The colonial occupiers have much to answer for. Many present-day problems were planted as part of divide-and-rule policies. However, we cannot continue to live in the past and repeatedly assign blame to former rulers. We must move forward and take decisive action against the problems that were created. A critical starting point is making people aware of the threats and the dangers they pose, so that remedial actions are supported by public backing. When LTTE extremist groups first emerged, they were referred to as “our boys,” yet they eventually became one of the world’s most ruthless terrorist movements, leading to three decades of bloodshed. This was followed by two additional periods of violence associated with the JVP. Now, a third community has been silently experiencing its own form of extremism, culminating in the Easter Sunday attacks. The nation cannot endure further bloodshed. People must demand action, irrespective of political, business, or communal allegiances.
The roots of this trajectory can be traced back decades. In 1942, Jamaat-e-Islami was founded in British India by Abul A’la Maududi, promoting a political interpretation of Islam that sought governance under religious law rather than secular systems. In 1954, Sri Lanka Jamaat-e-Islami was established under Abdul Cader Jailani Shahib, focusing on religious education, study circles, publications, preaching, and community-based influence. This marked the institutional beginning of organized ideological propagation. At this stage, activities were legal and largely social in nature, posing no immediate security threat, but they contributed to the gradual development of networks, influence channels, and ideological pipelines that would grow in complexity over time.
In the 1990s, Wahhabism was introduced through institutions such as the Centre for Islamic Guidance, promoting a rigid and exclusivist interpretation of Islam that rejected other traditions and non-Muslims. Not all religious movements are extremist; however, radicalization begins when religion becomes politicized, exclusivist, internally intolerant, and eventually weaponized to justify hostility or violence. Although early activities remained lawful, certain local elites and community leaders began to recognize opportunities for influence and funding through religious institutions, creating conditions that could later be exploited by extremist elements. These developments laid the foundation for an environment in which extremism could gradually emerge.
From the 1950s through the 1980s, ideological expansion occurred through religious education, literature distribution, mosque-based networks, and the establishment of madrassas, which initially focused on basic religious instruction. During this phase, activities remained non-violent and community-oriented, raising no immediate national security concerns. However, by 1980, the formation of the Sri Lanka Islamic Students Movement marked a shift toward structured youth engagement and systematic ideological transmission, enabling ideas to reach younger generations and ensuring long-term continuity.
The 1990s brought a more significant transformation with the introduction of Wahhabi and Salafi teachings, shifting religious discourse toward rigid and exclusivist interpretations. This resulted in sectarian divisions, particularly targeting Sufi Muslims, and fostered growing intolerance within the Muslim community itself. These developments largely went unnoticed because they were framed as religious reform, remained within legal boundaries, and did not initially present a visible national security threat. Nonetheless, beneath the surface, ideological networks were expanding, recruitment pathways were forming, and authority structures were evolving.
By the mid-1990s through 2009, the shift from ideology to violence became increasingly evident. Incidents targeting Sufi Muslims included shootings, arson, and intimidation. The killing of M.S.M. Farouk Qadhiree in 1998 and large-scale mob attacks in 2004 reflected escalating sectarian tensions, while continued clashes into 2009 demonstrated the persistence of religiously motivated violence. As seen in other extremist movements, the first victims were often members of the same community, as dissent was eliminated to enforce conformity. These attacks served as warnings to those who resisted, illustrating how extremist ideologies consolidate internally before expanding outward.
Between 2003 and 2014, more structured networks began to form. The Oluvil Declaration of 2003, partially inspired by earlier political movements, signaled a shift toward organized assertions of communal identity. Leadership figures such as M. H. M. Ashraff played a significant role in shaping Muslim political mobilization, emphasizing community autonomy, representation, and identity. While these developments were not inherently violent, they contributed to the creation of social and political networks that could later be exploited by radical ideologues, particularly after the LTTE threat diminished in 2009.
By 2012, the establishment of National Thowheed Jamaat by Zahran Hashim marked a critical turning point. Influenced by global Salafi-Wahhabi ideologies, the group developed localized networks for recruitment and indoctrination. By 2013, international bodies had identified such ideological movements as sources of foreign fighter recruitment, and connections between Sri Lankan networks and global jihadist groups began to emerge. Individuals from affluent families traveling to conflict zones highlighted the transnational dimension of these networks.
During this period, societal and economic signals also became visible. Changes in dress, the adoption of stricter religious practices, and economic activities linked to religious identity indicated alignment with hardline interpretations. Certain segments within political, professional, and business communities exploited these networks for financial and social gain, while underestimating ideological risks. Actions such as influencing law enforcement, facilitating foreign funding, mobilizing political pressure, and enabling unchecked movement of individuals contributed to the creation of a protected environment in which radical networks could develop with limited interference.
Following 2009, Sri Lanka’s intelligence agencies monitored these developments, including the spread of radical ideology, foreign recruitment, and emerging networks. However, response efforts were constrained because early activities were largely non-violent, limiting legal grounds for intervention. Monitoring, advisory measures, and community engagement were prioritized, but these approaches proved insufficient as networks evolved and expanded.
From 2014 onward, the global rise of ISIS significantly influenced local dynamics. The declaration of a caliphate and calls for global participation inspired recruitment efforts in Sri Lanka. Individuals traveled to conflict zones, while local networks engaged in recruitment, fundraising, and ideological dissemination through online platforms and study circles. By 2016, these activities had evolved into organized structures, with increased propaganda, coordination, and operational preparation.
Zahran Hashim’s trajectory illustrates this escalation. Beginning as a preacher promoting hardline ideology, his activities gradually intensified into public confrontations, vandalism of religious sites, and organized violence. Despite arrest warrants and intelligence warnings, he continued operating underground, strengthening networks and advancing toward operational capability. Discoveries of explosives, training activities, and coordinated attacks on religious symbols demonstrated a clear transition from ideological radicalization to organized terrorism.
Despite extensive intelligence warnings between 2015 and 2018, including international alerts, little decisive action was taken. Arrests were not carried out, extremist groups were not effectively banned, and networks were not dismantled. Even when foreign intelligence provided specific warnings shortly before the Easter Sunday attacks, preventive measures were not implemented. The attacks, which resulted in significant loss of life, were widely considered preventable.
This pattern reflects not an intelligence failure, but a failure to act. Critical questions remain regarding accountability, including why known individuals were not apprehended, why networks were allowed to operate, and why warnings were not acted upon. Concerns also persist about interference in investigations, political influence, and the absence of transparency regarding those who were aware of the threats but failed to respond.
Within this context, there is also a broader societal reflection. Sri Lankan Muslims have a long history on the island, shaped by trade, integration, and coexistence. Over generations, communities adapted to local cultures, languages, and social structures. However, the introduction of foreign ideological influences has created tensions between traditional practices and imported interpretations. The adoption of external cultural and religious norms, disconnected from local context, carries risks for social cohesion.
The example of Zahran Hashim highlights the dangers of uncritically adopting such ideologies. Other nations that once promoted rigid interpretations are themselves moving away from them, recognizing their destabilizing effects. Sri Lanka must also draw lessons from its own history. Just as earlier communities experienced the consequences of unchecked extremism, there is a need for vigilance, accountability, and collective responsibility to prevent similar trajectories in the future.
