The security landscape of India’s North-East in 2026 reflected a complex mixture of consolidation, transition and renewed volatility. While several States sustained the gradual decline in insurgency-related violence achieved over the past decade, emerging challenges linked to ethnic polarisation, cross-border militant movement, transnational Islamist networks, extortion economies, narcotics trafficking and unresolved territorial grievances continued to create significant security concerns. The region, which once recorded more than 1,100 insurgency-linked fatalities annually at the peak of violence in the early 2000s, has largely moved away from large-scale armed insurgency. Nevertheless, the persistence of armed formations, particularly along the Indo-Myanmar border and in ethnically contested areas, underlined the fragility of peace.
The most significant challenge in the region remained Manipur, where the aftermath of the ethnic violence that erupted in May 2023 continued to shape the broader security environment. Although overall fatalities declined in comparison to 2024 and 2025, the State remained deeply polarised along ethnic lines, with repeated incidents involving Kuki-Zo militant groups, Meitei insurgent formations, Naga armed groups and armed village volunteers. The restoration of an elected Government under Chief Minister Yumnam Khemchand Singh in February 2026, following nearly a year of President’s Rule, marked an important political development. However, recurring incidents of violence demonstrated that the structural causes of conflict remained unresolved.
On April 24, 2026, two Kuki village volunteers, Paominlun Haolai (22) and Letlal Sitlhou (41), were killed and several civilians, including women and children, were injured in suspected militant attacks at Mullam and Shongphal villages in the Ukhrul District of Manipur. On the same day, a Naga civilian, a Naga Village Guards (NVG) member Horshokmi Jamang (29), was killed in an ambush by suspected Kuki militants at Sinakeithei village in the same District, intensifying tensions between Kuki and Naga groups in the region. The incidents appeared to trigger retaliatory mobilisation, as, on April 24, 2025, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland/Government of the People’s Republic of Nagaland (NSCN/GPRN)-Aleng group claimed that its armed wing had killed five cadres of the Kuki National Army-Burma (KNA-B) in Kamjong District. According to a statement circulated on social media by ‘major general’ Aleng, ‘supreme commander’ of the South East Command of the Naga Army under NSCN/GPRN, the operation was carried out as a “decisive response” to the earlier April 18, attack near T.M. Kasom village in Ukhrul District. The outfit alleged that over 20 KNA-B cadres had assembled near the international border with plans to target civilians, and claimed that five Kuki militants were killed, while the remaining cadres retreated.
On April 18, 2026, two Tangkhul Naga civilians, including a retired Army soldier, were killed and another two were injured when suspected Kuki militants ambushed vehicles along National Highway-202 at T.M. Kasom village in Ukhrul District. The attack widened tensions beyond the Meitei-Kuki conflict and raised concerns regarding a potential escalation between Kuki and Naga armed formations. Earlier, on April 13, at least four suspected cadres of the KNA-B had been killed in a gunfight with cadres of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) along the Indo-Myanmar border in Kamjong District. On April 7, two children were killed in a suspected rocket attack at Moirang in Bishnupur District, followed by violent protests and firing incidents involving Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel. These incidents highlighted the growing use of heavy weaponry and the persistence of armed mobilisation across the State.
According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), 22 persons, including 13 militants, eight civilians and one SF trooper, have already been killed in nine insurgency-related incidents in Manipur in 2026 (Data till May 9, 2026). While this is well below the total of 58 fatalities recorded through 2025 and 87 through 2024, the nature of recent incidents indicates increasing brutality, the targeting of civilians, and the use of heavier weaponry. Since the outbreak of ethnic violence in May 2023, Manipur has recorded a cumulative total of at least 320 insurgency-linked fatalities in 142 separate incidents, including 128 civilians, 165 terrorists, 26 SF personnel and one fatality in the not-specified (NS) category.
Manipur also continued to witness the activities of Meitie Valley-Based Insurgent Groups (VBIGs), including the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP), People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) and factions of the United National Liberation Front (UNLF). Security Forces (SFs) intensified operations across the State, resulting in large-scale arrests and recoveries of arms looted during the 2023 violence. Since the imposition of President’s Rule in February 2025, more than 3,000 weapons have been recovered. In 2026, 271 terrorists have been arrested in 197 separate incidents. This followed 1,146 arrests in 797 incidents in 2025 and 378 arrests in 162 incidents in 2024. Nevertheless, insurgent propaganda and symbolic resistance remained active. Several underground groups under the Coordination Committee (CorCom) once again called for a boycott of Republic Day in January 2026, reiterating secessionist narratives opposing Manipur’s merger with India.
Cross-border dynamics further complicated the situation in Manipur. Militant outfits operating from sanctuaries in Myanmar’s Sagaing Region continued to exploit the porous border to regroup and launch attacks. Repeated incidents involving KNA-B, UKNA, PREPAK, PLA and NSCN factions reflected the fluidity of militant alliances and rivalries. The continuing instability in Myanmar has significantly strengthened militant mobility and the availability of weapons in the border areas of Manipur, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh.
Arunachal Pradesh remained affected primarily through spillover insurgency from neighbouring States and militant activity concentrated in the Tirap-Changlang-Longding (TCL) region. The TCL Districts continued to function as a strategic corridor for insurgent groups operating across Nagaland, Assam and Myanmar. The most significant incident in the State occurred on March 26, 2026, when militants belonging to the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang-Yung Aung faction (NSCN-K-YA) killed three Assam Rifles personnel near the Indo-Myanmar border in Changlang District. The outfit claimed responsibility, describing the attack as retaliation against border fencing activities undertaken by the Government of India.
Earlier, on January 26, 2026, militants suspected to be associated with NSCN-K-YA attacked an Assam Rifles camp near Changlang District Headquarters while, on October 16, 2025, suspected NSCN-K-YA and United Liberation Front of Asom-Independent (ULFA-I) militants jointly attacked an Assam Rifles camp at Hatman village in Changlang District, injuring four personnel. Such incidents demonstrated the continuing operational cooperation between Naga insurgent factions and ULFA-I elements.
SATP recorded three fatalities (all SF personnel) in Arunachal Pradesh in 2026, all resulting from the March 26 attack. In 2025, seven fatalities (all militants) were recorded in four separate incidents. In 2024, a single militant fatality was recorded.
Despite sporadic militant attacks, SFs achieved several operational successes in Arunachal Pradesh. Militants belonging to ULFA-I and NSCN factions were arrested or neutralised in multiple operations, while surrender trends remained encouraging. In 2026, a total of nine militants [three NSCN-Khaplang (NSCN-K), two each from ULFA-I and NSCN-IM and one each from NSCN and NSCN-Reformation (NSCN-R)] surrendered before SFs in Tirap and Changlang Districts in nine separate incidents. In 2025, 12 militants surrendered in eight incidents, while four militants surrendered in three incidents in 2024. The State Home Department informed the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly on March 9, 2026, that a total of 165 underground operatives belonging to various militant groups had surrendered in the TCL region over the preceding five years. Among these, 77 surrendered in Longding, 47 in Tirap and 41 in Changlang.
However, extortion remained deeply entrenched in the region. On February 10, 2026, NSCN-K-YA reportedly issued extortion demands to the Public Works Department (PWD) in Longding District, demanding a 20 per cent “tax” on development funds. Militants also continued to engage in abductions linked to ransom and coercive taxation. In November 2025, NSCN-K militants abducted a businessman and an elected Panchayat representative from Tirap District and reportedly took them across the Myanmar border.
The broader Naga insurgency remained unresolved despite years of negotiations between the Government of India and NSCN-IM. Although Nagaland recorded relatively low levels of violence in recent years, the absence of a final political settlement continued to generate uncertainty. NSCN-IM persisted with its demands for a separate Naga flag and constitution, while maintaining armed influence across Nagaland and adjoining Naga-inhabited areas. The continued extension of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) in several Districts of Nagaland reflected the Government’s assessment that the security environment remained fragile.
Insurgency indicators in Nagaland remained at historically low levels during 2025 and early 2026. SATP data recorded no insurgency-related fatalities in 2025, compared to three fatalities in 2024, comprising two militants and one civilian. Militancy-linked arrests also declined from 20 militants arrested in 12 incidents in 2024 to 11 militants arrested in six incidents in 2025, while three ULFA-I militants were arrested in April 2026. Similarly, militant surrenders remained limited, with five militants surrendering in 2024, seven in 2025, and one in 2026, reflecting the continued contraction of active insurgent operations, growing factional fatigue, and the stabilising effect of prolonged ceasefire arrangements despite the absence of a final political settlement.
Assam sustained the substantial decline in insurgency-related violence achieved over the past decade. Fatalities remained in single digits in 2025 and 2026, underlining the weakening of traditional insurgent formations such as ULFA-I, KLO and NSCN factions. SATP‘s fatalities database recorded five insurgency-related deaths in Assam in 2025, comprising four militants and one civilian. This figure was identical to that recorded in 2024, when four persons – three militants and one civilian – were killed. However, the security scenario in Assam increasingly reflected evolving threats linked to Islamist extremism, transnational radical networks, ethnic tensions and narcotics trafficking.
On December 29, 2025, the Assam Police’s Special Task Force dismantled an Islamist extremist module linked to Imam Mahmuder Kafila (IMK), an offshoot of the Bangladesh-based Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), arresting 10 operatives from Barpeta, Chirang and Darrang Districts. Investigations revealed links with JMB, Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) and Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), highlighting the growing influence of transnational Islamist networks following political instability in Bangladesh.
The State also experienced serious ethnic and land-related unrest. On December 23, 2025, clashes erupted in West Karbi Anglong District over eviction demands from tribal belt lands, resulting in two deaths and injuries to dozens, including police personnel. The violence highlighted the persistence of unresolved identity and land disputes in Assam’s hill districts.
At the same time, Assam intensified efforts against narcotics trafficking and organised crime. Significantly, on January 1, 2026, Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma stated that narcotics valued at approximately INR 29.19 billion had been seized in Assam over the preceding five years. Seizures between 2021 and 2025 alone exceeded INR 29 billion, accompanied by more than 23,000 arrests in drug-related cases. In 2025, drugs worth INR 4.19 billion had been seized, compared to INR 6.59 billion in 2024 and INR 7.23 billion in 2023. A total of 20,265 cases were registered under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act from 2020 to 2025, with 4,453 arrests.
Mizoram remained free from insurgency-related violence, continuing one of the most successful peace trajectories in the North-East. The most significant development in the State was the signing of the Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) between the Mizoram Government and the Hmar People’s Convention-Democratic (HPC-D) on April 14, 2026, followed by the surrender of 43 HPC-D cadres on April 30, 2026. The agreement effectively marked the formal end of the last active insurgent movement in Mizoram and represented the culmination of a three-decade-long peace process centred on Hmar autonomy demands. The accord, signed at Sakawrdai in the Sinlung Hills Council area, included provisions relating to development, administrative support and cultural recognition, and was widely regarded as a landmark achievement in consolidating peace in the State. The surrender ceremony near Aizawl further reinforced Mizoram’s long-standing model of conflict resolution based on political negotiation, rehabilitation and reintegration rather than coercive elimination.
Nevertheless, despite the end of organised insurgency within the State, Mizoram increasingly emerged as a corridor for cross-border smuggling of arms, explosives and narcotics, particularly due to its proximity to Myanmar. Recoveries of weapons and ammunition continued to rise in recent years, reflecting the spillover impact of the conflict in Myanmar. According to SATP data, 12 such incidents were recorded in 2025, compared to 16 in 2024, 11 in 2023, and 13 in 2022. No such incident has been recorded in 2026 (data till May 9, 2026).
The State also continued to face pressures associated with refugee inflows from Myanmar’s Chin State. Clashes and military operations across the border repeatedly forced civilians to seek shelter in Mizoram, creating humanitarian and administrative challenges. As of March 2026, Mizoram was hosting around 32,000 Myanmar refugees, with periodic fresh influxes following renewed clashes in Chin State; for instance, fighting between rival Chin armed groups in July 2025 pushed nearly 4,000 refugees into the Champhai District within a few days. On March 2, 2026, Mizoram Home Minister K. Sapdanga said that 26,381 Myanmarese nationals seeking refuge in Mizoram had been biometrically identified as of February 5, 2026. Although Mizoram remained largely peaceful internally, the growing presence of cross-border networks involved in smuggling and trafficking remained a matter of concern for SFs.
Tripura sustained its status as one of the most peaceful States in the region, with no insurgency-related fatalities recorded through 2025 and early 2026. The September 2024 Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) with the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) consolidated the State’s long-running peace process. In 2025 and 2026, no fresh militant surrenders were officially reported, following the large-scale laying down of arms by 584 NLFT and ATTF cadres in September 2024. In March 2026, the Tripura Government informed the Legislative Assembly that a cumulative total of 1,254 militants had surrendered between April 1, 2023, and March 17, 2026. These included cadres from multiple factions of the NLFT and the ATTF, including 417 cadres of NLFT- Biswa Mohan (NLFT-BM), 394 of NLFT-Parimal Debbarma (NLFT-PD), 223 of NLFT-Original (NLFT-ORI), and 220 cadres of ATTF, collectively surrendering 147 weapons, including AK-series rifles and grenades, reflecting the continued consolidation of peace and demobilisation efforts in the State.
However, challenges relating to rehabilitation and reintegration persisted. Former militants repeatedly protested delays in financial assistance, housing benefits and withdrawal of criminal cases promised under rehabilitation schemes. In December 2025, members of the Tripura Guerrilla Returned Demand Committee blocked the Assam-Agartala National Highway at Baramura Hill Range for several hours, demanding the release of pending rehabilitation funds and implementation of assurances made under earlier surrender agreements. The protesters threatened a wider statewide blockade in February 2026 if their demands were not addressed. The agitation followed allegations that nearly INR 230 million earmarked for rehabilitation remained unused after the suspension of the scheme during the COVID-19 period.
Tripura also faced continuing cross-border challenges due to its long and porous border with Bangladesh. In 2025, the Border Security Force (BSF) reported significant enforcement activity along the Tripura frontier, including the detention of illegal immigrants – part of a broader trend in which at least 3,518 illegal migrants were apprehended in the State between 2022 and August 2025. According to data presented by Chief Minister Manik Saha in the State Assembly on September 23, 2025, this included 982 migrants in 2022 (965 Bangladeshis and 17 Rohingyas), 1,072 in 2023 (1,014 Bangladeshis and 58 Rohingyas), 1,007 in 2024 (947 Bangladeshis and 60 Rohingyas), and 406 up to August 2025 (390 Bangladeshis and 16 Rohingyas). In addition, a small number of other foreign nationals, including persons from Nigeria and France, were also detained for illegal entry. Of the total apprehended, 2,739 were subsequently pushed back to their respective countries. During early 2026, fresh cases of illegal infiltration, smuggling, and cross-border movement continued to be reported along the Indo-Bangladesh border.
Security agencies also detected emerging Islamist radicalisation networks linked to JMB and IMK. On December 30, 2025, a suspected IMK operative was arrested in West Tripura as part of a wider counter-terrorism operation coordinated with Assam Police.
Additionally, the recovery of drones near the India-Bangladesh border raised concerns regarding technological evolution in cross-border smuggling and reconnaissance activities. The arrests of cadres linked to the newly floated Tripura United National Front (TUNF) also indicated that residual militant tendencies had not entirely disappeared.
Meghalaya remained largely stable with no insurgency-related fatalities recorded since 2021. The decline of insurgent violence reflected sustained counter-insurgency operations and weakening of militant outfits such as the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA). Nevertheless, residual militancy persisted through the activities of the Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC), which continued to engage in extortion, propaganda and sporadic disruptive activities.
On December 15, 2025, an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) exploded at a private company in East Jaintia Hills District. Two HNLC Over Ground Workers were subsequently arrested in connection with the blast. SFs also intercepted attempts by regrouped militant factions to revive extortion networks in the Garo Hills region.
Meghalaya additionally experienced occasional law-and-order disturbances linked to political tensions and local grievances. In March 2026, clashes during the nomination process for elections to the Garo Hills Autonomous District Council resulted in the death of two persons in West Garo Hills District. Authorities imposed curfew and suspended internet services to contain the unrest.
Cross-border concerns also persisted in Meghalaya due to the porous border with Bangladesh. Smuggling of cattle, narcotics, Yaba tablets and contraband goods remained widespread. Security agencies continued to conduct anti-smuggling operations, while concerns persisted regarding the continued presence of HNLC leaders in Bangladesh. In 2025 alone, SFs confiscated over 750 heads of cattle and contraband worth about INR 117 million, including narcotics such as Yaba tablets and cannabis, during anti-smuggling operations. In addition, earlier enforcement actions recovered 11,435 Yaba tablets, more than 7,500 bottles of Phensedyl cough syrup and about 31 kilograms of cannabis, from the border region, underscoring the continuing use of the corridor for narcotics trafficking.
Across the North-East, the role of the AFSPA remained significant. AFSPA continued to be extended in sensitive areas of Manipur, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh and Assam, though with selective relaxations in some Districts reflecting gradual improvements in localised security conditions. Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram remained outside the purview of the Act.
Peace agreements and surrender policies continued to contribute positively to regional stability. The implementation of accords with ULFA-PTF in Assam, NLFT and ATTF in Tripura, the signing of MoS with HPC-D in Mizoram and the continuing engagement with Naga and Kuki groups represented important elements of the Government’s conflict management strategy. At the same time, delays in implementation and unresolved political demands threatened to undermine these gains.
The broader regional security environment was also increasingly influenced by developments in neighbouring countries, particularly Myanmar and Bangladesh. The continuing instability in Myanmar enabled militant groups to retain safe havens and access weapons across the Indo-Myanmar border. Simultaneously, political developments in Bangladesh generated concerns regarding the revival of Islamist extremist networks and cross-border radicalisation.
Overall, the North-East in 2026 remained considerably more stable than during the peak insurgency years of the 1990s and early 2000s. Fatalities remained low across all States, insurgent capacities had weakened substantially, and several States sustained long periods without major violence. However, the region continued to confront evolving and interconnected security challenges. Ethnic polarisation in Manipur, communal polarisation in Assam, unresolved Naga political demands, transnational militant linkages, narcotics trafficking, extortion economies and emerging Islamist extremist networks, all underscored the fragility of the prevailing peace.
The consolidation of long-term stability in the North-East depends not only on sustained security operations, but equally on credible political dialogue, effective implementation of peace accords, improved border management, economic development, and the restoration of trust among communities divided by decades of violence and competing identity-based aspirations.
