable to manipulation. Former staff at Zinc described the relationship as “extremely exploitative,” with some influencers unaware of the true source of their funding until after they had signed legally binding agreements. They were often grateful for the financial support and accepted the terms without questioning the ethical implications. Meanwhile, Zinc staff were instructed to make the videos feel authentic and relatable, deliberately avoiding any overt signs that the content was part of a state-sponsored campaign.
Zinc Network has defended its practices, stating that it adheres to the “highest standards” of transparency and that its work helps civil society resist hostile foreign influence. It insists that its ethical guidelines are reviewed by an independent media ethicist and that it operates within all relevant laws. However, no disclosures were made to YouTube viewers that the videos they watched were state-funded, despite clear rules from the UK’s Advertising Standards Agency and YouTube’s own policy requiring such disclosures. This failure to identify the government as the marketer of the content could be seen as materially misleading the public.
The revelations about Zinc’s influence campaigns were uncovered through a three-year investigation by Declassified UK, which drew on whistleblower accounts, LinkedIn profiles, internal documents, and official government responses. The exposure of this operation casts a spotlight on the growing use of private contractors in covert influence campaigns, the lack of transparency in the UK’s foreign information operations, and the fine line between strategic communication and propaganda. While the Foreign Office claims that such initiatives are necessary to uphold democratic values and counter foreign disinformation, critics argue that the covert nature of the programme, the targeting of voters in foreign elections, and the use of deceptive tactics undermine the very principles Britain claims to defend.
