Donald Trump stated that the United States would “obliterate” Iran’s power plants if the Strait of Hormuz is not opened before the 48-hour deadline.
Iran responded: “If Iran’s fuel and energy infrastructure is attacked by the enemy, all energy, information technology, and desalination infrastructure belonging to the United States and the (Israeli) regime in the region will be targeted,” a spokesperson for the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, the body overseeing Iranian military operations, said in a statement reported by Fars News Agency.
The catastrophe for the entire world is evident if the above threats are carried out by the U.S. and Iran. Food insecurity will spread globally, with the most vulnerable being poorer countries such as Sri Lanka.
Among the many challenges facing Sri Lanka from the conflict in the Middle East, even prior to the above threats, is the country’s food security and the impact on export income from plantation industry crops such as tea, rubber, and coconut. Within the context of the conflict, besides logistics issues arising from challenges to transportation into and out of the country—which are central to the production of all agricultural products—the impact arising from a shortage of chemical fertilizer and its rising cost is critical. While longer-term strategic options must be considered regarding fertilizer, the current dependency on chemical fertilizer as an “essential food” for agricultural crops (both food and plantation industry crops) is inescapable. Unless this input is provided, there will be mass shortages of food for the population. The impact on the plantation industry will result in drops in production and export income for the country.
Based on data from the USDA Foreign Agricultural Service on previous disruptions, such as the 2021 import ban, and current 2026 economic projections, it has been reported that a serious supply chain disruption of inorganic fertilizer would likely cost Sri Lanka between $700 million and $1 billion per year in direct agricultural losses. This estimate is primarily driven by the high cost of food imports and the impact on the tea sector and other plantation crops.
While the government is very likely looking into these issues and discussing how best to mitigate the impact of probable production and transportation challenges, the writer suggests that, in view of the criticality of these twin issues—which will impact both food availability for the people and the government’s foreign exchange income—the government should elevate the coordination and management of this challenge to a high-level Agricultural Command Centre (ACC) reporting directly to the President.
Establishing such a centre, vested with the necessary executive power, is a practical and effective way to move beyond policy wish lists into execution. To be effective in the Sri Lankan context, this body must sit above the individual ministries, and the relevant ministries should work closely with this unit, which would function like a war room dealing with food security and the impact of the Middle East crisis on sectors dependent on imported chemical fertilizer.
A very important area that the ACC should be tasked with is to ensure that government subsidies—already roughly $300 million to $400 million annually—are provided to keep prices stable for farmers, as a huge rise in production costs could further exacerbate the crisis if farmers cease producing food crops. The government will have to increase its subsidy allocations and manage this exercise in consultation with the Finance Ministry.
In the agricultural sector, a food crisis and a drop in production of export-based plantations is a crisis that could hurt the country both immediately and in the long term. Tackling this crisis is not about appointing committees and holding talkfests. It requires immediate action. Traditional ministerial approaches led by laid-back bureaucrats are not suitable for addressing a crisis of this nature. It needs an approach akin to a war room: a dedicated, centralized entity used for high-level planning, collaboration, and rapid decision-making. Originating in military strategy, the concept is now commonly used in business for crisis management, project launches, or complex operational problem-solving. A war room as proposed will make quick decisions, ensure decisions are acted upon, and monitor and report on progress. An entity armed with sufficient executive powers to give directions to ministries will provide avenues to fast-track crucial decisions.
Data shows that the ongoing Middle East conflict has introduced new supply costs as of March 2026. Urea prices jumped roughly 50 percent (from $482 to $720 per ton) in just three weeks. The amount spent in 2025 is reported as around $200 million. Given the price hike and the likelihood of further increases, the cost to import the same quantity will be at least double, i.e., $400 million. Sri Lanka imports the bulk of its requirements from China, which has a coal-based manufacturing methodology that is not directly impacted by the Middle East crisis. However, as reported by Reuters, the crisis has triggered a significant shift in China’s urea strategy, primarily causing a halt in exports rather than a drop in domestic production. China has moved to restrict shipments to protect its own food security and domestic prices as global fertilizer markets destabilize.
Although China’s urea is mostly coal-based, the Middle East crisis impacts production costs and raw material availability indirectly. Rising global oil and natural gas prices, driven by the conflict and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, have increased operational and production costs for all fertilizers. China is heavily dependent on the Middle East for sulphur, importing roughly half its 9.6 million-ton requirement from the region in 2025. While primarily used for phosphates, the extreme price volatility and supply risk for sulphur have forced China to “conserve” energy and resources across its entire chemical sector. China also gets roughly 25 to 30 percent of its LNG from the Middle East. Disruptions in these flows strain gas-based urea plants, particularly in southwest China. Shipping and freight surcharges due to disrupted routes have increased transport costs by approximately 35 percent, directly raising the retail price for Sri Lankan farmers.
The impact on food production, tea, and plantation sectors is severe. Previous shortages of inorganic fertilizer led to a 40 to 53 percent drop in rice production, forcing Sri Lanka to spend hundreds of millions on imports to ensure food security. Production of vegetables and cash crops such as bananas and maize crashed by 50 to 70 percent during previous input shortages. Past data from the Central Bank of Sri Lanka shows that a sudden withdrawal of chemical fertilizers caused tea production to plummet by 18 to 28.7 percent. Since smallholders produce about 75 percent of the national tea crop, they are most at risk from price spikes or supply disruptions. Tea brings in over $1 billion annually, roughly 11 percent of exports; significant shortages could lead to permanent loss of market share to competitors like Kenya and India. Experts warn that the coconut and rubber sectors, which earned $1.5 billion in 2020, would see similar yield plummeting without chemical inputs.
The proposed Agricultural Command Centre should be tasked with developing a Risk Mitigation Plan within a week of its formation and submitting the plan to the cabinet for approval. Among other key requirements, the plan should include the status of existing fertilizer stocks and any stocks shipped but not yet received; the duration of these stocks based on current distribution rates; future sources of supply and risks associated with such supplies; estimates on fertilizer costs and funding availability; expenditure on current subsidies and estimates on future subsidies; assessment of local transportation challenges and alternate plans for distribution of fertilizer and produce should the fuel situation worsen; and alternate plans to address food security if the international energy situation deteriorates.
The ACC should also explore sourcing additional inorganic fertilizer from countries like China and Russia, which supplied around $52 million worth in 2024, as well as other sources, considering that Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, which supplied around $68 million in the same year, may be unable to supply in the near future.
While a war room should focus on the immediate crisis and mitigation, considering the importance of food security and plantation management in the longer term—and the need to address fertilizer, which impacts the entire sector—it is also suggested that a ministerial committee headed by the Prime Minister, and comprising the Ministers for Agriculture, Plantation Industries, and Irrigation and Water Management, be instituted to update strategic plans ensuring interdependencies between each ministry’s activities are recognized.
The policy decision to ban the importation of chemical fertilizer in 2021 may have been sound in principle but was poorly implemented. It failed to recognize the need to wean affected plantations gradually from inorganic fertilizer, which is a long-drawn process. Some initial progress was made in organic fertilizer production, but by 2025–2026, the sector had contracted, with many startups failing, leaving only a handful of survivors as farmers reverted to chemical fertilizers due to severe yield losses and food insecurity.
The Middle East crisis has highlighted the strategic importance of a fertilizer industry in Sri Lanka to ensure food security and support the plantation industry. The high-level ministerial committee mentioned earlier should assess the current status of the industry and develop a long-term strategic plan to make the country self-sufficient in fertilizer. A long-term strategy should also address the transition to organic fertilizer via a hybrid model, which experts estimate will take 10 to 15 years.
Long-term planning is often absent in Sri Lanka due to constant shifts in government priorities toward short-term policies that fit five-year election cycles, rather than long-term structural planning. Agricultural roadmaps are often viewed by officials as “luxury planning” that can wait until the fiscal deficit is stabilized.
Furthermore, fragmentation of agricultural policy in Sri Lanka—split across multiple, often competing entities—has contributed to the absence of long-term planning. The Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for policy-making on paddy and food crops, and the National Fertilizer Secretariat oversees fertilizer. The Ministry of Irrigation manages water, while the Ministry of Plantation Industries handles tea, rubber, and coconut. Provincial councils are responsible for local implementation. Without a single overriding authority or unified delivery unit to drive the National Agriculture Policy, long-term initiatives get lost in bureaucratic silos.
The fundamental importance of food security and the effective performance of the plantation sector is unquestionable. It is also crucial that irrigation and water management be a key component of the National Agricultural Policy. This understanding is essential for immediate planning and execution via the Agricultural Command Centre, and for long-term strategic planning via the high-level ministerial committee headed by the President. If this principle is not recognized, food insecurity will persist, and export earnings from the plantation industry will dwindle instead of increasing as required by the country.
