Malian government forces, supported by Russia’s Africa Corps, retook the northern desert town of Kidal on October 6, more than five months after anti-junta forces drove them out. The operation, conducted without a fight, represents a political gain for Bamako but offers limited strategic value as al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) continues a campaign of attrition against military governments across the Sahel.
The development, detailed in an analysis by The Soufan Center, follows the withdrawal of a coalition of Tuareg separatists and jihadists from Kidal. The separatist Front for the Liberation of Azawad (FLA), which had allied with JNIM, abandoned the town on the night of October 5, according to sources from the group. The decision followed sustained pressure from Malian and Russian forces and the destruction of much of the town’s infrastructure.
For the Malian junta, Kidal remains politically important despite its remote location and limited military significance. The government has made the recovery of territory central to its narrative of national unity and stabilisation, particularly after rejecting the 2015 Algerian agreements signed by Mali’s previous government with local rebel factions. The FLA emerged from the same separatist movement that had challenged state authority in the north.
The military operation was supported by Russia’s Africa Corps, which had previously withdrawn from Kidal and Tessalit following an agreement with JNIM and the FLA. Russian personnel retained military facilities in Aguelhok and Anefis, west of Kidal, which were reinforced by Malian forces throughout the summer. Both rebel and jihadist sources confirmed attempts to storm the facilities had failed. Although Anefis largely fell to JNIM in July, its military barracks remained beyond the group’s reach.
The continued government presence at Aguelhok and Anefis therefore represents the more substantial military achievement. The recapture of Kidal itself followed the withdrawal of its defenders rather than a direct confrontation.
FLA sources said the group had concluded that defending the town was militarily impossible while facing Russian and Malian airpower, including Turkish- and Russian-made drones. One source described the extent of the destruction: “90 percent of the infrastructure in town was destroyed: government buildings, schools, and even water towers. Water had to be brought from outside the town. None of our leaders spent a single night in Kidal since April, and lately we had no more than forty vehicles in town.”
The withdrawal denied Bamako and Africa Corps the decisive military victory they had sought. For JNIM, the loss of Kidal was a relatively minor strategic setback, although it represented a significant political and morale loss for the FLA.
A senior JNIM source told The Soufan Center that the organisation was not seeking territorial control. “JNIM is not seeking territorial control; we are conducting an attrition war against the Malian junta, and we will not be deterred from our objective by a battle that we did not choose.”
The group has sought to stretch government forces through simultaneous operations across northern, central and western Mali, alongside economic pressure and information operations intended to weaken the junta’s legitimacy. Its continued activity in Burkina Faso and Niger follows the same pattern. Small-scale attacks in Burkina Faso have persisted across a substantial part of the country, while operations in central Mali intensified as the rainy season approached its end.
The September 10 attack on the Dioura military barracks in central Mali was the most significant reported engagement in the current sequence. At least 150 soldiers were killed, while JNIM claimed that 95 soldiers were kidnapped. The group also seized substantial quantities of military equipment, including 19 122mm rockets, assault rifles, heavy machine guns, rocket launchers, mortars, vehicles and ammunition.
The captured matériel could be reused in subsequent operations, increasing JNIM’s short-term military capabilities. Fighters reportedly established themselves a few miles from military facilities before and after the attack, reducing logistical difficulties. Reports also indicated that several Africa Corps personnel were killed during the attack or its aftermath.
JNIM subsequently attacked positions in Konna and Sévaré on September 18. Sévaré’s military and aviation infrastructure makes it particularly important to government operations in central Mali. Repeated attacks could restrict reconnaissance, reinforcement and resupply by Malian forces and Africa Corps. JNIM said the nighttime assault, guided by drone imagery and supported by mortar fire, damaged four Bayraktar TB2 drones and helicopters.
The threat extends into Niger, where JNIM reportedly prepared an operation against Niamey’s airport and presidential palace. Local sources said five militants were arrested in the capital while preparing an attack on the presidential palace, allowing security forces to understand a planned airport operation involving taxi vehicles.
The episode also exposed the limits of Niger’s regional diplomatic arrangements. General Abdourahamane Tiani’s February 2026 visit to Algiers and the signing of economic agreements had been expected by some to protect Niamey from JNIM. Four months later, the group was preparing to strike the presidential palace. Algeria subsequently sent four Sukhoï-30 aircraft to Niamey one day after the attempted coup against Tiani on August 28, although no permanent deployment had followed.
Meanwhile, competition between JNIM and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) has intensified since early September. Fighting near N’daki on September 2 left scores dead on both sides. ISSP claimed 200 al-Qaeda fighters had been killed, a figure JNIM disputed, saying no commanders had died. The groups also disagreed over whether the confrontation involved an ambushed convoy or an attack on ISSP positions.
A major battle near Tessit on October 8 followed smaller clashes. ISSP claimed at least 400 JNIM fighters had been killed, although the outcome remained undetermined. Both organisations were committing substantial personnel and matériel to the conflict.
The juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso appear to be pursuing an undeclared informal truce, known as “Mutaraka”, with ISSP while concentrating on JNIM. That approach reflects the immediate threat posed by JNIM’s attacks on government forces and its political challenge to military rule. But ISSP’s expansion depends largely on territory contested by JNIM, making the rivalry increasingly central to regional security.
The Soufan Center’s analysis warns that treating ISSP as a secondary threat carries substantial risks. The competition between the two jihadist organisations is intensifying, while the juntas’ priorities remain focused on JNIM. ISSP activity against government forces continues in Niger, remains very limited in Mali and is largely absent in Burkina Faso. The balance between these groups, rather than the recapture of Kidal, is increasingly shaping the conflict across the Sahel.
