As tensions between Washington and Tehran continue to intensify, the Trump administration has sought to raise the stakes by announcing a new agreement with Saudi Arabia, Iran’s longstanding regional rival. The accord establishes a 30-year framework allowing Saudi Arabia to develop nuclear capabilities with American technological assistance. While the administration has maintained that the programme is intended solely for civilian purposes and will include safeguards, the agreement has prompted widespread concern over the possibility that Saudi Arabia could eventually enrich uranium domestically, a capability that some experts estimate could be achieved within ten years.
The agreement represents a significant shift in US foreign policy priorities in the Middle East. Rather than focusing exclusively on limiting Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Washington has now moved towards supporting the nuclear capabilities of one of Iran’s principal regional competitors. According to The Soufan Center, this transition raises broader questions about the future direction of regional security and the balance between strategic partnerships and long-standing non-proliferation objectives.
For decades, US policy has centred on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, which remain possessed by only nine countries. Although the Saudi agreement is framed around civilian nuclear energy, specialists have expressed concern that the absence of stringent publicly disclosed restrictions could establish a precedent that becomes difficult to reverse. The United States has traditionally favoured arrangements under which countries purchase enriched nuclear fuel from the international market rather than develop domestic enrichment capabilities. Russia similarly spent years encouraging Tehran to enrich uranium outside its borders through a joint venture on Russian soil, an offer ultimately rejected by Iran.
The new agreement stands in contrast to the nuclear cooperation accord reached between the United States and the United Arab Emirates in 2009. That agreement, widely regarded as the “gold standard” for civilian nuclear cooperation, required the UAE to adopt a legally binding commitment not to pursue domestic uranium enrichment. It also required the country to sign the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol, designed to provide inspectors with sufficient information and access to verify that no undeclared nuclear materials or activities exist.
Saudi Arabia has declined to sign the Additional Protocol. Although US officials have stated that separate safeguard arrangements have been agreed with Riyadh, no details have yet been released regarding the nature or scope of those protections. This lack of publicly available information has contributed to uncertainty surrounding how the agreement will be implemented and monitored over the coming decades.
Further uncertainty emerged one day after the agreement was signed, when US President Donald Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform that the deal was “totally subject” to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords with Israel. The announcement reportedly caught Saudi officials by surprise and prompted speculation that the condition had been introduced following pressure from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
The Trump administration has consistently promoted Gulf normalisation with Israel throughout its second term. Saudi Arabia, however, has maintained that formal diplomatic engagement with Israel can only occur alongside the establishment of Palestinian statehood, a position that has become a central element of the Kingdom’s foreign policy. Consequently, despite the strategic significance of the nuclear agreement and continued pressure from Washington, it remains uncertain whether Riyadh would alter its position regarding the Abraham Accords. At the same time, the possibility remains that the United States could ultimately move forward without enforcing that requirement.
Beyond the bilateral relationship between Washington and Riyadh, the agreement carries broader regional implications. According to The Soufan Center, permitting Saudi Arabia to move towards uranium enrichment could encourage other states to seek similar capabilities. Russia and China may point to the American precedent when offering comparable nuclear cooperation arrangements to their own partners. Countries including Türkiye and Egypt, which have long sought enrichment rights, could also intensify their efforts, increasing the prospect of a wider regional competition over nuclear technology.
The timing of the agreement further complicates an already volatile regional environment. It was concluded during a conflict that has been fought largely to prevent Tehran from acquiring precisely the type of capability now being offered to Riyadh. This development could further weaken prospects for the United States and Iran reaching an updated and mutually acceptable Memorandum of Understanding while simultaneously reinforcing Iranian efforts to rebuild its own nuclear capabilities.
Regional tensions have been heightened further by developments in Yemen. Days before the agreement was announced, the Iranian-backed Houthi movement declared a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia and claimed attacks on two Saudi oil tankers transiting through the Red Sea. The Houthis described their actions as “an eye for an eye” following airstrikes on Yemen’s Sanaa International Airport, which they attributed to Saudi Arabia. Those strikes followed an Iranian commercial flight transporting a Houthi delegation from Yemen to Iran for the funeral of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Operating from the mountainous terrain of northwestern Yemen, the Houthis have developed tactics that allow them to launch attacks on passing vessels before retreating into extensive cave networks. Their operations around the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the narrow entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, threaten one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors. According to the analysis, these attacks have the potential to disrupt global supply chains and energy markets, with oil prices already rising above $100 per barrel and expected to increase further.
When fighting involving Iran began in late February, some analysts suggested Tehran had deliberately withheld Houthi involvement as a strategic reserve. The subsequent activation of the group appears to support that assessment, introducing a new dimension into a conflict that has increasingly settled into a prolonged confrontation. While President Trump responded with threats directed at the Houthis on Truth Social, the conflict has also highlighted what the analysis describes as the limits of airpower in compelling an adversary to change course. Iran’s layered defensive strategy has complicated US military operations, while rising oil prices and approaching US midterm elections add further pressure to Washington’s calculations.
According to The Soufan Center, both Washington and Tehran appear to recognise that the conflict has reached a critical stage. Although the United States had reportedly been negotiating the Saudi agreement before the conflict with Iran began, its announcement at this particular moment appears intended to introduce a significant new strategic element. Tehran’s activation of the Houthis suggests it has reached a similar conclusion. Each side is attempting to strengthen its negotiating position as the costs of continued confrontation continue to mount, with the regional security environment becoming increasingly intertwined with global energy markets, maritime trade and the future direction of nuclear non-proliferation.
