Saudi Arabia is facing an intensifying campaign of Houthi attacks on its airports, energy infrastructure and maritime interests, forcing Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to seek assistance from international allies as Riyadh struggles to establish an effective response. The escalating confrontation has inflicted casualties, disrupted economic activity and damaged the Kingdom’s international standing, while exposing the limits of both military retaliation and attempts to contain the Iran-backed movement through concessions.
The latest exchange of attacks illustrates how the conflict has widened beyond Yemen’s borders into infrastructure central to Saudi Arabia’s economy and international reputation. Earlier this week, Saudi forces struck the Yemen Petroleum Company’s Sabaha fuel depot, prompting the Houthis to retaliate against Saudi Aramco headquarters in Dhahran. The timing coincided with Saudi Arabia hosting a World Petroleum Congress event, from which the heads of several major energy companies, including ExxonMobil, Chevron, BP, Shell and TotalEnergies, reportedly withdrew, according to the Financial Times.
The attacks on aviation infrastructure have created additional disruption. King Khalid Airport in Riyadh was struck in an attack that killed more than a dozen people and injured hundreds, prompting Saudi authorities to announce that the airport would remain closed until at least 17 October. The Houthis have used attacks on airports as a means of retaliation for the Saudi blockade and an attack by the Saudi-backed Yemeni government on Sanaa airport in mid-July. The strikes have also embarrassed the Saudi leadership by demonstrating that strategically important facilities remain vulnerable despite the Kingdom’s military capabilities.
Airports are relatively accessible targets, and attacks against them can generate disruption far beyond the immediate physical damage. The Houthis are demonstrating a capacity for precision while forcing Saudi authorities to manage operational chaos and public anxiety. The same campaign could signal potential threats to other critical infrastructure, including power stations, desalination plants and data centres. By increasing the perceived risks of visiting or investing in the Kingdom, the movement is also seeking to impose economic costs on Riyadh beyond the damage caused directly by individual strikes.
The campaign extends well beyond airports. In recent months, the Houthis have targeted the East-West oil pipeline and seized territory along Yemen’s Red Sea coast, including the port of Mokha and Dhubabi, as well as strategically positioned islands such as Perim. They have also attacked Saudi ships attempting to transit the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, adding pressure to already strained energy supply routes. Improvements in anti-ship missiles and drone boats have strengthened their ability to threaten maritime traffic, making the movement a more formidable adversary at sea.
For Mohammed bin Salman, the strategic choices are increasingly difficult. Escalation could impose additional costs on the Houthis and improve Saudi Arabia’s leverage before negotiations, but it offers no clear route to ending the attacks and risks intensifying the conflict. Accepting the current situation could instead be interpreted as weakness and encourage further aggression from Iran and its regional allies. Previous attempts to contain the Houthis through concessions have failed, while military force has also proved insufficient to neutralise the threat.
The Wall Street Journal has reported that the crown prince has been moving between palaces equipped with bunkers and travelling with an elite security team. Such precautions reflect the seriousness of the threat, although they also complicate the task of projecting confidence in Saudi Arabia’s security. Riyadh is seeking assistance from the United States, the United Kingdom and France, as well as Pakistan and Türkiye, as it considers its next steps.
Whether US President Donald Trump will provide direct military support remains uncertain. Trump has described the Houthis as “behaving very badly”, but has not indicated whether Washington will support Saudi Arabia with air power. The administration faces constraints on interceptors and other essential munitions, alongside reluctance to broaden the war further. The Houthis have threatened the United States and warned Trump against becoming involved.
Domestic political considerations in Washington may also limit the scope for intervention. US mid-term elections are approaching, while substantial opposition to the war in Iran persists among the American public. Trump may also have reservations about Mohammed bin Salman’s leadership of the military effort and the willingness of Saudi armed forces to pursue the fight against the Houthis. These uncertainties leave Riyadh unable to rely on an immediate American commitment to its defence.
The weakness of Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces further complicates the situation. They remain divided and suffer from low morale, while the Houthis have pursued incremental territorial and military gains that have exposed the absence of a coherent Saudi strategy. Yemen expert Nadwa al-Dawsari wrote in Lawfare that the movement “have built an extensive system of ideological and military mobilization” in areas under its control. Its ability to withstand bombing campaigns by the United States, Britain and Israel has reinforced its sense of invincibility. The Houthis are designated a foreign terrorist organisation, although the Trump administration has openly engaged in discussions with the group as the conflict continues.
The prospects for a settlement are closely linked to the wider confrontation between the United States and Iran. A negotiated outcome may require Tehran to pressure the Houthis to reduce their attacks, but the regional conflict remains unpredictable, with possible Israeli strikes ahead of Israel’s election later this month adding another potential source of escalation. Russia has provided targeting intelligence for Houthi missile and drone strikes, while dual-use electronic and industrial components used in Houthi weapons continue to flow from China.
Iran retains considerable influence through training and expertise, particularly for more sophisticated cruise and ballistic missiles, but the Houthis have also developed domestic weapons and munitions production, reducing their dependence on foreign supplies. Tehran has offered to mediate between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, an initiative that some interpreted as a slight against Riyadh. The artificial intelligence company Anthropic has also acknowledged that the Houthis have used AI to improve the sophistication of their missile inventory. These capabilities, combined with the movement’s demonstrated resilience and Iran’s willingness to sustain a prolonged confrontation, continue to complicate efforts to secure a negotiated end to the attacks.
