JR’s ASIAN fiasco
The charisma of JR Jayawardene remains a compelling enigma, particularly from our current perspective nearly three decades after his passing. This essay examines his approach to foreign policy and its impact on Sri Lanka’s political destiny. While his political career reflects pragmatism, liberalism, and other complex qualities, the true extent of his statesmanship is debated. Some regard him as a visionary similar to Cardinal Richelieu or a strategic mind absent in today’s foreign policy decisions, while others argue that his legacy is often exaggerated by his supporters. My analysis will focus on how JR Jayawardene’s foreign policy actually shaped the country’s direction and the extent to which his reputation as a statesman is deserved.
To understand J.R. Jayewardene’s diplomatic missteps, it is necessary to revisit his relations with New Delhi from 1977 until the ethnic riots of 1983, a period that significantly shaped India’s hostility toward Sri Lanka. Jayewardene’s tilt toward the West, which earned him the derisive nickname “Yankee Dicky” from his political opponents, intensified Sri Lanka’s entanglement in the late 1970s geopolitical nexus. In particular, his condescending remarks about Mrs. Indira Gandhi following her electoral defeat provoked her, as she was widely known for political ruthlessness. By failing to balance relations with New Delhi—an omission that undermined his rule in the long run—Jayewardene frequently sought partnerships with Western and ASEAN countries. In establishing diplomatic relations with ASEAN states and strengthening ties with others, the Sri Lankan government emulated certain policy orientations, thereby heightening the apprehensions of its larger neighbor, India. Moreover, New Delhi increasingly clashed with Colombo over outlooks, attitudes, and policies on global affairs. Jayewardene’s fascination with Singapore as a developmental model for Sri Lanka, and with ASEAN countries more broadly, puzzled Indian diplomats. It raised the obvious question of how Sri Lanka could realistically align with a vastly different geo-cultural context. Further straining relations, Jayewardene antagonized India when Sri Lanka, aligning with ASEAN states, voted against the Heng Samrin regime at the United Nations, while India recognized that government in Kampuchea. In April 1978, during his state visit to Sri Lanka, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew proposed a regional defense partnership to counter communist influence—a concept that resonated with Jayewardene, as both leaders were firmly anti-communist.
Sri Lanka’s attempt to join ASEAN ended unsuccessfully when member states declined to support its application. Mervyn de Silva, a prominent Sri Lankan journalist, characterized this outcome as a significant diplomatic setback that contributed to strained relations with India. Despite this, President J. R. Jayewardene continued to pursue ASEAN membership through diplomatic channels in member countries. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers ultimately rejected Sri Lanka’s application, citing its location outside the organization’s geographical area. In 1983, the ASEAN Standing Committee admitted Brunei as a new member, further highlighting the ineffectiveness of Sri Lanka’s diplomatic efforts.
Considering JR Jayewardene’s fascination with ASEAN , one cannot forget that ASEAN stood compatible with JR’s own vison in embracing new economic polices regardless of geographical distance . Yet there was another idea that stemmed from JR’s mind, which was to provide some counterweight to India. Indian Imperative was something JR always loathed to accept , but was finally compelled by the circumstances to accept.
Indian Imperative
The turning point that ended his infatuation with the West was the widely noted airdrop carried out by the Indian Air Force in 1987 during the Vadamarachchi Operation. President Jayewardene was reportedly shaken by the incident, and, strikingly, none of the Western countries he admired issued statements condemning India’s intervention. At the highest levels of government, Sri Lanka sought verbal or moral support from the United States. Upon learning of India’s actions, President Jayewardene attempted to speak directly with President Reagan. These efforts, however, were diplomatically deflected by officials at the U.S. State Department. The officials advised that, although they would attempt to convey the request to the White House, any urgent communication should, in the interim, be directed to the U.S. Ambassador in Colombo. This airdrop constituted a decisive moment in Jayewardene’s foreign policy, ultimately convincing him that no Western country would go the extra mile to support Sri Lanka in isolating India, given India’s far greater relevance to Washington’s strategic calculus.
Top of Form; Bottom of Form
Throughout his career, JR Jayewardene struggled to comprehend the geopolitical forces that Sri Lanka inevitably faced. His reluctance to acknowledge India’s strategic importance may have stemmed from his colonial upbringing, which influenced his persistent denial of India’s role. As a student at Ceylon Law College, he participated in a campaign to unveil Mahatma Gandhi’s portrait at the entrance, an act that provoked significant opposition from British officials in the 1920s. However, as a statesman, Jayewardene ultimately aligned his political strategy with Western interests.
Although JR underestimated the rise of India as a catalyst factor in international affairs, Kissinger in the 80s understood how Indian would be pivotal to Washington in the 21st century, as he resembled India’s relevance to Britain’s East of Suez in the 19th century, policy essentially shaped by the Viceroy’s office in New Delhi. Besides his natural interest in history, JR Jayawardene ignored this historical reality; in particular, his hobnobbing with the West irked Indira Gandhi as actions challenging India’s Monroe doctrine, which affirmed “India has no intention of intervening in internal conflicts of a South Asian country and it strongly opposes intervention by any other”.
It is by no means an exaggeration to state that his plans to intensify the island’s economic development or his dream of making Sri Lanka another Singapore became futile due to his inability to understand the “Indian Factor”, which ultimately brought nemesis to his second term after 1982.
