On March 24, 2026, two members of a so-called “death squad” (state-backed armed militia) were killed when unidentified gunmen – suspected Baloch insurgents – attacked them in the Paroom area of Panjgur District in Balochistan. Although no group claimed responsibility for the incident, similar attacks in the past have been attributed to Baloch insurgent groups.
On March 17, 2026, Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) cadres killed three ‘death squad’ members and captured another during a targeted strike in the Grari area of Washuk District. While claiming responsibility for the attack, BLF ‘spokesperson’ Major Gwahram Baloch stated that intelligence indicated that the operatives, under the patronage of the Army, had established a temporary checkpoint on the CPEC highway, harassing drivers and extorting money. The targeted group, led by a cadre named Sarwar and operating under Ali Haider Muhammad Hasni, had been involved in anti-Baloch activities, according to the BLF statement.
On March 12, 2026, BLF cadres carried out an intelligence-based action and killed one member of a ‘death squad’, Parvez, son of Nek Bakht, in the Absar area of Turbat tehsil (revenue unit) in Kech District. According to the statement issued by BLF’s ‘spokesperson’ Major Gwahram Baloch, Parvez had previously been associated with the Baloch movement, but surrendered to the Pakistan Army in 2017 and later became active against the national movement.
On March 6, 2026, the BLF cadres carried out an intelligence-based action and captured and executed one member of a ‘death squad’, Wahid, son of Kamalan, a resident of Tejaban in the Karki area of Kech District. According to the statement issued by BLF’s ‘spokesperson’ ‘Major’ Gwahram Baloch, Wahid was acting as an informant for the Pakistan Army and a local death squad. According to the statement, he was interrogated and confessed to involvement in several activities, including the killing of two BLF cadres in Balgatar on February 4, 2022, and participating in operations alongside Security Forces (SFs) in areas including Balgatar, Hoshab, Tejaban and Kirki.
On March 4, 2026, BLF cadres killed one member of a ‘death squad’, identified as Muslim, son of Ismail, in a targeted operation in the Konshqalat area of Tump tehsil in Kech District. While claiming responsibility for the attack, BLF ‘spokesperson’ ‘Major’ Gwahram Baloch disclosed that Muslim had been operating under the patronage of Saeed Abid, described as the head of a ‘death squad’ in Tump. The statement claimed he had been involved in informing on Baloch youth, facilitating enforced disappearances, and assisting operations against the local population.
During March 2026, Baloch insurgents eliminated at least eight state-backed ‘death squad’ members. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), during the first three months (data till March 27, 2026), 12 ‘death squad’ members have been killed in seven attacks. During the corresponding period of 2025, seven such incidents were reported, in which nine death squad’ members were killed and seven were injured. Meanwhile, during the rest of 2025 33 incidents of attacks on ‘death squad’ members were reported, in which 43 members were killed and 12 sustained injuries. In 2024, 27 ‘death squad’ members were killed while eight were injured in 14 incidents of attack. In 2023, four ‘death squad’ members were killed in four incidents of attack. In 2022, 17 ‘death squad’ members were killed and 10 were injured in 13 incidents of attack. Five incidents of such attacks were reported in 2021, resulting in four deaths and eight persons injured.
Some of the prominent attacks on ‘death squad’ members in recent time include:
On November 8, 2025, Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) cadres killed the leader of a state backed “death squad”, Shakir Saadullah Langove, along with three of his associates, during an intelligence-based raid in the Mangochar area of Kalat District. While claiming responsibility for the attack, BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeeyand Baloch accused Shakir Saadullah of running a “death squad” that assisted Pakistani armed forces in raids, extorted travellers, trafficked drugs and targeted Baloch activists.
On July 24, 2025, BLA killed one key figure of a ‘death squad’, Muawiya Jamaldini, in Nushki District. While claiming responsibility for the killing, BLA described Muawiya Jamaldini as a key figure of a state-backed armed group allegedly involved in targeted killings, home raids, and the harassment of families of slain Baloch cadres.
On July 22, 2025, tribal leader Mir Atta-ur-Rehman Mengal, the brother of notorious ‘death squad’ leader Shafiq-ur-Rehman Mengal, was killed in a BLA attack in the Aranji area of Wadh tehsil (revenue unit) in Khuzdar District. BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeeyand Baloch said the group conducted the attack which killed Mir Atta-ur-Rehman Mengal along with his colleagues.
On March 5, 2025, at least four ‘death squad’ members were killed and five injured when BLA targeted the vehicle of “death squad” leader Samad Sumalani in the Naal area of Khuzdar District. Sumalani was seriously wounded in the explosion. While claiming responsibility for the attack, BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeeyand Baloch noted, “Sumalani has been involved in the targeted killings of Baloch people in Naal, Gresha, Panjgur and surrounding areas.”
The targeting of “death squad” members represents retaliatory action by Baloch insurgent groups as a form of reprisal against individuals they accuse of facilitating the state’s systematic human rights abuses and extrajudicial killings in the province. These “death squads” are characterized as locally recruited militias, often comprising criminal elements, and are alleged to operate with the backing of state security and intelligence agencies in carrying out enforced disappearances and the SF’s “kill-and-dump” policy. They are also reported to accompany SFs during raids on the residences and locations of political activists, dissidents, and pro-independence leaders. In return, these groups function with relative impunity across Balochistan, engaging in various illicit activities, including drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and the operation of private detention facilities for extortion.
“Death squads” are widely alleged to be the principal actors behind “enforced disappearance” and unattributed extrajudicial killings in Balochistan. According to the Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP), the province has around 7,000 missing individuals. Other monitoring bodies, such as the Human Rights Council of Balochistan (HRCB), reported 1,455 cases of enforced disappearance in 2025, including 1,443 men and 12 women. Of these, more than 1,052 persons remain missing, 317 were subsequently released, 83 were reportedly killed in custody, and only three were processed through formal legal channels and transferred to jail. The pattern is geographically widespread, with Kech District recording the highest number of cases (318), followed by Quetta (172), Gwadar (164), Awaran (140), Dera Bugti (114), and Panjgur (105). In contrast, official figures from the Government of Pakistan’s Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances (COIED) are significantly lower, reporting only 454 active cases in Balochistan as of early 2026.
There are multiple “death squad” groups operating across different parts of Balochistan. Among the most prominent is the network associated with Shafiq-ur-Rehman Mengal, who reportedly established one of the earliest such militias in 2008, the Musallah Defah Tanzeem (MDT), with the stated aim of “defending” the public against pro-independence groups. Allegedly backed by state security agencies, Mengal initiated a reign of terror in Balochistan, killing not only suspected nationalists but also political, non-political and tribal rivals. Mengal has also been linked to the 2014 discovery of mass graves in Tootak, near Khuzdar, where 169 bodies were recovered.
Apart from Shafiq Mengal, several other local militia groups were raised as death squads in Balochistan, including the Zakaria M. Hasni-led death squad in Khuzdar; the Deen Muhammad Deenu-led group in Awaran; another led by Samir Sabzal, Rashid Pathan and Sardar Aziz in Kech; the Maqbool Shambezi group in Panjgur and the Siraj Raisani group in Mastung. Siraj Raisani was killed on July 13, 2018, when a suicide bomber targeted a BAP political rally, killing at least 128 people and injuring more than 200 at Dringarh village in Mastung District.
These “death squad” groups are alleged to have received not only military patronage but also political backing. A media report dated March 6, 2026, indicated that Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) leader and current President Asif Ali Zardari hosted leaders associated with such groups and facilitated their incorporation into the party’s political structure. Individuals linked to these networks include figures connected with the Jamal Raisani-associated Balochistan Muttahida Mahaz (BMM), the Bugti Aman Force reportedly tied to Sarfraz Bugti, and the Musallah Defah Tanzeem (MDT) led by Shafiq Mengal. By bringing individuals such as Shafiq Mengal, Jamal Raisani, and Sarfraz Bugti under its political umbrella, PPP is seen to be attempting to consolidate previously fragmented militia-linked networks within a single party framework.
Rather than addressing the issue of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, the Pakistani establishment has largely responded to the Baloch crisis through intensified coercive measures. On March 17, 2026, the Federal Government, in coordination with the provincial authorities, decided to deploy 3,000 Federal Constabulary personnel in Balochistan to maintain law and order. The decision was taken during a high-level meeting at the Chief Minister’s Secretariat in Quetta, jointly chaired by Federal Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi and Balochistan Chief Minister Sarfraz Bugti. Although the deployment was officially presented as a measure to ensure stability, it is widely perceived as a measure against dissident elements in the province, targeted by these forces in tandem with the “death squads”.
The expansion of SF presence alongside the political empowerment of “death squad” groups is likely to intensify the cycle of violence in the province, resulting in increased attacks and retaliatory action in the days ahead.
