India and Canada are moving rapidly to rebuild their economic partnership, even as unresolved concerns over organised crime, foreign interference and transnational repression continue to cast a shadow over the diplomatic reset. Indian Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman arrived in Canada on 25 August for a four-day visit, as bilateral ties gained fresh momentum. During her visit to Toronto, she offered an optimistic assessment of the relationship, describing India and Canada as among the world’s “most natural partners,” with ties that, she argued, run deeper than any trade agreement.
The timing is striking.
As Ottawa and New Delhi accelerate one of the most significant diplomatic resets of recent years, newly disclosed Canadian intelligence has revived concerns about the expansion of the India-based Bishnoi criminal network in Canada and the alleged exploitation of Canadian immigration channels by organised crime.
The juxtaposition captures the central contradiction in Canada-India relations in 2026. Economic and geopolitical incentives are pulling the two governments closer together, but the organised-crime, foreign-interference and transnational-repression concerns that contributed to their diplomatic crisis have not disappeared.
From diplomatic crisis to economic reset
Relations deteriorated sharply following the June 2023 killing of Canadian Sikh activist Hardeep Singh Nijjar in British Columbia and Ottawa’s subsequent allegations of links between Indian government agents and violent activity in Canada. India rejected allegations of involvement.
In October 2024, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police publicly alleged links between agents of the Indian government and homicides, violent acts and organised criminal activity in Canada. The RCMP also alleged that information collected through Indian officials and proxies had been used to target members of the South Asian community.
New Delhi’s security concerns, however, run in the opposite direction. India has long argued that Canada has allowed separatist and extremist activity targeting Indian interests to operate too freely on Canadian soil. Ottawa has maintained that peaceful political expression is protected under Canadian law while distinguishing it from violence, intimidation and criminal activity.
The result is a security relationship in which both sides believe the other has failed to adequately address threats to their interests.
Yet by 2026, the diplomatic trajectory had changed dramatically.
Prime Minister Mark Carney visited India in March, the first bilateral visit by a Canadian prime minister since 2018. The two governments launched negotiations for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, set an ambition to expand bilateral trade to C$70 billion by 2030 and announced cooperation spanning energy, critical minerals, artificial intelligence, talent and defence.
Security was not excluded from the reset. Carney and Narendra Modi agreed to strengthen cooperation against organised crime, extortion and transnational criminal networks, alongside new security and law-enforcement mechanisms.
Sitharaman’s visit is now pushing the economic track further. The inaugural Canada-India Finance Ministers’ Economic and Financial Dialogue provides another mechanism for institutionalising cooperation on investment, financial-sector issues and economic growth.
The incentives are substantial. Canada is seeking to diversify its trade and investment relationships amid uncertainty in its economic relationship with the United States. India, with its enormous market, growing energy requirements and expanding industrial base, is an obvious partner.
But economic interests are converging faster than security mistrust is disappearing.
The Bishnoi problem has not gone away
A classified Canada Border Services Agency tactical guide, circulated internally in December 2025 and recently obtained by Canadian media, reportedly describes the Bishnoi gang as an “emerging threat” with a growing operational presence in Canada.
According to reporting on the CBSA assessment, investigators have increasingly identified Indian nationals on study and work permits as participants in organised criminal activity associated with the network.
The broader figures cited in the report are striking. Between 2019 and 2023, about 4,000 Indian citizens who entered Canada on study permits were charged with 17,929 offences, including 4,920 charges classified as serious or organised-crime-related. In 2024, 2,418 Indian students were charged just over one percent of approximately 188,000 Indian students in Canada.
Those figures require careful interpretation. They do not establish that the students charged were members of, or recruited by, the Bishnoi network. Nor do they justify treating Canada’s much larger Indian student population as a security concern.
They do, however, highlight broader vulnerability Canadian authorities are examining: whether criminal networks have exploited temporary-migration channels to recruit participants or facilitate criminal activity.
Canada formally listed the Bishnoi gang as a terrorist entity in September 2025, strengthening authorities’ ability to target its financing, property and activities.
The Bishnoi issue should not be conflated with the earlier allegations of Indian state involvement in violence in Canada. But it adds another security challenge to a relationship already burdened by unresolved disputes over organised crime, foreign interference and transnational repression.
Two tracks, different speeds
The latest disclosures do not mean the rapprochement is collapsing. They reveal something more consequential: the difficulty of rebuilding economic and security relations at the same pace.
Both countries have powerful reasons to move forward. Canada wants diversified export markets, investment and more resilient supply chains. India sees Canada as a potentially important supplier of energy and critical minerals, as well as a source of investment and technology.
The economic reset is therefore becoming more than diplomatic symbolism. It is being embedded in trade negotiations, ministerial dialogues and commercial cooperation.
Security confidence will be harder to reconstruct.
The two governments have committed to greater cooperation on organised crime, extortion, trafficking, cybercrime and immigration enforcement. The test is whether these mechanisms produce measurable results.
Canadian and Indian authorities will need to demonstrate that they can exchange actionable intelligence and disrupt transnational recruitment, extortion and violent networks. Ottawa will simultaneously face pressure to show that deeper economic engagement does not weaken its response to foreign interference or intimidation on Canadian soil.
New Delhi, meanwhile, will expect Canada to demonstrate greater responsiveness to Indian concerns about violent extremism and threats directed at Indian interests.
Sitharaman’s visit therefore represents more than diplomatic normalisation. It reflects a calculation in both capitals that their economic and strategic interests are too substantial to allow the disputes of recent years to define the entire relationship.
Canada and India have rebuilt high-level diplomatic engagement remarkably quickly. Institutionalising economic cooperation may prove easier than rebuilding trust between their security establishments.
The durability of the Canada–India reset will ultimately be measured not by trade targets or ministerial visits, but by whether Ottawa and New Delhi can prevent unresolved security disputes from destabilising the relationship again.
