More than three years after Western governments expelled hundreds of Russian intelligence officers and imposed sweeping sanctions on Moscow following its invasion of Ukraine, Russian espionage networks have adapted and found new routes to obtain critical technology, according to an investigation by The New York Times.
The investigation reports that dozens of Russian spies removed from Western capitals have resurfaced in Japan, where officials say the combination of a powerful high-tech manufacturing sector and limited espionage laws has created opportunities for Russian intelligence operations. The country has become an important source of components that can support Russia’s military production, with Ukrainian government estimates indicating that around 90 percent of Russian missiles and drones contain Japanese-made parts.
At the centre of the alleged operation in Tokyo is a secretive Russian military intelligence unit known as the 20th Directorate. According to current and former officials from five Western intelligence agencies cited by The New York Times, the unit operates through officers posing as diplomats or businesspeople while seeking to acquire technology, equipment and components that Russia has struggled to obtain because of international restrictions.
The investigation identifies Maksim Vladimirovich Filchenkov as the individual overseeing the alleged Tokyo operation. Western intelligence officials told The New York Times that Filchenkov, a veteran officer of Russia’s military intelligence service, the GRU, maintains a cover identity as an employee of the Russian state airline Aeroflot. Officials said he has played a key role in efforts to obtain technology needed for Russia’s military campaign.
According to the investigation, Filchenkov arrived in Tokyo in February 2024 at a time when Russia was facing growing pressure to replace advanced foreign technology cut off by sanctions. As the war shifted increasingly toward drone warfare and precision weapons, Russian forces required access to advanced electronics, machine tools and other components previously supplied by international markets.
The New York Times reported that Filchenkov began developing relationships with Japanese logistics companies involved in shipments between Japan and Russia. Intelligence officials told the newspaper that such relationships can allow Russian intelligence officers to acquire sensitive goods through false documentation, indirect shipping routes and third-country transfers.
The alleged importance of Japan to Russia’s military supply chain became visible after Ukrainian investigators examined debris from Russian attacks. Following a Russian Kh-101 cruise missile strike that destroyed a residential building in Kyiv in May and killed at least 24 people, Ukrainian officials said they found Japanese components inside the weapon. The components, according to the Ukrainian assessment cited by The New York Times, were among items whose export to Russia had been restricted.
The investigation found that Ukrainian officials repeatedly raised concerns with Japan over the use of Japanese-made technology in Russian weapons. According to documents reviewed by The New York Times, Ukraine sent multiple diplomatic communications to Japanese authorities detailing recovered components, including circuit boards, transmitters and semiconductors manufactured by Japanese companies.
The documents identified parts linked to major Japanese manufacturers, including Nippon Electric Corp., Panasonic and Toshiba. The New York Times reported that there was no evidence the companies knowingly supplied Russia or violated export restrictions. The companies denied wrongdoing and said they complied with Japanese sanctions and trade regulations. Some said the identified components were older products that had not been sold by them for years.
The investigation also examined the role of logistics companies in moving goods through international routes. One company highlighted in the report was Proco Air, a Tokyo-based logistics firm that describes itself as a bridge between Japan and Russia. The company arranges cargo shipments through countries where Russian airline operations remain possible, including Sri Lanka and Uzbekistan.
Western intelligence officials told The New York Times that such networks can provide opportunities for Russian intelligence operations, although the newspaper noted that international shipping arrangements themselves are not illegal when used for permitted goods.
Proco Air owner Takehiko Miki denied knowingly assisting Russian intelligence or transporting restricted items. According to the investigation, Miki said his company only handles authorised shipments, including medical equipment and cosmetics, and that Japanese authorities had never contacted him about concerns regarding his business activities. Proco Air has not been charged with any wrongdoing.
The investigation also reported that one shipment document reviewed by The New York Times showed a March shipment of medical equipment to Russia through Sri Lanka. The document identified the recipient as R-Pharm, a Moscow pharmaceutical company whose founder, Aleksei Repik, has been sanctioned by Australia, Britain and Canada over his ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin, though not by Japan.
Japan has faced repeated warnings from foreign governments about attempts to bypass export restrictions, according to the investigation. Western officials have provided Japanese authorities with information about suspected networks involved in acquiring technology for Russia, including companies believed to have links to intelligence operations.
Despite those concerns, Japan has continued to support Ukraine and impose restrictions on Russia. The Japanese government said it has worked with international partners to ban exports of military-related goods to Moscow. Officials have also acknowledged the need to strengthen the country’s intelligence capabilities and address weaknesses created by decades of limited espionage legislation.
The New York Times reported that Japanese authorities have begun efforts to improve counterintelligence measures, including investigating cases involving suspected foreign intelligence activity. However, the investigation found that Russian intelligence officers continue to operate in Japan, highlighting the challenge facing Tokyo as it attempts to balance economic openness, national security and enforcement of international sanctions.
