Chinese-Canadian educator and writer Jiang Xueqin presents a stark interpretation of Middle Eastern geopolitics: that Israel may quietly benefit from a prolonged war that weakens the United States rather than a swift American victory. Jiang, who teaches at Moonshot Academy in Beijing and runs the YouTube channel Predictive History, argues that the competing strategies of the region’s major powers make a long conflict not only possible but strategically attractive to several players.
“Israel wants the United States to lose this war,” Jiang says in the recorded lecture, addressing students during a discussion about military strategy and global power. “And that means a long war that destroys the American political will to fight any more foreign wars. America loses, Israel becomes the dominant power in the Middle East.”
Jiang frames his argument around what he describes as four major actors shaping the geopolitical landscape: the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Each, he says, pursues its own strategic objectives, and those objectives frequently overlap, conflict or shift depending on how the balance of power evolves.
For the United States, Jiang argues, the primary objective is straightforward. “What the United States wants to do is destroy Iran,” he says. The reason, in his analysis, is rooted in global trade and energy dominance. If Iran were neutralized, Washington would gain unmatched influence over Middle Eastern oil supplies and the strategic waterways through which much of the world’s energy flows.
“If you destroy Iran, the United States would have complete control over Middle East oil and it would control global trade,” Jiang explains. Such dominance would allow Washington to maintain its global influence through control of maritime commerce. “It’s a really simple objective,” he says. “Let’s destroy Iran. We don’t care how, we don’t care why.”
Iran, in Jiang’s telling, has a very different set of goals. He describes Tehran’s strategy as focused on weakening American military influence in the region while asserting its own authority. One of Iran’s main objectives, he says, would be to dismantle the U.S. Central Command presence that coordinates American forces across the Middle East.
“Destroy CENTCOM,” Jiang says, referring to the U.S. military’s Central Command structure. If that happened, he argues, Iran would gain significant regional leverage. “If CENTCOM is destroyed, Iran has complete control over the Middle East,” he claims. Gulf states such as Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait or the United Arab Emirates would be forced to adapt to a new balance of power.
At the same time, Jiang argues, Iran would seek to weaken Israel without pushing the conflict into a catastrophic nuclear confrontation. “You can’t destroy Israel because Israel has nuclear weapons,” he says. “If you push them too far, those nukes start flying. You don’t want that.” Instead, Iran’s strategy would be to “humble Israel,” reducing its military dominance without triggering an existential response.
Israel’s strategic outlook, Jiang suggests, is more complicated—and far more controversial in his interpretation. According to him, Israel’s long-term objective could involve ensuring that no other power, including the United States, dominates the Middle East.
“For Israel, the strategy is different,” Jiang says. “You want to destroy CENTCOM and destroy Iran.” If both Iran and American military influence were weakened simultaneously, Israel would emerge as the region’s unrivaled power.
“Even though the United States and Israel are allies, their strategies are different,” he says. “Their objectives are different. In fact, they’re in conflict.”
Jiang also places Saudi Arabia within this complex strategic competition. Riyadh, he argues, seeks the destruction of Iran in order to eliminate its main regional rival. But the kingdom also wants to limit the influence of both Israel and the United States, maintaining autonomy in shaping the future balance of power.
“Saudi Arabia wants to destroy Iran because if you destroy Iran, you can be the bully,” Jiang says. At the same time, he argues, the kingdom seeks to avoid becoming subordinate to either Washington or Jerusalem.
The overlapping ambitions of these powers, Jiang claims, create a situation in which several actors might benefit from dragging the United States deeper into a costly ground war. Such a conflict could gradually erode American political support for overseas military campaigns.
“As you can see, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran all want to destroy the United States,” he says. “And how do you do that? You force the United States into a long ground war.”
In Jiang’s analysis, the logic of such a strategy explains why nuclear weapons are unlikely to be used in such a scenario. A nuclear exchange would end the conflict quickly and decisively, undermining the strategic advantage of prolonging the war.
“You don’t want to use nukes,” he explains. “Nukes would end the war too quickly.”
Instead, modern warfare increasingly revolves around narrative, morale and political endurance rather than purely military strength. Jiang emphasizes that the outcome of conflicts often depends less on firepower than on the ability to sustain public support and maintain alliances.
“When you do anything in war, you have to worry about troop morale,” he says. “Your soldiers have to believe they’re fighting for a good cause.” Governments must also manage public opinion and maintain political unity at home while shaping global perceptions abroad.
“You have to make sure the world is on your side,” he adds. “You have to worry about political will.”
For this reason, Jiang argues, wars often become struggles over narrative and legitimacy as much as battlefield success. “War is extremely complicated,” he tells students. “It’s not just about weaponry. It’s about controlling the narrative and the political landscape.”
The question of whether the United States would deploy ground troops is also central to Jiang’s analysis. He believes the strategic environment could push Washington toward a deeper military commitment even if American leaders initially try to avoid it.
“The United States doesn’t have a clear coherent strategy,” he says. “It’s passive. Therefore it can be manipulated into sending a ground invasion.”
In the lecture’s discussion session, students challenge Jiang on several points, including why Washington would risk such a conflict if the consequences could destabilize the global system.
One student asks why the United States would take such risks merely to secure control over oil supplies and regional influence. Jiang responds that the debate over America’s motives will likely continue indefinitely.
“We’re going to argue this for the rest of eternity,” he says. “No one knows and there’s never going to be a clear answer.”
He offers what he calls a simplified explanation rooted in longstanding American military doctrine. According to Jiang, U.S. strategic thinking has historically focused on preventing the emergence of a unified geopolitical bloc across Eurasia—the so-called “heartland” stretching from Europe through Russia and Central Asia to China.
“The greatest threat to American power is the heartland unifying,” he explains. Because the United States is primarily a naval power, its global influence relies heavily on controlling sea-based trade routes. A unified Eurasian landmass connected by rail and overland trade networks could bypass those maritime systems.
“If the heartland unifies, it can trade by itself through railways,” Jiang says. “But America is primarily a naval power. Therefore it requires people to trade by sea.”
For decades, he argues, U.S. strategy has focused on preventing any single power from dominating this vast landmass. This logic shaped American involvement in both World War I and World War II, he says, when Washington feared the rise of a hegemonic power in Europe.
Today, Jiang sees a new challenge emerging in the form of closer cooperation between Russia, China and Iran—countries often grouped within broader economic frameworks such as the BRICS alliance.
“Russia, Iran and China are coming together,” he says. “If they come together, that’s a major piece of the heartland.”
Such a partnership could reshape global trade patterns and reduce reliance on American-controlled maritime routes, especially if the dominance of the U.S. dollar declines.
“Once you destroy Iran, the heartland fractures,” Jiang argues. Without Iran acting as a key link between Eurasian powers, the possibility of a cohesive overland economic network would weaken.
His interpretation, while controversial and debated by analysts, reflects a broader discussion among scholars about the shifting dynamics of global power and the strategic importance of geography.
Throughout the lecture, Jiang repeatedly emphasizes that geopolitical conflicts cannot be understood through simple alliances or rivalries. Countries that appear to be partners may pursue very different long-term interests.
“By understanding how each player perceives the game,” he tells students, “we can understand their strategy.”
Whether or not one agrees with his conclusions, Jiang’s analysis highlights the complex calculations shaping modern geopolitics. In a region where alliances shift and rivalries overlap, even partners may quietly hope that the balance of power evolves in ways that serve their own long-term ambitions.
And in Jiang’s view, that reality makes any major conflict far more unpredictable than it first appears. “War,” he says, “is ultimately about strategy, narrative and political will—not just weapons.”
