Open-source intelligence analysts say a significant number of U.S. Tomahawk cruise missiles fired into northern Nigeria on December 25 failed to explode, raising questions about both the operation and the reliability of one of Washington’s most widely used precision weapons. Based on online imagery and forensic comparisons, investigators estimate that at least three of the 12 to 16 missiles launched did not detonate, implying a failure rate of between 18% and 25%.
According to OSINT researchers, photographs circulating on social media appear to show unexploded ordnance consistent with Raytheon-manufactured Tomahawks, specifically BGM-109C/E variants carrying WDU-36/B conventional high-explosive warheads. Analysts say the shape, components and markings of the debris match those seen in previous incidents involving unexploded Tomahawks. If confirmed, the failures would represent roughly $6 million worth of missiles that did not function as intended, given an estimated unit cost of about $2 million each.
The strike itself has been shrouded in uncertainty. Former President Donald Trump said the missiles were aimed at Islamic State targets, but many Nigerians have questioned both the targets and the circumstances of the attack. The Pentagon has not commented publicly on the reported missile failures, nor has it offered an explanation for what might have caused them. Possible factors raised by analysts include aging stockpiles, technical malfunctions, environmental damage to wiring, or interference such as GPS jamming.
While U.S. officials have remained silent, the episode has drawn comparisons to recent incidents elsewhere. In Lebanon, the United States reportedly asked for the return of an unexploded U.S.-made GBU-39 bomb dropped by Israel, highlighting the diplomatic and security complications that can arise when advanced munitions fail to detonate. No such request has been made publicly in Nigeria.
This would not be the first time the Tomahawk’s performance has fallen short of expectations. During U.S. strikes on Syria in 2017 and 2018, numerous missiles reportedly failed to reach their targets, either being intercepted or veering off course. After the 2018 attack, Russia’s military displayed missile fragments, including what it claimed was an intact warhead, as evidence of failures.
Questions about the system’s effectiveness date back even further. During the 1991 Gulf War, when the Tomahawk was still relatively new, its real-world performance reportedly lagged behind official claims. A 1997 report by the U.S. General Accounting Office found that the Pentagon’s assertion of a 98% success rate did not accurately reflect the missile’s effectiveness, and that contractors’ claims of “one-target, one-bomb” precision were misleading.
If the Nigeria reports are substantiated, they would add to a long-running debate over the reliability of an aging cruise missile system that remains central to U.S. strike doctrine, even as questions persist about transparency, accountability and the true outcomes of its use.
