As Russia has intensified its attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in recent months, the deployment of fiber-optic drones has proven devastatingly effective. The drones use hair-thin cables to maintain direct connections with operators, making them highly resistant to electronic jamming and essential to both sides on the front line. The Kremlin’s use of these drones faced a major setback in 2025, when a long-range Ukrainian drone struck the country’s only fiber optic plant, forcing it to shut down. But Chinese manufacturers quickly filled the gap, helping sustain Russia’s operations.
Fiber optic cables are one of many types of dual-use specialized Chinese equipment found in Russian drones. Beyond supplying finished commercial drones that can later be weaponized, Chinese manufacturers also provide many components in Russian-built drones, including microchips, engines, lithium-ion batteries, 5G tech, mesh modems used for communication, and other essential parts.
With global military spending continuing to rise, the US has further consolidated its dominance of the major arms market, as Ukraine and European allies increase purchases and Russia, its traditional rival, diverts more of its own weapons to the war. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the US accounted for 42 percent of global major-arms exports in 2021–2025, up from 36 percent in 2016–2020.
Together, the US and Western Europe accounted for 74 percent of global major arms exports between 2021 and 2025. Beyond finished products, Western influence extends to the technology used to manufacture high-performance military electronics. Advanced lithography equipment manufactured by the Netherlands-based ASML, the world’s sole manufacturer of extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines, enables chipmakers to mass-produce the most sophisticated semiconductors, which power cutting-edge military computing and artificial intelligence systems. American allies such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan also occupy important positions in international electronics and manufacturing supply chains.
This concentration of arms production and critical technology among US and Western companies gives them “significant economic and political power, which enables them to drive the strategic interests of states in exporting arms to conflict zones,” explains arms control expert Hiruni Alwishewa. This provides them with considerable influence over access to advanced weapons and the ability to sustain military operations.
China, while accounting for just 5.6 percent of global arms exports in 2021–2025, is nonetheless reshaping modern industrial warfare in ways that traditional measures of the arms trade struggle to fully capture. The ease with which commercial products can be repurposed for military use is transforming the arms business, even if much of this is a byproduct of Beijing’s drive to become a global manufacturing leader.
China’s growing role in these supply chains challenges the dominant Western position in the global arms trade. By supplying the components and equipment other countries and armed groups need to wage war, Beijing is gaining greater influence over their military capabilities and campaigns. This, however, complicates China’s stated neutrality in foreign conflicts.
From Arms Buyer to Industrial Lifeline
The war in Ukraine has transformed the Russia-China weapons relationship. During the 1950s and again in the 1990s and early 2000s, China’s armed forces relied heavily on Russian imports for combat aircraft, tanks, submarines, and advanced technology, states the Center for Strategic and International Studies. China’s growing domestic capabilities have since turned it into an international arms exporter and a competitor to Russia, even in markets Moscow once dominated.
Interestingly, China remains an important customer for Russia’s official arms industry, according to SIPRI. But the flow of goods from China to Russia in support of the war is harder to quantify since much of it consists of civilian goods moving through opaque trading networks and intermediaries. While a substantial number of Western products are rerouted through China, Chinese-made equipment and components play an increasingly large role in sustaining Russia’s war effort and, to a lesser extent, Ukraine’s.
China’s dominant and still-growing share of global vehicle production has created a vast industrial base for Russia to draw on for military use. Russian forces have purchased hundreds of light armored personnel carriers from Shaanxi Baoji Special Vehicle Manufacturing Co., Ltd., as well as all-terrain vehicles produced by Shandong Odes Industry Co., Ltd. Meanwhile, Chinese antennas are used in electronic-warfare systems to disrupt communications and navigation.
Chinese companies also supply the industrial machinery and other inputs that Russian factories need to manufacture weapons and ammunition. These include milling machines for cutting and shaping metal, lathes for turning metal into precise components, and computer numerical control (CNC) technology to automate manufacturing.
The full scale of Russian dependence on China is difficult to establish, but multiple analyses point to Beijing’s significant role as a supplier. The Jamestown Foundation estimated that in 2023, up to 90 percent of Russia’s “metalworking machine tools” came from China. Analysis by the Kyiv School of Economics has found that China accounted for roughly three-quarters of Russia’s reported imports of Common High-Priority goods, including integrated circuits, microelectronics, communication hardware, and optical devices.
By 2024, “Chinese exports to Russia reached $27 billion in machinery, $16 billion in electronics and $5 billion in telecom equipment—all well above pre-sanction levels,” according to Bob Savic, head of international trade and sanctions consulting at the Global Policy Institute. Given how extensively the Russian economy has been reoriented toward its war effort, much of these imports likely supports military production.
China’s Global Reach and Unintended Consequences
China’s centrality in the global arms market has created issues for US security interests elsewhere. North Korea, for example, has expanded arms cooperation with Russia while maintaining extensive trade with China, offering Pyongyang the means to sustain and upgrade its own weapons production.
This dynamic can also be seen in Iran. After US and Israeli attacks on Iranian missile infrastructure throughout 2026, “Russia has coordinated rebuilds using Chinese CNC machining centers and inertial guidance gyroscopes,” according to Savic, while Russia also serves as a conduit for Chinese microchips used in drones and other military equipment.
Since 2015, the Houthis have meanwhile faced Saudi Arabia and UAE military forces—both major recipients of American arms—as well as US and Israeli strikes. A new Saudi-led coalition involving Turkey and Pakistan to combat the Houthis was announced in October after a major Houthi offensive. Egypt later decided to extend military support to Saudi Arabia.
Access to Chinese components has helped the Houthis develop more capable weapons and sustain their attacks. The Middle East Research Observatory states that “[b]etween 2021 and 2025, roughly 35 percent of military items captured en route to the Houthis originated in China, up from 5 percent between 2015 and 2018.”
In 2024, the US Treasury Department singled out Chinese companies Shenzhen Jinghon Electronics, Ltd.; Shenzhen Boyu Imports and Exports Co., Ltd.; and Shenzhen Rion Technology Co., Ltd. for supplying dual-use and military-grade components to Houthi networks involved in drone and missile development. In October 2026, the Wall Street Journalreported that Conflict Armament Research had identified Chinese-sourced motor parts, airframe sections, and solid-propellant materials in an advanced Houthi ballistic missile.
These transfers do not establish that Beijing intended to support Houthi attacks. The armed groups’ missile and drone strikes on Saudi Arabia, a major Chinese trading partner, run counter to Beijing’s economic interests and show how difficult it is to control the end use of goods moving through global markets. Meanwhile, “Saudi Arabia is signaling its displeasure, but it is unlikely to risk a confrontation with China, its largest trading partner and a major buyer of its oil, even as those weapons threaten its security,” stated Al-Monitor.
Chinese-made equipment has also appeared in other conflicts where Beijing has little obvious interest in escalation. In Sudan, Chinese drone jammers, surface-to-air missiles, and other equipment have been observed, including in the hands of the Rapid Support Forces, with reported supply links to the United Arab Emirates. Chinese-made drones have also reportedly appeared in Libya despite a UN arms embargo.
China’s Efforts to Refine and Cement its Leverage
China’s growing ability to influence conflicts and compete asymmetrically with US-led military power will likely lead it to refine its approach. The ongoing evolution of China’s export controls, including another round in 2026, points to efforts to exert greater control over how its exports are used, translating into more direct geopolitical leverage rather than simply accepting that its exports may be used in ways that do not serve its interests.
Countries and armed groups that rely on Chinese equipment and components will therefore become more vulnerable to changes in Chinese export policy. This will, however, help Beijing gain greater insight into the military capabilities and supply needs of its direct and indirect customers.
Despite Washington’s continual dominance of official major arms exports, China’s industrial reach extends into the US defense sector. A report by defense analytics firm Govini found that Chinese-made components feature in more than 1,900 military platforms, and warned that the US is “fundamentally dependent on China for essential components of its weapon systems.” Additionally, China’s grip on critical mineral production and processing has left 78 percent of the US arsenal potentially exposed to Chinese mineral supply dependencies.
As China’s leverage grows, the Western alliance that has dominated global weapons production for decades faces mounting internal divisions. Disputes over continued support for Ukraine, lingering unease over Trump’s pressure on Denmark over Greenland, and trade tensions between Washington and its European allies have strained the trust underpinning their longstanding security partnership. The war in Ukraine has exposed how China, while not displacing the US as the leading exporter of traditional major arms, is increasingly capable of challenging Western control over the industrial foundations of modern warfare.
This article was produced by Economy for All, a project of the Independent Media Institute.
