On July 30, 2025, Security Forces (SFs) arrested two active cadres of the Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF)/People’s Liberation Army (PLA) identified as Konjengbam Jiten Singh (38) and Khongbantabam Priyobarta Meitei aka Tomba aka Abung (37), from the Ngaikhong Khunou check point under Bishnupur Police Station in the Bishnupur District of Manipur. They were involved in extortion activities.
On July 25, 2025, SFs arrested an active female cadre of RPF/PLA, Oinam Ranjita Devi aka Erai Leima (38), from Oinam Sawombung Mayai Leikai in the Thoubal District of Manipur. She was involved in extortion activities.
On July 25, 2025, SFs arrested an active RPF/PLA cadre, Ahanthem Surjit Singh (29), from the Leirongthel Pitra area under Nongpok Sekmai Police Station in the Thoubal District of Manipur. He was involved in extortion and the recruitment of new cadres in Thoubal.
On July 22, 2025, SFs arrested an active RPF/PLA cadre, Waribam Ajoy Singh aka Leishemba (25), from Langol Metei Leikai, Zone-III, under the Lamphel Police Station in Imphal West District, Manipur.
On July 22, 2025, SFs arrested an active PLA cadre, Kangjam Motea Meitei aka Tamthouba (33) from Border Pillar 73 (10) and Border Pillar 73 (11) under Moreh Police Station in the Tengnoupal District of Manipur.
According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), 71 PLA cadres have been arrested in 55 separate incidents in 2025 alone, while 21 PLA cadres were arrested in 10 separate incidents in 2024, and in 2023, 22 PLA cadres were arrested in 15 separate incidents. A total of 1,152 PLA cadres have been arrested in 823 separate incidents since 2000, when SATP started compiling data on India’s Northeast. (Data till August 3, 2025.)
In 2025, PLA-led violence has led to a total of 24 fatalities in one continuing incident between January 27 and 30, during a gunfight between Manipur based insurgent outfits including PLA/ Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL)/ United National Liberation Front – Koireng (UNLF-K) and the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), with the Myanmar-based Kuki National Army-Burma (KNA-B) in an area of Yaingoupk/Wangli village Border Pillar number 87 in the Kamjong District of Manipur, near the Indo-Myanmar border. 19 KNA-B militants, two unidentified cadres of PLA/KYKL, a PLA cadre identified as self-styled ‘captain’ Henthoiba aka Salam Nganba Meitei (28), one UNLF/ Manipur People’s Army (MPA) militant identified as ‘captain’ Chirom Chiromcha aka Robindro, and one KYKL/ Meeyamgi Yawol Lanmee (MYL) cadre identified as Pvt. Moirangthem Sushil aka Athouba (21), were killed during the gunfight. Four PLA/KYKL militants also sustained injuries. A total of 266 fatalities [186 terrorists, 47 SF personnel, 28 civilians and five in the Not Specified (NS) category] have been recorded in 134 PLA-led violent incidents since 2000.
Some other recent PLA-led incidents of violence include:
May 16, 2024: One KNA-B cadre was killed in a gunfight with PLA cadres at Taret Turel in the Min Thar area of Sagaing region in Myanmar, near the Moirengthel/Maringthel area along the Myanmar border.
December 4, 2023: At least 13 suspected PLA cadres were killed in an ambush laid by suspected Kuki militants near Leithao village near Saibol in the Tengnoupal District of Manipur.
Significantly, on May 14, 2024, a National Investigation Agency (NIA) chargesheet revealed that the “China-Myanmar module” of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) supported the cadres of two banned Meitei outfits, KYKL and PLA, to infiltrate India in order to exploit the current ethnic unrest in Manipur, with the larger conspiracy to destabilising the State. NIA alleged that PLA organized a weapons training camp in July 2023 at the Selloi Langmai Ecological Park near Keikhu, where 80 to 90 youths, mobilised by accused Anand Singh, were trained in handling firearms. This training was intended to intensify ethnic violence against the Kuki-Zo community and wage war against the Indian government.
Not surprisingly, on November 13, 2023, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) declared nine Meitei extremist organisations of Manipur, including PLA, as “unlawful associations” under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) for a period of five years. The nine Meitei groups from Manipur to be banned were “the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) and its political wing, the Revolutionary Peoples’ Front (RPF), the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and its armed wing, the Manipur Peoples’ Army (MPA), the Peoples’ Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) and its armed wing, the ‘Red Army’, the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) and its armed wing, also called the ‘Red Army’, the Kanglei Yaol Kanba Lup (KYKL), the Coordination Committee (CorCom) and the Alliance for Socialist Unity Kangleipak (ASUK) along with all their factions, wings and front organisations.” According to the notification, these nine Meitei groups have been banned for allegedly “engaging in activities prejudicial to the sovereignty and integrity of India”, and to curb their “secessionist, subversive, terrorist and violent activities.”
The PLA emerged on 25 September 1978, founded by N. Bisheswar Singh, following a split from the UNLF. Initially a Meitei-dominated group, the PLA nonetheless claimed a trans?tribal identity and sought to unite all communities in Manipur – Meitei, Naga, Kuki and others – for the secession of Manipur from India. Its ideological foundation was framed within Mao?Zedong thought and socialist principles, positioning itself as a revolutionary force for socialist independence
In 1989, PLA established its political wing, RPF, which heads a government?in?exile based in Bangladesh’s Sylhet region. The armed wing reorganized itself into four operational divisions covering different geographic sectors of Manipur, modelling a military organization with ranks, commanders and discipline.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the PLA waged guerrilla warfare against Indian SFs, including the Indian Army, paramilitary units and the State Police. In 1989, PLA militants assassinated an IPS officer, Vandana Mallick, near Imphal, marking one of their early high-profile attacks. The PLA also pursued ideological enforcement campaigns – enforcing prohibition, punishing drug peddlers and alleged perpetrators of rape – to cultivate a Robin?Hood image among sections of the populace.
The PLA established training camps both in Myanmar and Bangladesh, with recruits receiving guerrilla training in collaboration with Naga groups like the NSCN, and reportedly the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. The group financed operations through extortion of government officials and traders: taxing petrol, kerosene, rice and diverting public distribution system (PDS) supplies, often forcing officials and contractors to comply at gunpoint. With its strength estimated at around 2,000 cadres, the PLA/RPF is one of the largest active insurgent groups in the Northeastern region, bordering China, Bhutan and Bangladesh.
The group remains active and influential among Valley?based insurgent outfits (VBIGs) and is part of umbrella coalitions including CorCom, and with alliances with other Maoist?leaning groups like PREPAK, KCP, KYKL and UNLF – many of which share an ideological common ground and engage in joint operations in the Northeast. The outfit maintains alliances with UNLF, PREPAK as well as the NSCN-Khaplang (NSCN-K), United Liberation Front of Asom-Independent (ULFA(I)), and the Kachin Independent Army (KIA) of Burma – groups operating in western southeast Asia (WESEA), the region including Northeast India, Bhutan, North Bengal and Myanmar.
In February 2023, RPF’S long-serving ‘president’ Irengbam Chaoren died of illness and was succeeded by Manoharmayum Ngouba as ‘chairman’. In February 2022, Chaoren declared that his outfit had no desire to enter into peace talks with India. His sense of betrayal by the government and anger against the Centre’s imposition of AFSPA in Manipur purportedly made him hostile towards the idea of peace-talks. Chaoren had then stated,
We have seen the failed process of peace-talks and agreements fallen apart. We have seen the 9 Point Agreement of 1947, 16 Point Agreement of 1960 and the 1975 Shillong Accord between India and Naga revolutionary and more than six years old Framework Agreement, are meant to trade Naga’s freedom with some material benefits. Under such a situation, it is not possible to achieve freedom through peace talks particularly in the WESEA region which India treats as their enemy by enforcing AFSPA and other draconian laws.
Moreover, counter?insurgency operations and Myanmar’s civil war dynamics have affected PLA’s resurgence. After Myanmar’s February 2021 coup, the PLA reportedly cooperated in border areas, with some cadres assisting the Myanmar junta forces for pay, and to gain combat experience and confidence, to resume operations back on Indian soil – including a deadly ambush in November 2021 in Manipur that killed seven people, including a Colonel’s family.
Interestingly, on July 28, 2025, ULFA-I and PLA accused the Indian Army of launching a drone strike on their camps in Myanmar’s Sagaing region on July 13, 2025, using Polish-made WARMATE loitering munitions armed with thermobaric warheads. In a joint statement, they alleged that high-end combat UAVs, including SkyStriker drones, were used, with wreckage from five WARMATE drones recovered bearing 2022 serial numbers – allegedly from the same batch India procured. The groups claimed the attack killed three cadres, and injured 19. They identified the launch points as Wangti and areas near Nampong and Joyrampur. The Army officially denied involvement.
The Manipur’s PLA, guided by the RPF, remains a formidable insurgent outfit in Northeast India. Despite sustained counter-insurgency efforts, the group has shown remarkable adaptability, with ideological persistence, local recruitment, and trans-state and transnational alliances – with outfits such as NSCN, ULFA-I, the Myanmar junta and reportedly Pakistan’s ISI. The PLA has leveraged the current ethnic unrest in Manipur and instability in post-coup Myanmar to regroup, recruit, and train cadres, intensifying threats to regional security. Frequent arrests, active extortion networks, and cross-border skirmishes highlight the group’s operational resilience.
The resurgence of PLA-led violence in 2025, including inter-group clashes and alleged drone strikes, reflects the broader volatility of the India-Myanmar borderlands. However, a solely militaristic response is insufficient. Longstanding grievances rooted in political exclusion, ethnic tensions, and socio-economic disparities continue to fuel insurgency in the region. A holistic approach is essential – one that couples strong security frameworks with inclusive governance, regional diplomacy, and justice-driven development. Without addressing the causes and regional enablers of insurgency, groups like the PLA will continue to thrive in the margins of Northeast India’s contested political landscape.
