Indo-Pacific countries are rapidly expanding defence cooperation and military capabilities as they respond to China’s growing military power and shifting perceptions of long-term United States engagement in the region, signalling a gradual reshaping of Asia’s security architecture beyond reliance on a single dominant ally.
At a major defence forum in Singapore, known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, senior military and government officials from across the region outlined a growing push toward deeper bilateral and multilateral defence ties. While US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth reiterated Washington’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific, regional leaders expressed a parallel recognition that countries must increasingly strengthen their own capabilities and partnerships to ensure stability amid rising geopolitical uncertainty.
Nations including Japan, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and the Philippines are now actively expanding defence cooperation, with a focus on joint exercises, cybersecurity collaboration, and arms procurement partnerships. This shift reflects a broader strategy of “burden-sharing,” as regional actors seek to complement rather than rely solely on the traditional security role of the United States.
Japan has emerged as a central hub in this evolving network. Under its expanding defence policy, Tokyo is deepening military-industrial cooperation with regional partners and easing restrictions on defence exports, enabling the potential sale of warships, missiles, and other advanced systems. This marks a significant transformation in Japan’s post-war defence posture and positions it as a key supplier and coordinator within an emerging Indo-Pacific security framework.
Officials from countries such as the Philippines emphasised that strengthening intra-regional defence ties does not replace US involvement but instead reinforces deterrence by creating a more distributed security structure. This approach aims to ensure that multiple actors contribute to regional stability in the face of perceived strategic competition from China.
Canada and New Zealand have also stepped up engagement, with expanded participation in maritime exercises, cybersecurity cooperation, and training programs with regional partners. New Zealand is additionally exploring major naval procurement decisions, including potential replacements for its ageing frigate fleet through partnerships with Japan and the United Kingdom, underscoring the growing integration of defence supply chains across allied nations.
Despite this diversification of partnerships, many regional leaders continue to emphasise that US involvement remains central to Indo-Pacific security. Officials from Australia and the Philippines stressed that defence ties with Washington are still foundational, even as they simultaneously pursue broader networks of cooperation. This dual-track approach reflects an effort to hedge against geopolitical uncertainty while maintaining existing alliance structures.
The overall trend points to a more complex and “multi-nodal” security environment in the Indo-Pacific, where alliances are no longer defined solely by US leadership but increasingly by interconnected partnerships among regional powers themselves. As tensions with China persist and global strategic attention becomes more dispersed, Indo-Pacific nations appear set to deepen this cooperative defence model in the years ahead.
