In an interview conducted in mid-December in New Delhi by Sri Lanka Guardian, Lieutenant General R. K. Sawhney spoke at length about India’s military posture, strategic culture and national security outlook. His observations were firmly grounded in personal experience spanning more than six decades of service and engagement with India’s defence establishment.
A former Deputy Chief of the Army Staff and former Director General of Military Intelligence, Lieutenant General Sawhney currently serves as Centre Head and Senior Fellow for National Security and Strategic Studies, as well as Internal Security Studies, at the Vivekananda International Foundation. His reflections combined deep institutional memory with lived historical experience, offering a clear articulation of how India perceives its own power, limitations and strategic vulnerabilities.
From the outset, he rejected the notion that India’s more assertive military posture reflected expansionist ambition. “As was told to you by Ambassador Satish Chandra, our ambitions, as far as external matters are concerned, are not there at all,” he said. “You see, we have got no ambitions to occupy any territory outside. So basically what we have to do is guard our own sovereignty.”
For Lt Gen Sawhney, the centrality of sovereignty to India’s strategic mindset cannot be separated from the trauma of Partition. He framed this not as an abstract historical episode but as a deeply personal inheritance carried by his generation. “We have been divided, as he mentioned to you, with the Partition, which we continue to suffer from for quite some time,” he explained. “I, like him also, was born in Lahore. So we are generations that have been born where our ancestors, our temples, our samadhis, were all left behind. Not a single person of our kin was left. You see, we belong to that generation.”
This sense of loss, he said, created a lasting wound that shaped national resolve. “So that was something which we always carried with us, that wound. So we decided that we will not allow this country ever to be divided again.” In his words, this historical experience underpins a collective mindset in which territorial integrity is non-negotiable. “Our sovereignty becomes very important to us. It remains very important that we shall not allow any part of this country to be separated. That’s our philosophy.”
He contrasted this enduring sensitivity to sovereignty with what he described as an earlier era of excessive restraint in the face of repeated attacks. Referring to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, he recalled the psychological impact of incidents such as the 2008 Mumbai attacks. “Just to give you a small example, the 2008 attack in Mumbai, the financial capital, on the best hotel we have got, which is an iconic hotel, in which about 112 people were killed,” he said. “They went on a rampage — cafés, then the railway station, the most important railway station. They killed people there, irrespective of religion and race.”
He emphasised that India’s response at the time consisted largely of protest. “And that is where, after that traumatic experience, what did we do? We just protested.” According to him, this pattern repeated itself over years of attacks and sabotage. “Every time, what we did was we just went and protested, and we got nothing from those protests.” He described the cumulative effect as a psychological build-up among the public. “People really wanted something to be done, and the perpetrators to be punished.”
International appeals, he said, produced little beyond assurances. “Every time we went to them — we went to the UN, we went everywhere — we just got assurances and nothing else.” This, in his view, explains the shift towards a firmer posture. “So that is the psychological thing behind it, that we shall not allow this sort of thing to happen to us.”
Lt Gen Sawhney then traced his own formation as an officer back to the early 1960s, linking his personal history to pivotal moments in India’s military experience. “You see, I joined the army in December 1961. So I was 19 and a half,” he said. His first posting was in Nagaland, shortly before the 1962 war with China. He spoke with candour about that period. “When we suffered the attack from the Chinese, at that particular time too, we had a very tolerant government, which thought that discussions could guard our frontiers, that diplomatic manoeuvres could provide us security — which was absolutely a false assumption.”
He recalled witnessing what he described as the humiliation of 1962. “I saw the humiliation of 1962 as a subaltern. Because my battalion, by the time it reached, the war had finished. We were most unprepared for that war.” Responsibility, he argued, lay at the political level. “Some politicians at that time have to take responsibility for that, because we didn’t do enough to guard our frontiers.”
He emphasised that the warning signs were visible but ignored. “We saw it coming and we didn’t prepare for it.” He also criticised decisions taken during the conflict itself, particularly the reluctance to use air power. “At that particular time, when the reversals were taking place, we did not use our air force because of a false assumption that if we did that, the war would get expanded — which was again a wrong assumption.”
These experiences, he said, left a lasting imprint. “So at that particular time, when we were sitting there, I think we realised that this shall not happen again. And that’s where my upbringing started.”
He recalled the arrival of General Sam Manekshaw, whom he described as a transformative figure for a demoralised force. “So we had a very fine general at that time who had been discarded — General Sam Manekshaw — who came as a corps commander and ultimately became the Field Marshal.” He remembered “him coming to a disheartened army and really motivating us to do what we had to do ultimately.” Looking back, he concluded, “we decided at that time — at least in my young mind — that this could have been avoided, that this disgrace could have been avoided.”
Lt Gen Sawhney stressed that India’s armed forces had not always been weak or ill-prepared. “It was a very efficient army, by the way. In the First World War and the Second World War, we did very well.” He pointed out that in 1948, during operations in Kashmir, the army had been “a very well-trained, very well-motivated army.” However, he argued that this standard eroded over time. “But gradually and slowly, we forgot.”
He attributed this decline to political attitudes that de-emphasised military capability. “And a feeling came into the mind that at one time Nehru said that we may not require an army.” The consequences, he said, were severe. “So we stopped investing in the armed forces. We stopped upgrading the armed forces. And that was a failing — a big mistake.”
When asked about deterrence against China today, Lt Gen Sawhney framed the issue in terms of sustained investment rather than intent. “You see, the point is that at this particular time, we require to continue investing.” He noted that China’s military modernisation was systematic and ongoing. “Because the Chinese themselves are upgrading their forces and equipment in a very systematic fashion.” India, he said, had made progress but not enough. “We have been doing it, but we require to do much more.”
Deterrence, in his words, was essential. “Deterrence is required, which we are able to give.” He was explicit about intentions. “Our intentions are not aggressive. Theirs are.” But deterrence required credible capability. “Because we have to give them a feeling that, should they attempt any adventure, it will be very costly. That’s what we want.”
On the perennial debate between defence expenditure and development, Lt Gen Sawhney rejected the idea that the two were mutually exclusive. “They can go side by side with each other,” he said. He highlighted the dual-use nature of much defence-related industry. “Most of the defence industry, which we are realising now, is dual-use.” Investment in defence, he argued, created broader economic benefits. “Should you invest in them, you also create an ecosystem which creates other industries.”
He stressed the importance of domestic production. “As long as you don’t start importing in a big way and becoming pathetically dependent on imported arms — that’s what we are trying to stop.” Indigenous capacity, he said, “creates employment.” He cited shipbuilding as a clear example. “The Navy used to be dependent on imported ships. Today they’re manufacturing. It’s a massive industry.”
He extended this logic to emerging technologies. “In the field of the armed forces and defence preparedness, AI is coming in a big way.” Such technologies, he noted, were inherently dual-use. “Dual-use technologies are coming in.” The spillover effects reached sectors such as automobiles and aviation. “The automobile industry gets a fillip. If you go for engines, you can also go for transport aircraft and commercial aircraft.”
For him, defence investment was part of a broader industrial strategy. “It’s interlinked.” He argued that India still spent relatively little. “We are still at a comparatively low level.” In his view, defence spending should rise.
Throughout, he returned to the theme of deterrence rather than ambition. “It is not that we have any extraterritorial ambitions. It is to create deterrence.” He described China as “a competitor who is becoming a world power” and noted that “in the last 10 or 12 years, they have been trying to compete with America.” Against such a backdrop, he said, “to deter them, you require something very, very substantial.” He summarised the philosophy succinctly: “If you really want peace, you prepare for war.”
Asked about compulsory military training for youth, Lt Gen Sawhney dismissed the idea. “No, we will never do that.” He explained that India’s armed forces have always relied on volunteers. “We don’t require conscription, because we have sufficient people who will volunteer for the armed forces.” While he acknowledged changing career preferences among younger generations, he argued that national strength extended beyond uniformed service.
“The comprehensive national power is a combination of many factors,” he said. “The armed forces, the economy, our technologies.” Highly educated citizens, he argued, contributed regardless of whether they joined the military. “As long as these highly educated boys and girls contribute to technology and the economy, they are also directly contributing to comprehensive national power.”
He described this as a collective effort. “The soldiers, the technicians, the economists, the trade people — they all have to come together.” He pointed to China as an example of such integration. “It’s a whole-of-nation approach.” At the same time, he was clear about what India did not want to become. “We would never like to become what is called a military power. We are not, and we don’t want to be known as one.”
What mattered, he said, was capability. “But we should have enough potential, enough capacity, to be able to defend our interests.”
He concluded by highlighting a defining feature of India’s armed forces: their apolitical character. “We have a very fine tradition ever since our inception,” he said. “The armed forces are absolutely apolitical. They serve only the flag and the legitimate government.” This tradition, he noted, had endured since independence. “It continues today, and we are very proud of it.”
Drawing an implicit contrast with neighbouring states, he added, “there will never be people like we have in the neighbourhood — in the western neighbours — who continue to meddle in politics.” For Lt Gen Sawhney, this separation between military power and political authority remains a core pillar of India’s national identity.
