China’s influence in Bangladesh is expected to grow further after this week’s national election, following the 2024 ouster of long-time prime minister Sheikh Hasina, whose government had close ties with India. According to a Reuters report, the shift reflects both Beijing’s expanding engagement in Dhaka and strained relations between Bangladesh and its powerful neighbour to the west, although politicians and analysts caution that India remains too significant to be pushed aside altogether.
Bangladesh votes on February 12, with the two leading parties historically far less aligned with New Delhi than Hasina was during her uninterrupted 15-year rule from 2009. Her Awami League has since been banned, and Hasina is now in self-imposed exile in India. Since her fall, China has stepped up its presence, signing major infrastructure and defence agreements, including a deal to build a drone factory near Bangladesh’s border with India.
Chinese Ambassador Yao Wen has been highly visible in Dhaka, holding frequent meetings with Bangladeshi politicians, officials, and journalists to discuss cooperation projects worth billions of dollars, according to embassy statements. Reuters reported that this diplomatic push has coincided with growing public resentment toward India, which many Bangladeshis accuse of backing Hasina despite allegations of human rights abuses during last year’s violent crackdown on protests.
Humaiun Kobir, foreign affairs adviser to leading prime ministerial candidate Tarique Rahman of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, said public anger has made closer ties with India politically toxic. Rahman himself has struck a more measured tone, telling Reuters that his party would seek friendly relations with all countries while prioritising Bangladesh’s national interests.
Tensions between Dhaka and New Delhi have flared in recent weeks across multiple fronts, including cricket, visas, and diplomacy. Bangladesh retaliated against the exclusion of one of its star bowlers from an Indian Premier League team by banning broadcasts of the tournament and requesting that its World Cup matches be moved out of India, a request later rejected by the International Cricket Council. Formal engagements between officials have also dwindled, though Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar met Rahman in December during a condolence visit.
China has been Bangladesh’s largest trading partner for more than a decade, with bilateral trade around $18 billion annually and Chinese goods accounting for nearly all imports. Since Hasina’s departure, Chinese firms have invested hundreds of millions of dollars, while Indian conglomerates that expanded under her rule have not announced major new deals. Constantino Xavier of the Centre for Social and Economic Progress told Reuters that Beijing has been “steadily building its influence” by exploiting the downturn in India-Bangladesh relations and declining US engagement.
Despite this momentum, analysts say deeper engagement with China does not mean Bangladesh will sever ties with India. The two countries remain deeply intertwined through geography, trade, and security cooperation, with India surrounding Bangladesh on three sides. Lailufar Yasmin of Dhaka University told Reuters that any incoming government would have to act pragmatically, maintaining workable relations with both regional powers.
Long-standing grievances over water sharing, border killings, and India’s support for Hasina continue to fuel anti-India sentiment, particularly among younger voters. Yet officials in New Delhi have privately acknowledged the need to engage whoever forms Bangladesh’s next government. As the election approaches, Bangladesh appears set to lean more heavily toward Beijing, while still balancing an unavoidable and complicated relationship with India.
