On August 26, 2026, the Special Task Force (STF) of the Assam Police, in a joint operation with the Hailakandi Police, arrested Fazal Islam Barbhuiyan (21), an alleged operative of the Pakistan-based Shahzad Bhatti Network (SBN), from the Ramnathpur area of Hailakandi District, Assam. The arrest followed the apprehension of three alleged SBN operatives from Dhubri, Chirang and Barpeta Districts on July 25, 2026. Acting on leads developed from the earlier arrests and subsequent investigation, the STF and Hailakandi Police apprehended Barbhuiyan and seized several documents from his possession. He had allegedly been evading arrest in connection with the ongoing SBN investigation.
On July 24, 2026, the STF of the Assam Police, in coordinated operations with the district Police of Dhubri, Chirang and Barpeta, arrested three alleged SBN operatives, arresting one suspect each from the three districts. The arrested operatives were identified as Akramul Islam (26), arrested in Dhubri; Aminur Rahman (22), arrested in Chirang; and Abdul Hussain (54), arrested in Barpeta. Five mobile phones, seven SIM cards, Aadhaar cards, bank passbooks, debit cards and other incriminating documents were seized during the operations. According to the STF, the three were suspected of involvement in recruitment, online radicalisation, reconnaissance, logistics, espionage, arms procurement, establishment of sleeper cells and facilitation of terrorist activities. Investigators further alleged that the SBN operates through encrypted communication channels under the direction of Pakistan-based handlers associated with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma subsequently stated that this was the first time suspected jihadi elements with direct links to Pakistan had been arrested in the State.
On May 22, 2026, the Assam Police Special Task Force (STF) arrested an alleged SBN operative during an investigation in Nalbari District, marking the first reported detection of alleged SBN-linked activity in Assam. STF Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) Pranab Kumar Pegu stated that the network’s activities in the State first came to notice during the investigation. The identity of the alleged SBN operative has not been publicly disclosed by the Assam Police STF.
According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least five alleged SBN operatives have been arrested in three separate incidents across Assam in 2026 (data till August 30, 2026).
Taken together, the cases indicate that SBN-linked activity detected by the Assam Police has extended across multiple districts, rather than being confined to a single localised pocket. The geographical spread is notable: Nalbari and Barpeta are located in different parts of western and central Assam; Dhubri lies in western Assam along the Bangladesh border; Chirang is in the Bodoland Territorial Region; and Hailakandi is in southern Assam’s Barak Valley. The arrests therefore suggest a geographically dispersed pattern of suspected contacts and activity, although the available evidence does not yet establish the existence of a single, fully developed operational network spanning all these districts.
The development is significant in the context of the broader expansion of the SBN investigation in India. Security agencies have identified SBN-linked suspects and conducted operations across several States, with major concentrations reported in Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Delhi and Punjab, while subsequent investigations have extended to Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Uttarakhand, Karnataka, Gujarat, Bihar, Telangana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and Kerala. According to a Press Information Bureau (PIB) release on August 17, 2026, a coordinated operation conducted on August 12, 2026, resulted in 253 detentions across 14 States – Uttar Pradesh (62), Haryana (52), Delhi (51), Punjab (44), Rajasthan (15), Maharashtra (eight), Uttarakhand (five), Karnataka, Gujarat and Bihar (three each), and Telangana, Himachal Pradesh, J&K and Kerala (two each) – with fresh First Information Reports (FIRs) registered in Delhi and Karnataka. Recoveries included Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), grenades bearing Pakistan Ordnance Factory markings, pistols, live ammunition and Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras allegedly used for surveillance. Assam was not included in the 14-State August 12 data, indicating that the Assam investigation was proceeding through a separate State-level case.
The emergence of SBN-linked activity in Assam is significant not simply because it adds another State to the network’s geographical footprint, but because it demonstrates the potential extension of a Pakistan-based terrorist-criminal network into the Northeast. Assam’s international borders, connectivity with the wider Northeast and location between the rest of India and the region make the State strategically important. At the same time, the available evidence warrants caution: the arrests establish suspected linkages and investigative leads, but further investigation will be required to determine the extent of SBN’s organisational presence, recruitment activities, financing and operational capabilities in Assam.
The scale of the crackdown should not, however, be equated with SBN’s actual cadre strength. The 253 detained persons comprise suspects and persons being investigated in different cases, and there is presently no credible public estimate of the number of trained and active SBN operatives. What the arrests demonstrate is the network’s ability to recruit and activate a sizeable pool of local contacts, which appears to be one of SBN’s principal strengths. Investigations have indicated that Shahzad Bhatti’s network recruits Indian youth through social-media platforms, offering relatively small payments for reconnaissance, logistics and other assignments. A media investigation report described a “need-to-know” structure in which recruits are kept isolated from one another, reducing the possibility that the arrest of one operative will expose the wider network.
At the centre of the network is Shahzad Bhatti, described by Indian agencies as a Pakistan-based gangster, who moves frequently between Pakistan and the Gulf countries, particularly including the United Arab Emirate (UAE), who has evolved into a cross-border terrorism facilitator. Earlier, SAIR had noted that Bhatti was believed to have moved to the UAE, where he claimed to own an agricultural and dairy business. His current location remains unclear, although investigators believe that he continues to move between Pakistan and the Gulf. Bhatti is alleged to maintain links with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and receive support from Pakistan-based handlers and close associates, including Abid Jatt, Ajmal Gujjar, and Yawar Khan – a Dubai-based alleged ISI handler reportedly linked to the Dawood network. His public social-media presence reportedly gives him access to a large audience: According to an August 18, 2026, media report, Bhatti had approximately 250,000 followers on Instagram and more than 450,000 on Facebook. This provides an unusual recruitment advantage for a Pakistan-based handler. Rather than relying exclusively on established extremist organisations, the network can potentially identify individuals online, cultivate them remotely and subsequently assign them increasingly serious tasks.
The network’s operational model also appears deliberately hybrid. It combines characteristics of organised crime and terrorism: recruitment of individuals with limited criminal backgrounds, movement of weapons and narcotics, surveillance of targets, targeted violence and the creation of sleeper cells. On June 9, 2026, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) searched 18 locations in Punjab and Haryana in connection with three cases involving attacks on Police establishments and a grenade attack. Subsequently, on June 16, 2026, Delhi Police arrested seven alleged members of a Bhatti-linked syndicate and reported the recovery of sophisticated firearms, ammunition and digital evidence.
The cross-border dimension is particularly important. Indian agencies allege that SBN receives directions and funding from Pakistan-based handlers, uses encrypted communications and facilitates the movement of weapons and other logistical resources into India. The recovery of grenades bearing Pakistan Ordnance Factory markings during the August crackdown has been cited by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) as evidence of cross-border linkages. At the same time, such recoveries establish the provenance of some material more clearly than they establish the precise command relationship between individual Indian operatives and the ISI. The latter remains an allegation requiring continued investigation and corroboration.
The alleged association with other extremist and separatist formations further complicates the network’s structure. Assam investigators have cited links with organisations including the Khalistan Armed Force (KAF), Punjab Sovereignty Alliance (PSA), Khalistan Liberation Army (KLA), Sher-e-Punjab Brigade (SPB), United Sikh Brotherhood (USB), Sikh Tigers of Khalistan (STK) and Tehrik-e-Taliban Hindustan (TTH). Investigators disclosed that TTH had claimed responsibility for the killings of two Police personnel – Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI) Gurnam Singh and Home Guard Ashok Kumar – in Adhian village under Dorangla Police Station limits in the Gurdaspur District of Punjab, near the International Border (IB), on February 22, 2026. These alleged linkages raise the possibility that SBN functions less as a conventional hierarchical terrorist organisation and more as a network connecting Pakistan-based handlers with geographically dispersed criminal, extremist and local facilitation networks.
For Assam, the principal threat is, therefore, not necessarily an imminent large-scale terrorist attack. The more immediate concern is the creation of small, deniable and replaceable cells capable of conducting reconnaissance, providing logistics, transporting weapons, recruiting vulnerable individuals and facilitating attacks elsewhere. Assam’s geography makes this particularly relevant. The state shares an international border with Bangladesh and provides connectivity to the wider Northeast, while Dhubri and other western districts have established transport and communication links with northern West Bengal and the wider region. A network capable of establishing local contacts in these districts could potentially use Assam as a logistical, recruitment or facilitation environment, even if its ultimate targets lie outside the state.
The emergence of SBN also illustrates the changing character of Pakistan-linked terrorism in India. Many traditional terrorist organisations have relied heavily on dedicated cadres, physical training and established command structures. SBN, by contrast, appears to place greater emphasis on digital recruitment, criminal intermediaries, encrypted communication, small payments and compartmentalised cells. This can lower the costs of recruitment and make attribution more difficult. It also potentially enables Pakistan-based handlers to influence individuals who may have no previous history of extremist activity.
The Assam arrests have consequently exposed a threat that extends beyond the immediate suspects. The challenge for security agencies will be to determine whether the five arrests have substantially disrupted the network of contacts identified so far in Assam, or represent only the first visible layer of a larger network. The recovery of communication devices, financial documents and identity records could be critical in establishing contacts, funding channels and recruitment pathways. Equally important will be determining whether SBN has established links with criminal networks already operating in Assam and neighbouring States.
The arrest of five suspected operatives in Assam cannot be viewed in isolation. It forms part of a broader national investigation that has already uncovered hundreds of suspected associates in multiple cases. While the August crackdown has disrupted SBN’s immediate capabilities, its decentralised recruitment model may allow it to regenerate through new and previously unidentified recruits. The principal security challenge is, consequently, not merely to arrest existing operatives, but to dismantle the digital, financial, logistical and cross-border ecosystem that enables the network to repeatedly generate new cells.
For Assam, the immediate priority will be to prevent the consolidation of the network before it develops the depth and resilience reportedly observed among SBN-linked networks in Punjab, Haryana, Delhi and Uttar Pradesh. The May, July and August arrests provide an opportunity to map SBN’s local facilitators at an early stage. Whether Assam remains a peripheral recruitment and logistics zone or develops into an operational theatre for SBN will depend substantially on the outcome of the ongoing investigation and the ability of security agencies to identify and disrupt the network’s wider support structure.
