by Luxman Aravind
The last week Trial-at-Bar judgment in the Easter Sunday criminal proceedings is far more than another judicial determination. It is a significant legal milestone that compels a reassessment of one of the most misunderstood aspects of the Easter Sunday attacks. It requires the country to distinguish between intelligence, operational policing and executive decision-making. For years, these separate responsibilities have been conflated in public discourse, giving rise to assumptions that have often found little support in the evidentiary record. The Court’s reasoning now provides an opportunity to restore that distinction.
For more than seven years, discussion surrounding the Easter Sunday attacks has been shaped by political contestation, speculation and competing theories about institutional failure. The State Intelligence Service became one of the principal targets of criticism, frequently portrayed as an organisation that had failed to warn the State of the impending attacks. The recent judgment does not support that proposition. Instead, it directs attention to the evidence placed before the Court and the institutional responsibilities assigned by law to each agency involved in the national security framework.
The evidentiary record accepted by the Court establishes a clear sequence of intelligence dissemination. On 8 April 2019, the State Intelligence Service disseminated intelligence received from a foreign counterpart through the Chief of National Intelligence, warning that Zahran Hashim and members of the National Thowheeth Jama’ath were planning imminent suicide attacks. The warning identified likely targets, outlined possible methods of attack and named several individuals believed to be connected to the operation. This was not a vague security assessment. It was specific intelligence intended to facilitate preventive action.
The intelligence picture became progressively more refined as additional information emerged. On 18 April, the Director of the State Intelligence Service communicated intelligence concerning the Thalankuda motorcycle explosion, an incident later regarded as part of the operational preparation for the attacks. On 20 April, the intelligence assessment had advanced considerably. The Defence Secretary was informed that a dry run had already been conducted, that suicide attacks were expected on or before 21 April and that churches together with hotels frequented by Indians were among the intended targets. During the morning of 21 April itself, the State Intelligence Service transmitted further intelligence indicating that the attacks were expected between 6.00 a.m. and 10.00 a.m., while informing the Defence Secretary that the Police had already been alerted.
This chronology is central to understanding the significance of the judgment. The Court did not proceed on the basis that intelligence had failed to reach the country’s senior decision-makers. Nor did it conclude that the intelligence services had withheld information or failed to communicate the warnings received from foreign counterparts. On the contrary, the Court accepted that the principal intelligence reports had reached the Defence Secretary through official channels, and it further observed that the authenticity and receipt of those communications were not disputed during the proceedings. The legal inquiry therefore focused on what followed after those warnings had been disseminated rather than whether they had been disseminated at all.
That distinction is neither technical nor incidental. It lies at the heart of any lawful national security architecture.
The statutory function of an intelligence service is to collect information, assess threats and disseminate intelligence to those vested with legal authority to respond. Intelligence organisations are designed to warn. They are not empowered to enforce. The State Intelligence Service possesses no statutory authority to arrest suspects, establish roadblocks, conduct criminal investigations, execute search warrants or direct police operations. Those powers belong to law enforcement agencies acting under statutory authority. Intelligence without executive action cannot prevent a terrorist attack. Equally, operational agencies cannot discharge their responsibilities unless intelligence reaches them in time. The effectiveness of the system therefore depends upon each institution performing its own legally defined role.
The judgment reinforces precisely this principle. It does not diminish the importance of intelligence. It demonstrates its value. The intelligence available before the attacks did not remain static but evolved into increasingly detailed operational assessments over a period of nearly two weeks. As the threat picture became clearer, the intelligence was correspondingly updated and disseminated through the established chain of command. The Court’s analysis therefore shifts attention away from the existence of intelligence towards the institutional response expected after its receipt.
This is perhaps the judgment’s most important contribution. For years, public debate has frequently centred on whether intelligence existed at all. The Court’s reasoning demonstrates that this is no longer the decisive legal question. The more fundamental issue is whether the intelligence, once received, resulted in timely operational measures by those entrusted with executive responsibility. That distinction has profound implications not only for legal accountability but also for the integrity of public discourse.
The judgment does not resolve every question surrounding the Easter Sunday attacks, nor does it purport to settle every allegation that has emerged since 2019. Courts are neither commissions of political inquiry nor forums for validating public narratives. Their constitutional function is to determine facts on the basis of admissible evidence subjected to judicial scrutiny. That discipline distinguishes judicial findings from public speculation. Allegations may shape political debate, but they cannot substitute for evidence.
This should serve as an important reminder as Sri Lanka continues to confront competing narratives surrounding the Easter Sunday attacks. Legitimate questions will continue to be asked, as they should in any constitutional democracy. Yet institutional accountability cannot be assigned on the basis of assumption, conjecture or repetition. It must remain anchored to statutory responsibility and evidence tested before the courts.
The recent judgment ultimately restores an important legal principle that had become obscured in public debate. National security is not the responsibility of a single institution. It is a coordinated legal framework in which intelligence agencies collect and disseminate information, law enforcement agencies investigate and exercise coercive powers, and executive authorities bear responsibility for directing and coordinating operational responses. Where one institution fulfils its statutory duty, responsibility necessarily shifts to those upon whom the law confers the power to act.
Like many other tragedies during the three decades of civil war and in the years that followed, the Easter Sunday attacks remain an immeasurable national tragedy. Nothing contained in any judgment can diminish the suffering endured by the victims and their families. Justice, however, requires precision as much as accountability. Institutions must be assessed according to the legal duties imposed upon them and the evidence placed before the courts, not according to assumptions shaped by years of public controversy. In that respect, the recent Trial-at-Bar judgment is indeed an eye-opener. It reminds the nation that the rule of law demands careful distinctions between intelligence and enforcement, between dissemination and execution, and above all between evidence and speculation.
